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ABSTRACT
The analysis of the system of speculative thought of Plato and Zoroaster, as found in
Plato's Timaeus and Zoroaster's Gathas, seeks to compare a well-known philosophy,
that of Plato, to a lesser known and often misunderstood system of speculative
thought within a religion, namely Zoroastrianism. The purpose of such a comparison
is to show that the speculative thought found in religion is often comparable to
philosophy, as is the case in the doctrines postulated in the Gathas. It serves to
illuminate the philosophy within a lesser known religion (Zoroastrianism) by
comparing it to a well-known philosophy (that of Plato), and in doing so, to cast new
light on both.
The comparison of Plato and Zoroaster has been proposed and sometimes executed by
other scholars as well. The main problem in these other comparisons, thus far, has
been the fact that no historical contact or definite doctrinal influence of Zoroaster on
Plato has been or is likely to be established. Though Plato might well have been
familiar with Zoroastrian doctrines, this cannot be satisfactorily proven. This study
does not depend on historical contact or doctrinal influence (though the possibility of
the latter has been discussed), but compares the two doctrines independent of
historical factors and is based solely on the striking similarities between these two
systems of thought.
This study has focussed on some of the basic concepts within the two doctrines, such
as creation, the soul, and dualism. In this study I have emphasised the philosophical
aspect of Zoroastrianism, though it is classified as a religion, because I believe that
much of what has been classified as religion also incorporates speculative thought that
can be analysed separately, and as a system of speculative thought it is comparable to
other traditions of speculative thought, such as Greek philosophy. This comparison
therefore seeks to counteract some of the assumptions about religions, and how they
are studied, by focusing on the philosophical basis underlying the doctrines in the
Zoroastrian religion.
Another aspect to the comparison is a focus on the similarities of doctrine originating
in two cultures previously held to be vastly different, namely Persian and Greek.
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There has previously been a tendency to consider the cultures of the classical and the
ancient Near Eastern world as separate and completely distinct from each other, and
in doing so, ignoring important historical contact. Although the historical interaction
between these two areas has received increased attention, comparative investigations
have emphasised the differences between the cultures of these regions, although
similarities do abound and the comparison of analogous aspects of the various
cultures could prove valuable to the study of the ancient world. Recognition of the
larger context within which the various cultures of the ancient world operated can
only add to the understanding of the ancient world, and pave the way for reassessing
the traditions and world-views of various cultures.
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OPSOMMING
Die analise van die spekulatiewe denkstelsels van Plato en Zoroaster, soos uitgelê in
Plato se Timaeus en Zoroaster se Gathas, beoog om 'n bekende filosofie te vergelyk
met 'n minder bekende en dikwels wangeïnterpreteerde spekulatiewe denkstelsel
binne 'n religie, naamlik Zoroastrisme. Die doel van so 'n vergelyking is om te
demonstreer dat die spekulatiewe denkstelsel wat binne 'n religie gevind kan word
dikwels vergelykbaar is met 'n filosofie, soos die geval is met die
leerstellings/denkstelsels wat uitgelê word in die Gathas. Dit dien om die filosofiese
binne 'n relatief onbekende religie (Zoroastrisme) uit te lig deur dit te vergelyk met 'n
bekende filosofie (dié van Plato), en in die proses is dit moontlik dat daar nuwe lig
gewerp kan word op albei.
Die vergelyking tussen Plato en Zoroaster is al deur verskeie academici voorgestel en
soms uitgevoer. Die hoofprobleem in al die vorige vergelykings is dat daar tot dusver
by Zoroaster geen historiese kontak met of invloed op die leerstellings van Plato
vasgestel kon word nie. Alhoewel Plato heel moontlik bekend kon gewees het met
Zoroaster se leerstellings, kan dit nie bo alle twyfel bewys word nie. Hierdie studie
voorveronderstel geen historiese kontak tussen of beïnvloeding deur die leerstellings
van Zoroaster en Plato nie (hoewel die moontlikheid van laasgenoemde bespreek
word). Dit is 'n vergelyking wat slegs gemotiveer is deur die treffende ooreenkomste
tussen hierdie twee denkstelsels.
My studie fokus op 'n aantal basiese konsepte binne die twee leerstellings, soos
skepping, die siel, en dualisme. Ten spyte van die feit dat Zoroastrisme as 'n religie
geklassifiseer word, word die filosofiese aspek van Zoroastrisme in hierdie studie
beklemtoon, want ek glo dat baie sisteme wat as religieë geklassifiseer word
spekulatiewe denke inkorporeer wat onafhanklik van die religie self as 'n
spekulatiewe denkstelsel soos filosofie geanaliseer kan word, en verder ook vergelyk
kan word met ander tradisies van spekulatiewe denkstelsels, soos die oud-Griekse
filosofie. Hierdie vergelyking poog om die aannames oor religieë, insluitend
aannames oor hoe religieë bestudeer moet word, teen te werk deur te fokus op die
onderliggende filosofiese basis in die leerstellings van Zoroastrisme.
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'n Ander aspek van die vergelyking is 'n fokus op die ooreenkomste tussen
leerstellings wat huloorsprong het in twee kulture (die Persiese en Griekse
onderskeidelik) wat voorheen as heeltemal uiteenlopend en verskillend beskou is, en
in die proses is die belangrike historiese kontak geïgnoreer. Alhoewel die historiese
interaksie tussen die twee areas toenemend aandag geniet, word die kulturele verskille
beklemtoon ten spyte van die feit dat daar veelvuldige ooreenkomste is en dat 'n
vergelyking van ooreenkomste tussen verskeie kulture baie waardevol kan wees vir
die studie van die antieke wêreld. 'n Waardering van die wyer konteks waarbinne die
verskeie kulture van die antieke wêreld gefunksioneer het, kan net bydra tot 'n beter
begrip van die antieke wêreld en die weg baan vir 'n herevaluering van die tradisies
en wêreldbeskouings van die betrokke kulture.
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1CHAPTER 1 - METHODOLOGY
1. Hypothesis
Many scholars have noted that various concepts in the writings of Plato and Zoroaster
are comparable and some have attempted an analysis of these comparable aspects in
their doctrines. Previous comparisons between Plato and Zoroaster have tended to fall
into two categories, firstly those who seek to deny any similarity between the two
philosophers, and secondly those who wish to overemphasize the possible influence
Zoroaster (or Zoroastrianism) had on Plato's philosophy, or vice versa. One of the
main problems in such a comparison is the lack of evidence for historical contact and
influence.
This study seeks to approach a comparison of the doctrines of Plato and Zoroaster on
the basis of the similarity in their thought, independent of a historical context, because
of the premise that all human minds, and therefore all human thinking, operate on the
same basis, and a comparison of human thought that transcends time and space
contexts is therefore possible. This study does not ignore the individual environment
of each philosopher and the influence it exerted on their philosophies, but nevertheless
it does not rely on a premise of contact or influence.
The respective doctrines of Plato and Zoroaster are systems of thought that
incorporate both philosophical and religious elements. The emphasis in this study
will be placed on the philosophical aspects of the two doctrines, though the religious
aspects are not excluded owing to perceived problems with methodology' and
epistemology concerning religion. The purpose of the comparison is to facilitate a
better understanding of the system of speculative thought underlying Zoroastrianism
by comparing it to Plato's philosophy, which is better known, and in doing so, re-
evaluate the philosophy of Plato itself. The main focus will be on Zoroastrianism, for
the very reason that Plato's philosophy is better known and has been thoroughly
analysed by various scholars.
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22. Methodology defined
Methodology, as it follows on a statement of intention, is essentially a statement of
the validity of the method employed to accomplish this intention and the reason for
employing this method. Therefore, firstly, the aims of the various methods that could
be employed in this study, and their validity, will be discussed. Secondly, one method
is often a reaction to previous methods, and these will be mentioned as influencing
factors. Thirdly, a working method which is consonant with the intention of the study
will be suggested and elaborated on, discussing its validity and the reason for its
employment.
The basic problems in the field of epistemology and methodology, according to Deist
& Le Roux (1987:11-19), may be presented as follows:
• firstly, the question whether certain knowledge is possible;
• secondly, the opposition between the human and the natural sciences;
• thirdly, defining 'man' as primarily spiritual, natural/material or rational (further
implications of any of these would be the question of what laws govern, what
patterns are observable in, or what determination of future or reconstruction of
past events is detectable in 'man's' behaviour);
• fourthly, which approach to adopt in studying 'man', his behaviour and his
history, for instance objective or subjective, general or specific;
• fifthly, whether the study of history is valid/useful/possible.
To add to Deist and Le Roux's list, I would like to mention some other important
factors, such as the influence exerted on methodological interpretation by the current
situation (e.g. political, economic, religious, and so forth), as can be seen in
Naturalism or Marxism, for example. Current trends in methodology are also
influenced by previous methodologies and are often shaped solely as a reaction to
their predecessors. The elements that are retained should also be noted.
The methods that could be used in the study of Zoroastrian religion pertain to both the
study of religion and the study of history. The various schools of thought within these
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fields, including the approaches that will be employed and those that will be rejected,
will be discussed briefly.
3. Methodology in the study of religion
3.1. Problems in defining religion
More problems are encountered when defining the phenomenon of religion than in
defining any other cultural domain. The main problem is the fact that most cultural-
anthropological definitions are unacceptable to the people who actually experience the
phenomenon of religion 'spiritually' (or subjectively/emotionally). There seems to be
a pervasive attempt to reconcile specific definitions (e.g. scientific, anthropological,
psychological and so forth) with the definitions of the actual practitioners of religion.
This constant attempt at accommodation is not present in the study of other cultural
systems in which the findings are not invalidated by the question of whether or not the
participants agree with the findings. But even within the attempts of the social
sciences to define religion there is dissension. I shall discuss the definitions and
delineations of religion by Geertz, King and Selby consecutively.
Geertz (1979:79-80) pays special attention to religious symbolism as a vehicle for the
cultural conceptualisations of the world and man's place in it. He defines religion as:
".a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods
and motivations in men by formulating a conception of a general order of existence and
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations
seem uniquely realistic."
This definition could apply to all emotive and propagandistic phenomena, such as
patriotism, and ignores the speculative tradition within (or underlying) religion.
According to Geertz (1979:81), religion is both a model of 'reality' and a model for
'reality', thus being an ideal of reality as the culture represents its physical
incarnation, but also an ideal for reality as the culture should function by religious
dictates. Geertz (1979:82-83) also touches on the theme of chaos vs. order in the
universe, and man's fear of chaos, which is manifested when situations cannot be
interpreted, cause suffering, or pose a moral dilemma and push man's cognitive
3
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4analytical capacities, his powers of endurance, and his moral integrity and insights
beyond their limits. Religion thus recognises the "inescapability of ignorance, pain
and injustice" in the human experience, but simultaneously denies that these problems
or "irrationalities" are the status quo of existence (Geertz 1979:84-85). Geertz
(1979:89) finally sums up his anthropological approach as necessitating the
elucidation of the relation of systems of meaning (embodied in symbols) to structural
and psychological processes in society.
It is perhaps a case of two opposing views: one in which society forms religion and is
thus reflected in it owing to its authorship, vs. the other in which religion, in tum, is
the basis of society and society thus conforms to religious dictates. It is a case of the
chicken or the egg, depending on perspective. In terms of religion, society can thus
be seen as either the shaper or that which is shaped.
Geertz (1979:83) also includes among the chaotic experiences dilemmas that "push
man's cognitive capacities.beyond their limits", e.g. problems that cannot be simply
observed or inferred. This would necessarily lead to speculation and it could well be
that the system for attaining and offering explanations of chaos and assigning
meaning to existence, or to structural and psychological processes in society, is a
speculative system like philosophy. There are many similarities between the
speculative thought found in philosophical and religious systems, and it would appear
that the speculative thought of either system could be profitably compared to the
other.
King (1987:282-283) focuses on the incongruities that anse from an attempt to
describe and define religion from a "Western theistic dichotomous" point of view and
identifies various problems: firstly, the assumptions of theism permeate linguistic
structures that shape Western thought; secondly, it is not certain whether its criteria
are applicable for what should be seen as religious/sacred or profane, nor if this
distinction is applicable in all instances; thirdly, defining that which is seen as the
source for religion, bearing in mind the differences between theism, universalism,
etc., is a point of contention; fourthly, there are problems that arise from trying to
define a religious community, for example the geographic togetherness of a
synagogue vs. the cuItic togetherness of a tribal society.
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These problems of categorisation also affect systems which are analogous to the
'Western theistic dichotomy', but still suffer from inadequate elucidation - for
example Zoroastrianism, a tradition which has been grossly misunderstood by many
scholars and which has only recently been viewed as even analogous to other religions
of the western tradition, despite its obvious influence on Judaism, Christianity and
Islam. Some scholars believe that aspects vital to Zoroastrianism, such as the Amesha
Spentas, are still not understood adequately.
There is also a problem concerning the accuracy and acceptability of a definition of
religion; consensus between those who study it and those who participate in it is rare.
There is always a social, historical, economic, geographical and cultural context
within which religion operates, and within the same scientific-humanist context of the
social science factors mentioned, a psychological aspect, which deals with the
mechanisms and motivational forces resulting from human self-consciousness and
which stresses experiential inwardness, is also encountered (King 1987:284).
This problem is not encountered in any other cultural domain, such as economy,
where the study of Marxism is not solely dependent on whether inferences about the
system would be approved of by a Marxist. I believe this approach of extreme
accommodation is a false paradigm for the study of religion, as the believers' points
of view should form only part of the analysis, not dictate the conclusion. The social
science factors mentioned, such as the psychological factors in the religious beliefs of
a culture, are very interesting and illuminating to the question of religion, but would
perhaps be more so if the believers' points of view were more critically analysed.
Attempts have been made to avoid the 'reductionism' present in the sociological and
psychological disciplines that reduce religion to its component factors. One such
approach is the analysis of religions of a varied nature in terms of the presence of an
awareness of the sacred or holy, often seen as awe, or a blend of "fear and
fascination", as described by the Hebrew prophets of the Old Testament (King
1987:284). Such an attempt, however, ignores the absence of fascination in favour of
fear in 'primitive' religions, as well as the practically non-existent awareness of a
radically 'Other' or 'Ultimate Being' in favour of man's oneness with his 'environing'
universe in Asian religions (King 1987:284).
5
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Selby (1981: 129), in turn, focuses on the function of religion and describes religion in
human life as:
".made up of those aspects of the life situation to which humans cannot remain indifferent or
cannot evade and which they cannot control or adjust to through the ordinary techniques and
attitudes of practical utilitarian life".
This implies that religion is that which man cannot grasp or fully conceptualise and
act upon. Religion can, however, be viewed as that which man has attempted to grasp
and interpret, otherwise it would amount to no more than an amorphous mass of fears
and hopes.
Selby (1981: 129) also argues that the most striking of all events, and one that no
human can evade, is his/her own death. Although I have reservations regarding the
tenability of most of Selby's anthropological substantiations owing to their
oversimplification, I concur with his view of the importance of uncontrollable
experiences, such as death and the unknowable that follows, which prompt religious
beliefs as well as philosophical issues, and is thus a paramount concern in terms of
speculation. This concern with the finality of death vs. the immortality of (at least)
the spiritual aspect of man may manifest itself in many forms in different cultures.
Such beliefs include malignant or benign forefather spirits of the dead regulating
current societal welfare, a religious expression of a psychological desire to 'live
forever', a genetic need for survival expressed in the spiritual by belief in the
perpetuation of the soul, or a cultural regulation of order relying on the religious
sanction of behavioural codes and mores or reflecting a divinely preordained order.
Thus, not only is the definition of religion fraught with problems, but the function of
religion in a cultural system is also as complex as the definition itself. There is no
aspect of culture where religion does not come into play, either as an influence on or
as a reflection of cultural systems. It is not only present in political systems as
divinely sanctioned authority and victories, but it also has a role in shaping how
history is viewed and written. There is also an economic involvement, as the church
was often a great landowner and provider of jobs, as well as an intermediary between
God and man for successful crops. The formulations of justice and laws, morality,
stratification, ethos and morale in a society all owe a great debt to its religion. Also,
culture reflects religion, and its accomplishments have often been greatly influenced
6
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7and even prompted by religion, as seen in art, architecture, literature, music, and so
forth.
Religion permeates all cultural domains, but as a cultural domain itself it is no
different from any other cultural domain, such as politics or economy. Cultural
domains are necessarily interrelated, and form a unified whole not because they are
the sum of the cultural domains that make up the culture as a whole, but because they
are connected and related. Religion is but another aspect of the web which is culture,
and it is no more nor less intertwined than any of the other domains. This is why
religion cannot be ignored in this study, but one aspect of it will be emphasised,
namely the speculative aspect or philosophy within religion. Since religion is
inescapable in this particular analysis, not only because the Gathas are religious texts
but also because religion is important for the study of many aspects of culture in
general, I shall briefly discuss the methodological approaches used to study religion as
well as the aspects of these methods that will be employed.
3.2. Methodological approaches
3.2.1. Comparative Religion
Comparative Religion is synonymous with 'The Science of Religion' and is centred
on the application of a comparative method of analysis of the data provided by the
study of different religions, wherein each religion is placed within a general scheme
of progress, development, evolution, and value (Sharpe 1987:578). Evolutionism was
the main inspirational theory behind Comparative Religion, and what would otherwise
have been a positive step forward for the study of both religion and evolution, became
a categorisation based on judgements of religions as, for instance, 'inferior',
'primitive' or 'superior'. Ideally, however, it was a cultural-historical comparison of
the various religions in terms of religious development.
Evolutionism contended mainly with the theory of diffusion, which was historically
evidenced by documented contact (through trade, conquest, missionary activities,
etc.), but difficult to trace prehistorically (Sharpe 1987:579). The 'Myth and Ritual
School' of the 1930's, however, concentrated on the theory of diffusion, discussed
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below. After World War I, the Evolutionism that had hitherto shaped Comparative
Religion fell from favour, and although the term 'Comparative Religion' was still in
use, the subject splintered into various related approaches which focussed on specific
aspects of society, such as history, sociology, psychology, phenomenology, etc.
(Sharpe 1987:579).
What has been taken from this approach is the comparison of religions, although the
Evolutionism approach has been discarded. Yet Evolutionism has not been altogether
abandoned, as inherent value judgements are reflected in, for instance, the reluctance
to view religion as anything but a subjective experience by the 'believer', which can
only be described instead of treating it as another aspect or cultural domain,
interacting with and being acted upon by other cultural domains. It is no longer
overtly stated that Evolutionism is applied to religions, but it is often applied in the
process of comparison.
3.2.2. The Myth and Ritual school
The Myth and Ritual School arose partly as a reaction to the Evolutionism approach
to the study of ancient religions and partly as result of a growing recognition of the
importance of ritual acts and of the accompanying texts or myths in ancient religions,
which were, according to the Myth and Ritual School, "at the heart of an ancient
society's self-understanding" (Harrelson 1987:282). The Myth and Ritual School not
only offered substantial criticism of the perspectives Evolutionism employed in,
amongst others, Comparative Religion, and continually stressed the need to regard the
actual practices of a religion as seriously as its religious ideas and literary heritage,
but the Myth and Ritual School also did much to replace the criticised comparative
approach with a new method of comparison (Harrelson 1987:284).
The accent on the importance of the non-literary tradition within religion has been
incorporated in the study of religions, and Boyce is one scholar who has incorporated
ancient and modem religious practices and ritual texts in her studies as aids to the
examination of religious texts. Although the Myth and Ritual school was a reaction
against Evolutionism, evolution does come into play when non-literary aspects are
studied, especially when it is an anthropologically based study of present practices to
8
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illuminate their ancient equivalents. Evolution must be taken into account in these
instances because change has taken place in religious traditions (e.g. they have
evolved, as cultures do). Yet it is often not fully recognised that change takes place in
any given tradition, and that the modem and the ancient data should be examined with
this variable of difference and evolution in mind.
3.2.3. The History of Religions
The discipline of the History of Religions is characterised, according to Bianchi
(1987 :400), by empirical method and an ongoing historical investigation which is the
result of "the dialectical relationship that exists between the object of study and its
methods of research". These methods are "inductive and intended to grasp religion in
its concreteness, in its historical creativity, and in its meaningfulness for the cultural,
social, and individual lives with which it is interwoven" (Bianchi 1987:400). This
approach to the history of religions is also often contrasted with that of other
disciplines, such as the hermeneutical or phenomenological approach (Bianchi
1987:400).
The phenomenological approach attempts to extract the meanmg of religious
phenomena without "committing itself to an analysis of the historical, cultural, social,
geographical and psychological settings of those phenomena and thus neglects the
diachronic, formative processes of a religious phenomenon"; the sequence of change
and development, of evolution and revolution, is therefore ignored (Bianchi
1987:400). The a-historical nature of this method, though useful and often very
enlightening, is only meaningful within the context of a larger framework of
methodological approaches that take the dynamic influence oftime into account.
The History of Religions approach necessarily regards religion as a historical
phenomenon, but Bianchi (1987:400) notes that religion is not reduced to a historical
phenomenon only, as is the case with Historicism. Historicism opposes the
phenomenological approach, according to Bianchi (1987:400), because it criticises the
inadequacy of countering "the historical reductionism with an appeal to the
irreducible character of religion as perceived by the subjective, experiential sensitivity
of the phenomenologist". Bianchi (1987:400) believes that in both cases there is "an
9
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illegitimate appeal to an a priori conception of religion" which is incompatible with
the positive, inductive, comparative-historical approach of History of Religions and
its dialectic between tentative interpretation and current research.
The search for universal definitions and approaches can lead to a priori reductionism,
and the History of Religions approach necessitates an 'analogical', as opposed to a
'univocal', method, stressing the importance of an ongoing dialectic that takes into
account both what is interpreted and the possible reasons for such an interpretation
(Bianchi 1987:400-402). A historical typology of religion therefore attempts to "map
specific sets of analogically related affinities that are not merely conceptual or
phenomenological but historical", carefully avoiding isolated classificatory and
analytical observations on the one hand, and subjective and selective intuition on the
other, both of which have proved ethnocentric and reductionist (Bianchi 1987:404).
This dialectic approach is more informative in a historical context than it is
problematic, as it recognises both the changing record of history and the changing
interpretation of it, and the approach could be valid for the study of the history of
philosophy as well as religion. An example of such an approach would be to study
the 'analogically related affinity' between the philosophies of Plato and Zoroaster, as I
shall attempt, with the added advantage of conforming the method of study to the
preferred method of Plato himself, namely dialectic. The historical aspect of the
approach will only be employed to take cogniscance of the historical context within
which Plato and Zoroaster functioned, however, not to analyse any possibility of
historical contact.
3.2.4. Phenomenology of Religion
Yet another approach, mentioned already, is the Phenomenology of Religion. In the
term phenomenology (from the Greek word phainomenon - "that which shows itself')
scientists usually emphasise the descriptive rather than the explanatory, according to
Allen (1987 :273), and in the Phenomenology of Religion this emphasis on describing
(rather than explaining) the nature of religious phenomena is also adhered to. This is
an example of non-philosophical phenomenology, but the term is mainly associated
with philosophical phenomenology and identified with philosophers such as Hegel
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and Kant (Allen 1987:273). Kant specifically accentuated "phenomena" as data of
experience, data which appear to, or are formulated by our minds, and believed these
phenomena could therefore be studied with the mind, i.e. rationally, scientifically and
objectively (Allen 1987:273). Philosophical phenomenology differs substantially from
religious phenomenology, but there are some characteristics of philosophical
phenomenology that have influenced religious phenomenology extensively, and have
particular relevance to the Phenomenology of Religion. I shall list and critically
discuss these influences on the Phenomenology of Religion below:
1. Its "descriptive nature" is marked by a dismissal of philosophical theories and
concepts in favour of an employment of direct intuition and description of the
phenomena as they appear in immediate experience (Allen 1987:274). This,
of course, is highly subjective and, although it denounces preconceived ideas,
ignores the presence of 'outside' influences (cultural, psychological, etc.) and
the inevitable shaping of or dictating to the construction of results by the
observer as well as the observed, because of preconceived ideas.
11. Its "opposition to reductionism" attempts to counteract the oversimplification
of traditional empiricism and other forms of reductionism, and aims to deal
with phenomena "as phenomena" and in this way to become aware of what
they "reveal in their full intentionality" (Allen 1987:274-275). Yet in this aim
they practise their own form of reductionism by reducing religious phenomena
to just an experience and a description, ignoring phenomena such as origin,
change, application and, most importantly, different interpretations and
insights.
111. Its "intentionality", which refers to the property of all consciousness as
consciousness of something, because a subject "intends" an object, is a way of
describing how consciousness constitutes phenomena (Allen 1987:275). Here,
to some degree, many phenomenologists fall into the trap of reducing the
"meaning': of religion to that which is a construct of the minds that seek (or
will) its meaning. It is not clear whether this is considered contrary to their
approach to religion. It is certainly contrary to their aim of empathy and
sympathy for the religious phenomena studied, as many religions assume that
the ultimate and essential "meaning" of their religion cannot be fully grasped,
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and almost all would object to the interpretation that religious phenomena are
exclusively dictated by intentionality.
IV. Its "bracketing", or an anti-reductionist insistence on the irreducability of
intentional immediate experience, entails the phenomenological epoche (the
Greek word for "abstention from or suspension of judgement"), and its goal is
to free the phenomenologist from unexamined presuppositions, or of rendering
explicit and clarifying presuppositions (Allen 1987:275). Sadly, these
presuppositions are an integral part of any theory, and are often ignored,
mostly because they are not obvious. Thus, their examination is an essential
aspect of a successful theory, and their complete avoidance is impossible.
This is where history is valuable, as presuppositions and their influence on
observations are often clarified (and are often informative) in retrospect.
v. Its "eidetic vision" (from the Greek word "eidos"), which Husser} adopted
from the Platonic word designating "universal essences", is based on the
assumption that such essences express the "whatness" of things, the
"necessary and invariant features of phenomena" that allow the observers to
recognise them as phenomena of a certain type (Allen 1987:275). Yet the rest
of the meaning that Plato ascribed to eidos entails its unattainability, owing to
the constraints on and imperfections of human observation and representation.
It is therefore possible to experience the eidos/essence of something in its
actual state, but even in this unlikely event it will be impossible to describe or
express it accurately. Here we return to the fallibility of a subjective-
descriptive rendering of a controversial subject which ignores the influences
and contexts of both the subject and the observer. This approach thus falls
into a sort of nihilism as regards epistemology.
Of the five characteristics mentioned above, "intentionality" and "bracketing" have
not been accepted by all phenomenologists, but the majority of phenomenologists
support a descriptive phenomenology which is anti-reductionist and which involves
insight into essential structures (Allen 1987:275).
Though Phenomenology of Religion has made another attempt at combatting
reductionism, it has failed by perpetuating its own reductionism in that it focuses on
description and precludes analysis. It also fails to take into account the various factors
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that influence and are influenced by religion. Zoroastrianism, if it is to be described
phenomenologically, could not be said to be a reaction against paganism in Iran, nor
could it be described as anything but an experience which revealed itself to one
individual (Zoroaster). This experience has been perpetuated by all the other
Zoroastrians by proxy through the doctrines Zoroaster propounded rather than through
their own personal experience.
It is difficult to separate one approach to the study of religion from another in terms of
which is right or wrong - mainly because they overlap to a great extent, but also
because they are all in some way inadequate. No approach is (or can ever be) perfect,
but no approach must be dismissed. There are some common problems which could
prove valuable in highlighting certain criteria for an adequate approach:
1. Objective vs. subjective observation, which is obviously currently lacking in
synthesis and mutual recognition, is a problem that needs to be addressed.
Il. Reductionism, which will always be present and which is unavoidable,
whether overtly/intentionally or covertly/unintentionally, must be studied and
there must be a constant and ongoing awareness of the danger of reductionism
in any research. It would be better if, given such a preliminary awareness, it
were determined as "specific" rather than "reductive".
Ill. Influences, of any kind, on both theorist and subject are still under-
emphasised, be they cultural, social, historical, political, psychological or
geographical. These must be analysed, as much as reductionism should be
checked and analysed.
IV. Empathetic understanding of all and even seemingly insignificant aspects or
elements associated with any religion, has been greatly neglected. Though the
Myth and Ritual School tried to rectify the situation by attempting to reinstate
myths and rituals to their proper and equal importance, they also failed to see
that every element is as cardinally important, if not as prominent, as the next.
Furthermore, although Evolutionism was discarded after the First World War, I do not
see sense in discarding the theory of evolution as well, as the two are completely
different terms and concepts, although related. Evolution has been interpreted as a
process of changing or evolving from "primitive" or "rudimentary" to "advanced" or
l3
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"complex", and was applied to the study of religion in terms of derogatory
marginalisation of non-western religions. This interpretation of a linear progression
and improvement is a misinterpretation of what evolution is. Evolution is merely the
process of continual change and adaptation (not necessarily to something better, or
there would be no extinction). Adaptation happens because of changing
circumstances and is therefore adaptation to external forces and internal needs (which
are both interrelated and mutually affected).
Nothing, however, happens or can be understood without the application of change in
external forces or internal needs. Therefore, to treat something as a completely
separate and thereby intelligible phenomenon, is impossible without acknowledging
other factors. I concur with Kant's view on the possibility of rationally understanding
all phenomena by means of objective scientific observation, but also concur with his
theory on the individual and the community. In the latter he postulates that everything
is in perpetual community with other things and is affected by them. Thus nothing is
beyond influence.
Evolution of traditions is taken into account, not only in the shaping of both systems
of philosophy (Plato's and Zoroaster's), but also in the later tradition of
Zoroastrianism (as well as Platonism, though this will not be discussed). Where the
data are sufficient (as, possibly, in Plato's case) one could attempt an investigation
into possible individual evolution (which certainly happened, but which must be
discovered in the text, if possible), though this is largely beyond the scope of this
study.
3.3. Conclusion
What can be gained from these methodologies will be applied, as I have indicated
above, but my purpose is specifically to interpret the Zoroastrian religion according to
its speculative basis (as thought out by Zoroaster and as seen in the Gathas). The
philosophical system inherent in this religion is not overtly stated, however, but must
be gleaned from the Gathas as the a priori philosophical structure on which the
religious text was based, and which can be seen reflected in the religious views held
on topics such as cosmology, dualism and metaphysics.
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Religion and philosophy are related, hence the field 'Philosophy of Religion'; but this
is a modem movement within philosophy, and no attempt has yet been made (to my
knowledge) to study whether the ancients had a similar philosophical field. It may
even have been a religion of philosophy instead of a philosophy of religion. But it is
often not acknowledged that the study of religion does have a speculative component,
both in religion itself and in the method of studying it.
The question remains, however, whether or not religion has a cognitive component.
Religion comes from a system of beliefs centred around that about which man is
uncertain, and it should therefore by logical inference be a field in which thinking
predominates, for there is nothing like the seemingly inexplicable to fascinate the
human intellect. An unthinking and accepting tradition within religion exists,
however, and has been placed at the very core of our thinking about religion. This has
led to the emphasis being placed on belief and experience as paramount, and
speculative traditions within religion being misinterpreted, if they have been
interpreted at all, according to this emphasis on belief, which is an incorrect criterion
to use for speculation if it is to be seen as axial to such a study.
Even if religion does not have a cognitive component, nothing prevents us from
thinking about it, from any point of departure, for if people can study religion on the
assumption that it is all a Divine Truth, and others can equally legitimately study it on
the grounds that God does not exist and that religion is the 'opiate of the masses',
keeping people repressed under a detrimental economic status quo, then one can study
religion as if it were a philosophy.
Therefore, although religion is an aspect of this study, the methodological approaches
generally employed to study it form an inadequate basis, given the reasons above, and
can only be used secondarily, when questions pertaining to the religious domain are
analysed. Another method should therefore be sought as primary to this study. Two
related movements in the study of history partially satisfy the need for a broader
methodology: Historicism, and Neo-Historicism or Narrativism.
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4. Methodology in the study of history
4.1. Historicism
Historicism drew from preVIOUS and contemporaneous sources of method to
substantiate its approach. Deist (1993 :385) notes that it accepted that established
methods of dating and classification had to be employed in the analysis of historical
documents, it viewed the human mind as the only instrument capable of grasping with
coherence the complexities of human experience (of whatever date - present or past),
in accordance with Vico's argument, and it viewed individual cultures as monads,
based on Leibniz's theory.
Historicism further believed that, in order to obtain access to the essential nature of a
cultural monad, one has to immerse oneself to the point of mental transference to that
time and place, tuiting the unifying idea/essential nature of the culture and thereby to
understand it 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' (Deist 1993 :385). This was hermeneutically
possible, according to Deist (1993:386), because Dilthey substituted 'historical
reason' for Kant's 'critical reason', having elaborated on Schleiermacher's idea of a
'substratum of general human nature', which incorporated Hegel's idea of the
historicity of thought, and which underpinned the possibility of a communication of
ideas across space and time.
The link between past and present is therefore mental, for Deist (1993:386) argues
that the nature of human experience and expression is universal and the motivations
for actions in the past would be comprehensible in the present through a rational
'reconstruction' (a term coined by Dilthey) or 're-enactment' (Collingwood's term).
Deist (1993:386) further points out that there is no way to be certain if the historicist's
interpretation or reconstruction/re-enactment of the past resembled the past at all, as it
is quite possible that historical subjects might have employed a logic very different
from the historicist's.
The ontological implication of this theory is very valuable, however, especially in
artefact analysis. Working from the premise that interpretation is not a function of the
human mind but a condition of human existence, Deist (1993:387) argues that one
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should regard objects from a culture not as static and isolated objects in need of
interpretation, but as expressions of interpretation (by the ancients themselves). Two
such examples of interpretation are Plato's Timaeus and Zoroaster's Gathas. The
validity of a current comprehension of these works (according to the above-mentioned
premise of the human mind as 'substratum of general human nature') is also the
validation of a comparison between the two, as they too embody the workings of the
mind within this 'substratum'. The mental link between past and present is also a link
with the future; and present interpretation, like past interpretation, is therefore part of
an ongoing dialectical process of history. This dialectical process was seen as a
narrative by Neo-Historicism, which I shall discuss below.
The scientific explanations that Historicism employed were derived from a positivist
method, namely Popper & Hempel's Covering Law Model (Deist 1993:388), a
formula for describing actions and reactions (given certain factors) in history via
mathematical equations, functioning like statistics to predict an outcome (or the
preceding factors). The Covering Law Model failed to secure a scientific status of
reliable predictability, however, and Deist (1993 :390) argues that it possibly failed on
account of the lack of information input in relation to such a simplified system, or
because of the large margin of possible error. The other possible cause for failure is
that too many variables cannot be accounted for. This ties in directly with the
Romanticist argument for the unpredictability of human behaviour as a result of free
will, thereby introducing such incalculable variables. At best the attempt at a
Covering Law Model was an illustration of statistical probability factors.
4.2. NarrativismlNeo-Historicism
Deist (1993 :390) notes that Neo-Historicism had the same premise as Historicism,
that of endorsing empirically ascertained and 'reliable' facts, but that it utilised these
facts in a narrative. Essentially this would be a partially creative construct of the
narratorlhistorian's mind working the 'facts', according to Deist (1993:390), into
possible scenarios while accentuating the strangeness of the other culture as
experienced by the narrators/historians submerging themselves in the scene. An
important factor is that neo-historicists do not treat the 'understanding of the past' as a
passive re-enactment of the gist of the ancient cultures, but their point of departure is
17
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also an attempt at understanding the past "from within" (Deist 1993:390-391). They
thereby recognise the historians' preconceptions, biases and prejudices which may
influence their interpretation and selection of foci, or rather their "construction" of
coherence among the facts about the past (Deist 1993:391). To this one could add
taking cognisance of the biases, motives and prejudices of the ancient authors
themselves.
The method employed for establishing coherence from the disparate items within the
record is also significant. Deist (1993:391) distinguished three ways in which this is
achieved: firstly, items may be categorised philosophically, according to their
'essence' or 'nature'; secondly, they may be classified scientifically, with reference to
general laws and theories; and thirdly, they may be ordered configurationally, with
reference to the context of their occurrence, also referred to as their 'configurational
coherence'. Deist (1993:391) further notes that it is therefore the historian's duty to
assign to the disparate items or 'facts' in the record a place and function within the
"complicated network of inter-connected events". The establishment of such a
'configurational coherence' necessitates the use of 'synoptic judgement' on the part of
the historian, who must construct a logical framework within which to assign
appropriate functions to the facts for the particular situation (Deist 1993 :391).
This raises the problem of how to assign 'importance' to the factors involved. Deist
(1993:392) argues that, in this context, "the significance of a particular incident is thus
dependent not on its 'inherent meaning' or the 'intention of the actors', but on the
place and function assigned to it by the historical narrative", and notes that Dray
refers to this process as the 'history-constituting act of selection' or the 'explanation-
injecting feature of narrative construction'. The Covering Law Model (or its
'probabilistic reformulation') is also employed to assist in, or is a 'handy heuristic
tool' for the recognition of events as significant or important 'facts', since a covering
law developed from the observation of human behaviour (by the study of, for
instance, psychology, sociology or anthropology) could enhance the historian's
synoptic judgement and the validity of the interpretation or even suggest "colligatory
concepts" for the construction of narratives spanning a large amount of time and
therefore significant change (Deist 1993:393).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19
. The approach here is essentially the coherence approach, as opposed to the
correspondence approach (Renfrew & Bahn 1994:432). The coherence approach,
however, is not very impartial and is inclined to gross selection of facets to be
accounted for, rather than forcing the historian to approach all the data collectively
and holistically, thereby taking into account all the facets (configurationally coherent
or not). There is no doubt that this selection of facts will tell much as (and if) it
surfaces in the archaeological record later. It can never be regarded as indisputable
fact, however, because it so blatantly emphasises the creative process of the narrative
at the cost of the investigation of a culture for the purpose of finding as close an
approximation to its past reality as possible. This approach is nonetheless valid,
because it is virtually impossible to incorporate all data holistically, and emphasis is
necessary as long as it is recognised as a partial reconstruction which must be seen as
one possible interpretation among many.
4.3. Conclusion
Although there are many points of criticism that can be raised in objection to the
approaches of Historicism and Neo-Historicism, both are valid and indeed valuable
contributions to methods of interpretation. Thanks to the accent on interpretation via
a wide range of social sciences and theories of the postprocessual approach (Preucel
& Hodder 1996:7-8; Renfrew & Bahn 1994:426,430-432) many advances have been
made in methodology and epistemology. This includes the recognition of the
coexistence of concepts such as 'validity' and 'relativity', which in the past were
judged unscientific and therefore of no value. But even science has had to recognise
not only the unavoidable links between almost all disciplines (including the human
and natural sciences), but also the mutability of what we "know", given time and new
information and/or (re)interpretation.
Yet one cannot ignore the great danger of giving so much licence for free
interpretation to the historian, as is often done in the 'coherence' (as opposed to the
'correspondence') approach. The reality that is constructed by this procedure is
influenced by many unnecessary factors not pertaining to the search for 'truth' in the
study of history. Although the supposition is valid that these factors exercise
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influence anyway, they should at least be minimised or properly evaluated and
investigated by taking them into account overtly and specifically.
Historicism recognises these influences, but fails to compensate for them, thereby
falling prey to a sort of nihilism. This same pseudo-nihilism, as seen in New
Archaeology and the Critical Theory (Renfrew & Bahn 1994:432), has been the
logical conclusion to the neo-historicist premise that there is no 'absolute truth', but
only the truth you construct for yourself. Some therefore believe objectivity is an
impossibility. The search for truth then becomes a moot point. In this ultra-relativist
conclusion that relegates the argument of the validity of the study of history to the
negative conclusion of Scientism which it sought to oppose, lies the danger of too
much licence in interpretation. The search for as close an approximation to 'truth' as
possible is achievable, but is encumbered by too much selectiveness, creative licence,
unaccounted-for biases, and so forth.
Historicism and Neo-Historicism are not 'right' or 'wrong', however, and by their
own assertion, there is no right or wrong. Neither are these approaches without merit,
but much should be recognised as creative possibilities rather than be assigned the
status of theoretical probabilities. It is not 'absolute truth', but neither does it claim to
be: it overtly recognises the relativity and selectivity of its postulation, thereby
enhancing our knowledge rather than hampering it either with unchallenged postulates
that are excessive in their subjectivity, or with purely creative constructions
masquerading as the study of history. But a more specific methodological approach
employed in this field of study, e.g. the method used in the study of the history of
Iranian religion (including comparative materials), is needed, since this field of study
has its own unique set of circumstances and problems.
5. Methodology employed in the study of the history of Iranian religions
5.1. Comparative materials
De Jong (1997: 18-19) notes that the work currently being done on the Achaemenian
empire, the reshifting of the focus of interest and redress of some of the fundamental
questions concerning this field with the help of indigenous sources and archaeological
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excavations, as well as rigorously redefined methodologies, has alerted scholars to the
problems with the previous construct of Achaemenian history, which primarily
derives its inspiration from Greek views of the history of their Persian neighbours and
of themselves.
De Jong (1997:19) notes that the current work on these matters has shown to what
extent Greek perceptions of history and elements from the Greek cultural ideologies
have decided scholarly interpretation of Iranian history, and indicates that a study of
all the sources and a renewal of their interpretation could rectify this situation. The
sources on Iranian religion are themselves problematic, especially the Zoroastrian
texts, and De Jong (1997: 19-20) argues that this limits historical investigation and is
the reason for the lack of attention that the field of history of Iranian religions has
received to date. Such limitations on historical investigation imposed by the texts will
not, however, affect the proposed comparison of the two philosophies in this work.
As regards comparative materials, Iranianists often have to draw on various sources
such as Vedic literature and contemporary Zoroastrian practices, a procedure which
De Jong (1997:21) notes could surprise or even irritate Classicists. The reason for
such eclectic sources in the study of Iranian religions is because of the limitations of
these texts, specifically regarding dating, which necessitates the use of any and all
material that could supplement understanding, even though the relevance of some
sources (such as the ninth century Pahlavi texts) is contested (De Jong 1997:21-22).
The use of such varied sources is not the result of a belief that the religious tradition
never changed, but they are employed as away, and at present the only way, of
making sense of "otherwise unintelligible information" (De Jong 1997 :21).
Therefore, this 'irritating' aspect of the study of Zoroastrianism is necessary because
of, firstly, its antiquity and, secondly, its poorly preserved written tradition. These
two factors necessarily relegate the study of Zoroastrianism to far more diverse
methods of reconstruction, used for periods such as this, as they need such diverse
methods of reconstruction to make them understandable. This comparative method of
including diverse sources in interpretation, although new to the study of Iranian
religions, is characteristic of archaeology, and the archaeological method for
combining diverse data and piecing together how they relate is fully developed. The
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archaeological methods incorporate many other disciplines, such as anthropology,
which enables a relation to be established between practices then and practices now.
Methods and techniques therefore exist for dealing with sections in history which are
not adequately documented, materially or textually, and these would be more
appropriate to the study of Zoroastrianism than the methods employed by scholars of
periods in history that are better represented in the historical record. This
consideration is often forgotten by researchers in areas of research that have a wealth
of textual material, which they proceed to examine in virtual isolation from all the
other factors involved, giving the textual material an exaggerated status in the larger
whole of the archaeological reconstruction of history. Therefore, no excuses will be
made for using comparative sources in the study of Zoroastrianism.
Though comparative methods exist in the study of Greek philosophy, I believe they
are still rather conservatively employed, because the field of Greek philosophy has for
so long been studied according to a very specific outlook, even in comparison to other
traditions, and it is still treated as the pinnacle of human reason in the ancient world
(if not the only instance of reason), as an atheist scientist's heaven, and as a superior
manner of thinking (because it is a similar to modem Western thought). The reason
that non-textual or inadequate textual data are viewed as unintelligible is simply a
disregard for the bigger picture of reconstruction, and for the part that textual sources
play in reconstruction. The record without the texts is not unintelligible but simply
incomplete - as all data and research of the past must necessarily be.
De Jong (1997:22) states that "the present state of knowledge about Iranian religions
is such that anything that can possibly contribute to our image of Zoroastrianism must
be considered", and in this study many different sources will be used. One of the
sources I shall draw on is Plato's philosophy, though this is an a-historical source of
comparison. Sources of historical information that cannot be ignored, however, are
the Greek historians, as has been mentioned above with reference to the Achaemenian
history, and these will be discussed briefly below.
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5.2. Greek sources
Greek writers have been described as using a "rhetoric of otherness" when talking of
any non-Greek peoples and Greek authors often exploited the Greek xenophobia as a
contrasting device to show up Greek culture in a better light (De Jong 1997:26-27),
but the antithesis between Greek and barbarian is still being constantly accentuated
even outside literary circles. De Jong (1997:27) argues that there are two important
elements in the development of the antithesis between Greek and barbarian: first of
all, it is commonly assumed that this notion of "Greek ethnic self-consciousness",
though present in earlier periods, was intensified and elaborated on as a result of the
Persian wars, during which time the Persians came to represent the barbarian par
excellence; and in the second place, most barbarians known to the Greek mainland
were slaves, which led to the characterisation of barbarians as "servile" or "obsessed
with despotism" which was juxtaposed with the characterisation of the Greeks as
"democrats and lovers of freedom". The contrast of Oriental despotism and
submission to Greek freedom which, more than anything else, came to represent the
Greek cultural ideal, according to De Jong (1997:28), was perpetuated as a favourite
image in Greek literature, and represents one of the aspects of what De Jong calls
"Greek Oriental ism", by which is meant the "stereotyped representations of an
Oriental people in order to activate Greek cultural awareness and a sense of moral as
well as physical superiority".
This wartime propaganda, necessarily the most blatant attack on a rival group (which
was preceded by acute xenophobia and anti-barbarian propaganda), became the
standard treatment of non-Greek speaking people. This evolved into the negative
usage of 'barbarian', which originally just meant 'a person who does not speak
Greek'. This is very much a commonly held opinion, and until recently it has been
accepted without any further thought. The picture of oriental excesses and despotism
is still present in preconceived notions not overtly stated in any method, and visible in
the approach to any subject about the classical world. The biased treatment of Persia
by the Greek sources has been discredited, but the bias still lingers. This will be
discussed further in the Introduction (chapter 2).
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6. Methodology to be employed in this study
Now that some of the methodological approaches pertaining to the study of the history
of religion have been discussed - methods for studying religion and history and the
specific problems addressed and conclusions drawn or advancements made in the
method employed for the study of the history of Iranian religion, specifically - it
remains to be stated what aspects of these will be employed in the methodological
approach of the present study. This study is concerned with but an aspect of the
cultural domains it touches upon, which are in tum but an aspect of the cultures of
Greece and Persia themselves. Therefore, a methodological approach must
necessarily incorporate several different fields of study in its emphasis, while at the
same time being rather specifically tailored to the focus of the present study. I shall
therefore draw upon aspects of many of the relevant approaches to the study of
religion and history, but not adhere to one in its entirety or exclusively. The main
tenets of the method employed in this study are as follows:
1. That a multidisciplinary approach will be employed, incorporating fields such
as religion, philosophy and history.
11. That comparison is possible, because of the human mind forming a link
between ancient and modem thought, for the study of ancient cultures from the
perspective of the modem era. The same assumption about the operation of
the human mind can therefore also suggest a link between two different
philosophies previously not compared because of their lack of historical
contact and influence. Through the underlying unity of human thought, this
link enables one to compare artefacts of two different cultures and two
different cultural domains as an exercise in multidisciplinary study. Such an
approach poses a challenge to a too narrow employment of artificial categories
and of separations of cultural phenomena, and a challenge to the
methodologies and interpretations of both by shedding new light on possibly
underemphasised or overemphasised areas of study through the comparison of
how the two artefacts have been interpreted.
111. That the 'mental' link mentioned above has further implications for the
validity of studying the past, since it is thereby inherently linked to the present
and the future. A study of the past is therefore as valid as any study of the
present.
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IV. That this approach is best illustrated by the method of archaeology, rather than
any other method that I am aware of, though Historicism and Narrativism
come close. It fulfils multidisciplinary requirements, it deals with culture as a
whole and it assigns to each cultural area's artefacts a measure of importance
according to the views held by the culture itself, their occurrence in the record
as relative to other artefacts, and so forth. But it also recognises the necessity
of working specifically, and it has many specialised fields on which it draws to
fill in the bigger picture. As such, comparison is the main source of
information for many things, including artefact classification and dating. This
applies to texts as well, and they need not be the product of historical contact
to be similar and comparable. All the data are relevant and all the data are
related to other data as well.
Moreover, this study cannot be anything but a very specific view of a very short
period of time, informed by two individuals, representing a small portion of the
general population within their cultures, and is not a universal or even a broad
investigation of all the aspects of those cultures. It does not mean that this detracts
from its possible value, however, since a more specific and focussed view of any field
serves to give intensive attention to some aspects of a larger whole, thereby advancing
interesting and possibly valuable interpretations of a more focussed nature rather than
only approaching a culture generally.
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CHAPTER 2 - INTRODUCTION
Plato
1. Plato's combination of philosophy, science, myth and religion
It is a general perception that Western philosophy originated in Greece with
'philosophers' such as Thales and Democritus, as well as moral reformers such as
Protagoras and Socrates. If one wishes to study Plato's doctrines one must
necessarily take these philosophies into account, simply because Plato came out of
this specific environment of thought and was shaped by these theories. But Plato was
not only a philosopher, he was also an early scientist, a 'mythologist', and a religious
and social reformer. Studying Plato as yet another in a long line of Greek
philosophers is therefore inadequate.
Although in the Greek-speaking world there were some interesting attempts at
scientific explanation, and the not-so-novel idea of looking for an initial cause of, or
substance to, the whole universe, there is little that can be called a coherent system of
philosophy or science before Plato. But if there is any question as to whether or not
these theories were philosophy, there is no doubt as to the effect of these philosophies
on a society that had practically no systematic or formal religion, only cults and
superstitions. The pervading ideas of most of this 'early philosophy' tended towards
atheism or at least towards an impersonal power or force instead of a personalised
god.
The same situation occurred with the introduction of Darwin's theory of evolution.
Darwin did not deny the existence of God, but his introduction of a force of abstract
nature was immediately interpreted as a direct threat to the personal God of the Bible.
This perceived threat might not be far-fetched, even if it is without reason, for society
is not so far evolved from an animistic and impersonal concept to be safe from a
return to it and a rejection of the idea of a personal god. Yet opposition between
philosophy and science, on the one hand, and religion, on the other, has biased the
interpretation and perception of some of the early Greek philosophers, and the study
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of early Greek philosophy largely ignores the religious and mythological conceptions
that the Greeks had at that time, including the philosophers. By religious and
mythological conceptions I am not referring to a rigid and national tradition (which
did not exist in Greece at the time), nor toHomer or Hesiod's concepts (though they,
too, are religious and mythological), but rather to the way in which some of the Greek
philosophers interpreted and employed these concepts. One example of an
incorporation of a system of faith and myth is to be found in Plato's philosophy.
Plato not only revived old religious concepts, in cosmology, in myth, and even in
education, but also postulated the first coherent system of faith in Greece. The Greeks
at that time did not even have a word for religion, piety (eusebia) being the closest
approximation to the term 'religion'. The Greeks also had a rather amoral pantheon
of gods whose failings were an exaggeration of human failures. But Plato never had
the opportunity of seeing his ideal society (as proposed in the Republic) in action, and
therefore he could not put his religious reforms into practice. He could only
contemplate the creator through his metaphysics in the Timaeus, and speculate about a
national religion and a new pantheon in the Laws.
Plato's religious reforms are called 'theism', however, and his myths are similarly
relegated to mere metaphor and dismissed as nothing more than illustrations of his
philosophical theories. Plato's science, on the other hand, is analysed with vigour
mostly because of its accidental accuracy and similarity with modem science, but his
political reforms are treated as interesting but impracticable postulates. Most
importantly, these fields are not often treated holistically.
I argue that Plato did not only write philosophic dialogues, but also embarked on
systematised scientific theory and revived and (re)created myth and religion. He
obviously knew his predecessors' works (in philosophy/science and mythology) well,
and, furthermore, could extract from them what was meaningful and combine it in a
coherent and complex system of his own. Plato's doctrine therefore belongs, in a
sense, to a period before philosophy and science split off from religion and
mythology. However, there is a tendency to analyse Plato's doctrines from the
vantage-point of current society in which those concepts are almost irrevocably
incompatible.
27
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
28
I shall therefore be analysing the Timaeus, not with a view to picking out the Pre-
Socratic influences and discussing the tentative speculations about physics, geometry
and physiology, but as a work that combines Plato's 'theism' and myths with his
philosophy, science and politics, showing us how they interact and are inseparable.
Plato's theories are also comparable to Zoroaster's doctrines, and both perspectives
will be compared in the hope that the comparison in itself provides a new perspective
on the doctrines of both philosophers.
This type of approach necessarily demands some understanding of the environment
from which the system of thought sprung, as it was not only a development from, but
also often a reaction to it. Moreover, this context is not limited to chronological
events surrounding Plato's life, but could rather be interpreted as a development from
the earliest Greek traditions, perhaps even as old as the Aryan invaders who first
settled in Greece. There are even elements in Plato's metaphysics that are strongly
reminiscent of shamanistic activity, a sense of the otherworldly that subsequently
survived predominantly in Eastern religions.
Although no study of Plato is complete without taking these aspects into account, the
scope of the present work does not allow for a discussion of the historical,
mythological and philosophical contexts and their influences on Plato. The dialogue
form that Plato employed cannot be analysed within the constraints of this work
either. These aspects of the study of Plato's philosophy have been documented and
analysed extensively and further interpretation in this work is therefore unnecessary.
Cognisance must, however, be taken of Plato's metaphysics.
2. Studying Plato's metaphysics
Plato's metaphysics is an area which should by rights enjoy the most attention, as it
illuminates problems in every possible field of his doctrines, for his concept of the
world of Forms or Ideas as an ultimate reality underlies all his other postulates, and he
viewed it as an all-encompassing standard by which all else operates and can be
known. Plato's metaphysics is often viewed as an obscure or inaccessible part of his
theories, but in fact it reflects an almost universal cultural concept. Some
philosophers and scientists, and many a shaman or priest in every culture, had a
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concept of something more ultimate, some inaccessible truth, that can be grasped only
in a specific state of mind. As such, metaphysics is an integral part not only of the
study of Plato, but of the study of any system of speculative thought.
Although many scholars have studied Plato's metaphysics, the discussion of Plato's
metaphysical theory can never be complete. I have not pursued a discussion of
Plato's metaphysics in this work. Yet no analysis of Plato's philosophy can ignore his
metaphysics completely, and this study largely presupposes a general knowledge of
Plato's metaphysical precepts, as they form the basis for all his speculation. Plato's
Forms are also viewed as analogous to the Amesha Spentas in Zoroaster's doctrine,
for the Amesha Spentas form the metaphysical basis for Zoroaster's views as well.
Both Plato and Zoroaster can therefore be said to have postulated their doctrines on
the creation, its inherent dualism of good and evil, and the state of the soul within it,
according to a system of metaphysics.
Such metaphysical speculation is meaningless, however, unless it relates to the
physical world in some way. It must also deal with everyday occurrences and explain
phenomena, and have implications for the afterlife and the immortality of the soul, as
well as the soul's immediate morality and the more macroeosmie ramifications of this
morality for society in general. Above all, it must serve to stimulate speculation and
motivate the individual to think, and thereby also to choose to act correctly.
Plato discusses in the Timaeus how his metaphysics (the world of "Forms" or "Ideas")
are related to and interact with the cosmos and its creator. Here one gets a glimpse of
what Plato thought about the order of the universe, and who was responsible for it. In
the Timaeus, Plato discusses both the physical aspects of the creation and
"phenomenal" or abstract subjects such as metaphysics, epistemology, the soul, and
good and evil. In the Gathas, Zoroaster also related all his views on the abstract
subjects mentioned above, and the physical aspects of creation, to the abstract forms
he referred to as the Amesha Spentas. The correlation between the Amesha Spentas
and the Forms is striking, for both are abstractions of values and concepts, operating
in a non-material realm to which the current existence of the creation is directly
related.
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Firstly, however, some clarification is necessary as to what the Amesha Spentas are,
and how both the Amesha Spentas and the Platonic Forms will be referred to. The
concept of the Amesha Spentas is rather complex, and their status seems to have
changed drastically in the later Zoroastrian literature. In the Gathas, however, they
appear to serve the dual purpose of indicating abstract ideas and values, as well as
personifying these ideas and values both in the spiritual and the material worlds.
They are also 'aspects' of God, or his emanations, and as such represent (or
epitomise) the concept or force of "the Good". There are seven Amesha Spentas who
emanate from God (Ahura Mazda), namely Spenta Mainyu (Beneficent or Good
Spirit), Vohu Manah (Good Mind or Good Thinking), Armaiti (Piety or Devotion),
Asha (Order or Divine Law) Khshathra (Dominion or Might and Majesty), Haurvatat
(Perfection or Well-Being) and Ameretat (Immortality).
The term 'Amesha Spentas' (Blessed Immortals) only occurs in the later Zoroastrian
literature, but all seven emanations form the basis of the doctrines in the Gathas and
can be said to form a distinct group of abstract concepts central to Zoroaster's
thought. The term 'Amesha Spentas' is therefore commonly employed in the study of
Iranian religions as a convenient way of referring to this group of concepts in
Zoroastrianism. Although the Amesha Spentas form a definite group in the Gathas,
and are certainly personified in many instances, the use of personal pronouns to refer
to the Amesha Spentas can be misleading, for their names are the same as the words
for the abstract concepts which they personify.
Obscurities in the language of the Gathas often make it unclear, when an abstract
value or concept (such as order) is mentioned, whether Zoroaster meant the Amesha
Spenta as a personified being, the Amesha Spenta as the ultimate embodiment of an
abstract value or idea, or merely the abstract concept itself, whether in the spiritual or
the physical realm. It is even possible that Zoroaster meant all of the above, in some
instances, and relied on the ambiguity in the usage of abstract terms to imply a
resonance between all the spheres of existence in which the concept operates. Asha
could therefore denote the Divine Law or Order ordained by God, the abstract concept
of order operating in the creation, or order as a moral concept to be emulated.
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Although there is no consensus about when to interpret an abstract concept as an
Amesha Spenta or as an abstraction only, I have used the lower case when discussing
a concept in the non-personified sense of the term. This is solely to facilitate the
distinction between a personification and an abstraction of a term in the discussion of
the text. All nouns should by rights be capitalised, however, as that is how they
appear in the Gathas, a convention similar to that used in German.
So far I have made a distinction between a personification and an abstraction, and
pointed out that the Gathas do not indicate which meaning is applicable to an abstract
concept. This might imply that an abstract term must denote either a personification
or an abstraction, but this is not the case. There is no way of knowing whether
Zoroaster meant to differentiate between a personification and an abstraction in the
use of abstract terms. It may well be that Zoroaster meant to incorporate all the
various meanings into an abstract concept. This would mean that, when a term such
as 'order' is used, it could be interpreted as a personification and an abstraction
simultaneously.
Order, as a personification, would therefore be the Amesha Spenta called Asha
(Order), in his spiritual form as well as his earthly or material manifestation. This is
analogous to Plato's Forms in their 'mental' or 'spiritual' existence as distinct from
the physical creation, as well as their presence in the physical creation by virtue of
creation's emulation of the Forms. Order, as an abstraction, would therefore be an
abstract term that can be applied to describe a quality in the soul, the society, the
physical environment, or the state of mind or morality of an individual. This is
analogous to Plato's Forms in their 'mental' or 'spiritual' aspects discernible in
human existence.
3. Problems with analysing the Timaeus
The analysis of the Timaeus is riddled with problems. There is, for instance, the
problem of accurately placing or dating the dialogue. Its chronological place among
Plato's other dialogues is the source of much scholarly speculation (cf Owen 1953;
Cherniss 1957). Although I have treated it as part of Plato's later dialogues, none of
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the mam postulates within this study rely on the chronological position of the
Timaeus.
For the purposes of this study, further assumptions are made as well. Firstly, I believe
that the Timaeus follows the Republic and is followed by the Laws, perhaps not
chronologically, but certainly in terms of continuity of thought. In fact, the necessity
of giving a synopsis of the Republic at the start of the Timaeus seems to indicate that
these two works do not follow each other chronologically. The similarity of the
themes in the Critias and the Laws also suggests that the Critias's interrupted line of
thought was completed, with some changes, by the Laws. There are various elements
that link the Critias and the Laws, but this has never been accepted in Platonic studies,
although Owen (1953:337) believes that the ideas in the unfinished Critias can be
found in the Laws.
The main difference between the themes of the Timaeus-Critias and the Laws is that
Plato seems to have become more pessimistic towards the end of his life, when the
Laws was written. He wrote the Timaeus for the top philosophers whom he hoped
existed, as a theoretical exercise, a feast of ideas and speculations upon which there
can be infinite elaboration. In the Laws Plato continued to write for philosophers, but
with a definite practical purpose, that of reforming the state. He no longer understated
the practical aspect of his reform, nor did he assume that knowledge of the Forms
would result in good actions (in philosophers specifically or the masses in general),
but he overtly stated what needed to be done, practically, to reform society for the
good.
This pessimism seems to have come from a recognition that there are no ideal
philosopher-kings. In the Timaeus the summary of the ideal state is devoid of the
mention of philosopher-kings. This role can be said to be fulfilled by Timaeus
himself, but Timaeus never existed, and Plato must have come to realise that no one
like that could ever exist. He therefore had to turn his attention to divinely inspired
laws instead of divinely guided philosophers.
The Laws is therefore the answer to what should have been the ideal state in action.
There are no philosopher-kings, and the guardians and proletariat are all subjected to
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rigorous religious laws (Laws 907c-910c). God, not man, is the measure of all things,
and the state becomes a theocracy (Laws 713a-718a, 966b-968a). Completely isolated
(with no foreign contact via war or otherwise) and self-sufficient, running on a
subsistence economy as far as is possible, Magnesia is protected from outside
corruption, and its citizens never have the opportunity to dig trenches and expose
themselves to the world, like the Atlanteans (Laws 842b-850c, 950c-951 a). Thus,
even the people who will never be intellectual philosophers, who can grasp and act on
the ideal metaphysics, can be partially guarded from evil (foreign or bodily) by
insulation, asceticism, morality and stable harmony under divine law.
By accepting these assumptions, the analysis of the problems within society which
Plato sought to address, as well as the question of the audience at which he was
aiming this address, becomes clear. Yet there are innumerable plausible possibilities,
and an examination of all is not possible here. I have chosen what seems most
plausible to me, but acknowledge the multitude of other existing and possible theories
concerning this dialogue.
The important aspects within this study are that Plato conceived of a system of order
in the universe, related this to his theories on metaphysics, and postulated a creative
process. All of the aspects mentioned above had implications for the individual and
for society at large (including its politics), which Plato apparently sought to reform.
In this, Plato's philosophy is strangely analogous to Zoroaster's 'religious
speculation'. I shall attempt to discuss why a comparison between these systems of
thought should be undertaken, and shall briefly discuss the problems of such a study.
Zoroaster
1. Why a comparison between Zoroaster and Plato?
1.1. Zoroastrianism as a philosophy
Some of the most distinguished scholars have sought to minimise the importance of
Zoroaster's doctrines, either doubting their antiquity or their authenticity. Duchesne-
Guillemin (1979:2-3), in the introduction to his own translation of the Gathas, quotes
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Dannesteter (who translated the Gathas into French in 1892) as asking: "How is one
to accept that a man who lived at least six centuries before the current era, far away
from Greece, could have expressed his views on God and the world in philosophical
language, using abstract notions which recall those of the Gnostics and the Neo-
Platonists? These discourses must, therefore, be forgeries composed even seven or
eight centuries after the time of the prophet to whom they are attributed". The
linguistic argument which Darmesteter employed to demonstrate the Gathas to be
forgeries "convinced nobody" (Duchesne-Guillemin 1979:3), yet the incredulity
regarding their value and meaning did not diminish, but merely took on a different
form.
It is perhaps fortunate that the philosophical nature of the Gathas was first commented
upon, and its antiquity questioned, for this indirectly established the recognition of
their philosophical content as unquestionable. Once the antiquity of the tradition had
been established, attempts to refute its philosophical nature in later interpretation were
rendered ridiculous. Despite this, some scholars refused to accept both the antiquity
and the philosophical nature of the Gathas. Duchesne-Guillemin (1979:3) refers to
Nyberg as one such scholar who, without questioning the antiquity of the doctrine,
attempted to prove that it lacked any philosophical character. Although, as Duchesne-
Guillemin (1979:3) points out, Nyberg presented Zoroaster as "a kind of
shaman. [or] Mongol sorcerer who intoxicated himself with hemp fumes", his work
was original and important, and could therefore not be ignored by the expert scholars
since they were unwilling to refute it. This apparent impasse, resulting neither in a
refutation of the claims of the antiquity of and philosophy in the Gathas nor in a
proper appreciation of its doctrines, is well summarised by Duchesne-Guillemin, who
quotes Simone Petrement as ·saying:
"I do not know why scholars avoid with a kind of horror representing Zoroaster as a
philosopher or as having anything, however little, to do with philosophy. Yet if there
is an abstract and philosophical religion, it is indeed his. Why should one not want to
recognise it? Because it is very ancient? Everything is more ancient than one thinks,
even, and especially, philosophy" (Duchesne-Guillemin 1979:3).
Examples do exist, however, of scholars who view Zoroaster's Gathas as having an
underlying structure of a philosophical nature, such as Jackson (1965:6), Geiger
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(1977:52; 54), Eliade (1976:312; 314), and Haug (1971), who states that the Gathas
clearly express philosophical and abstract thoughts about metaphysical subjects (Haug
1971 :142-143), and who describes Zoroaster's doctrines as a system of moral
philosophy (Haug 1971 :300).
That Zoroaster did have a fully worked-out philosophy in mind seems likely, but that
he intended to transfer this philosophy to his disciples is doubtful, for his intentions
were to propound religious convictions based on his philosophical postulates, not the
philosophical postulates themselves, and his documents (the Gathas) were for an
audience of believers, not philosophers. Precisely because the philosophy of
Zoroaster has to be discovered within the Gathic religion, Geiger (1977:52) states that
there can be no claims to be able to represent faultlessly all the individual traits of the
philosophical system which Zoroaster had established for himself. It is important to
note, however, that such a system of philosophy must have existed, is visible in the
Gathas as premises underlying his religious conclusions or convictions, and can, at
least partially, be discovered.
It is possible that Zoroaster had not fully developed his system of philosophy, but
Haug (1971 :300) argues that this cannot even be said of Plato, and that Zoroaster,
moreover, postulated his philosophy long before the Greeks became aware of
anything. like philosophical speculation. Zoroaster's achievement, in the light of his
remoteness in time and space, would be remarkable in itself, but his philosophical
ideas show him to be a profound contributor to philosophy and an equal of many later
philosophers. Haug (1971:300-301) argues that Zoroaster's philosophical ideas show
him to have been a "great and deep thinker.and the great fame he enjoyed, even
among the ancient Greeks and Romans who were so proud of their own learning and
wisdom, is sufficient proof of the pre-eminent position he must once have occupied in
the history of the progress of the human mind".
Zoroaster's status in the Greek and Roman sources is varied, however, and serve not
so much to depict what his accomplishments were as to show to what extent the
Greeks and Romans revered him. Zoroaster was variously considered a sage, prophet,
philosopher, scientist or magician, and is often mentioned as philosopher so-and-so's
teacher or as author of various books. Jackson (1965:7) refers to some classical
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authors (Lucian, Dialog.; Cicero, de Finibus 5.29; Valerius Maximus, 8.7; Pliny,
HN 30.2.1; Apuleius, Florid. p.19; Porphyrius, Vita Pythagorae, 41; Lactantius,
Institutiones, 4.2; Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorae, 19; Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata,
i.357) who claim that Pythagoras studied Magian lore in Babylon, which Jackson
considers to be not without foundation. Plato is purported to have been anxious to
visit the Orient and to study with the Magi, but the Persian Wars prevented him
(Diogenes Laertius, Philosoph. Vit, 3.7; Apuleius, de Doctrin. Plat. Phil., p.569. The
Anonym. Vit. Plat. adds that in Phoenicia Plato met Persians who introduced him to
Zoroastrian lore) (Jackson 1965:7-8). There is also a claim that a certain Magian
teacher, Gobryas, instructed Socrates (Jackson 1965:8).
Moreover, there are a number of classical references to books Zoroaster is supposed
to have authored, some of which Jackson (1965:8) mentions, such as a work bearing
the name of Zoroaster by Heraclides Ponticus, a pupil of Plato and Aristotle, which is
mentioned in Plutarch (Adv. Colot., 1115 A). The followers of the sophist Prodicus, a
contemporary of Socrates, apparently claimed to be in possession of secret writings of
Zoroaster; and Aristotle, Deinon, Eudoxus of Cnidus, and especially Theopompus,
were familiar with Zoroastrian tenets (Jackson 1965:8). Jackson (1965:95) also states
that the records of antiquity imply that the Zoroastrian books, because of their
"encyclopaedic character, stood for many sides of life", which is not surprising if one
takes into account that some of the original Nasks (books) of the Avesta, which were
unfortunately lost, are reported to have had entirely scientific contents, and that the
Greeks attribute the authorship of books on physics, the stars, and precious stones, to
Zoroaster.
Many of these references cannot be verified, but these references, whether accurate or
not, illustrate that Zoroaster was considered to be more than a religious reformer. An
unfortunate result of an inaccurate description of Zoroaster is that he was considered,
as Jackson (1965:6) puts it, the "arch-representative of the Magi", and that he was
famed more for magic arts than for the "depth and breadth of his philosophy and
legislation, or for his religious and moral teaching". The true Zoroastrian doctrine
seems likely to have reached the classical world partially intact at least, and probably
at an early age, since it is the Zoroastrian tenets of dualism and metaphysics which
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can be discerned in the works of philosophers such as Plato and some Pre-Socratics,
rather than the misinformation about Persian magic which marked the later literature.
Eliade (1976:314) believes it is not surprising that Greek antiquity regarded Zoroaster
as a philosopher, master of initiation and author of hermetic and alchemical treatises,
for he argues that the spiritual and philosophical nature of Zoroaster's religion is
"striking". Eliade (1976:314) further argues that Zoroaster displays "creative
imagination" and "a capacity for rigorous reflection". This is evidenced by the fact
that Zoroaster "transmuted" some of the main Aryan deities to form the Amesha
Spentas, entities that are Ahura Mazda's entourage, but also embody abstract values
(such as Power, Truth and Order) and cosmic elements (such as Fire, Water and
Earth) (Eliade 1976:314). The Amesha Spentas are therefore defined by Zoroaster as
intermediaries between God and his creation (Eliade 1976:314).
Eliade (1976:314) also argues that Zoroaster, by calling God 'wise' and extolling the
importance of the virtues of 'truth' and 'good thought', repeatedly emphasises the
value of "wisdom, that is, of science, of accurate and useful knowledge". Eliade
(1976:314) does not mean science in the modem sense of the word, but of "creative
thought that discovers and at the same time creates the structures of the world and the
universe of values that is their correlative", and as such, Zoroaster's doctrines may be
compared to the meditations in the Upanishads, the authors of which also
revolutionised the Vedic world view.
If there is doubt as to whether Zoroaster had a clear system of philosophy, a different
evaluation would be to call Zoroaster's doctrines 'well thought-out'. Zaehner
(1961 :50) views the Gathas as giving the impression of having been deeply thought
out, and Henning (1951 :46) sees Zoroaster's view of Man not as something reached
by "nebulous feeling or by the dreams that may come to one in a drugged stupor", but
as something which can only be reached by "very clear thinking". It is perhaps even
misleading to say that there is 'doubt' regarding the philosophical nature of
Zoroaster's thought, and the originality and depth of thought that confronts scholars
from such antiquity should rather be described, in Zaehner's (1961 :49) words, as
"disconcerting" .
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The Zoroastrian religion differed in many ways from the commonly held beliefs
within the society, and Zoroaster himself said that his doctrine contained "Secret
Mysteries" (Yasna 48.3) and "unheard words" (Yasna 31.1). Geiger (1977:29) argues
that, for Zoroaster, his revelation was no longer "merely undefined presentiment and
conception of the Godhead, but a matter of intellect, of spiritual perception and
knowledge", which Geiger considers to be "of great importance, for there are
probably not many religions of such a high antiquity in which this fundamental
doctrine, that religion is a knowledge or learning, a science of what is true, is so
precisely declared as in the tenets of the Gathas". The constant accent which
Zoroaster placed on knowledge and the cognitive, although he pays an equal amount
of attention to the spiritual, is almost peculiar within a system of faith and seems to
belong, more properly, to a system of philosophy. Zoroaster's belief that it is only
through exercising the mind (or Vohu Manah) that one can properly know, and
therefore choose, the good and the true (Yasna 49.5) is indeed reminiscent of Plato's
philosophy specifically, and has many more parallels in other philosophies than it
does in other religions.
There are many other references in the Gathas which propound the universal
importance of Good Mind (Vohu Manah), including many verses that pertain
specifically to the wisdom of the individual as well, such as Yasna 30.3, where it is
the wise who choose the good, and the unwise who choose evil. Geiger (1977 :29)
translates this verse as meaning that it is the unbelieving that are unknowing, and the
believing, on the contrary, are "learned, because they have penetrated into this
knowledge [of the good]", but notes that it is also possible to distinguish between
good and evil spiritually (Yasna 44.15). In the same vein, it is Piety (Armaiti) who
stands by to help those "perplexed by doubt" (Yasna 31.12). It was expected of every
person not only to choose between good and evil, but to make that choice for
themselves (Yasna 30.2), or as Geiger (1977:30) interprets it, "man for man shall the
people examine or test whatever the prophet has announced to them, and learn the
truth thereof'.
It could be argued that, in Zoroastrianism, the good was philosophically accessible to
those who sought to employ Good Mind, and spiritually (through Piety) to those who
did not or could not. This is similar, once again, to Plato's theory that the populace of
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his Magnesian society who believed in God did good, and it was only the unbeliever
. who chose incorrectly (Laws Bk. X 885b), whereas the philosopher he describes in the
fifth book of the Republic (476d-478e) sought and emulated the Good through his
employment of knowledge (which was clearly juxtaposed to 'belief throughout the
discussion, but this 'belief is not to be confused. with ignorance, Republic 477b).
The stress Zoroaster placed on both the freedom of choice in the individual and the
exercise of thinking, or knowledge, in order to make this choice led Geiger (1977:30)
to argue that this constituted an "open breach with the old national religion", since
there is no longer a reliance on unknown and often unknowable higher powers and
superstitions, but an "independent penetration into the perception of the divine truth
which was [to Zoroaster] a mystery before then". This breach with the old religion,
although forming a new one, was in some senses a breach with religion itself, at least
as it was known until then. Even if it is not accepted that Zoroaster's doctrines can be
interpreted, not only as a very contemplative or philosophical religion, but also as a
philosophy, it is still possible to compare his doctrines with a philosophy, for instance
Plato's philosophy.
·1.2. Previous comparisons between Zoroaster and Plato
Many have compared Zoroaster's doctrines to the teachings of the Greek
philosophers, especially to the doctrines of Plato, a connection perceived throughout
the ages (from Plato's pupils, through the Renaissance, to today). Their doctrines
have a surprisingly similar ring to them, though no comparison has yet been deemed
satisfactory by scholarly consensus (cf Chroust 1980, Afnan 1965). I shall only
briefly mention some examples, as the Zoroastrian influence on Greek philosophy is a
subject that is all but inexhaustible.
The earliest authenticated classical allusion to Zoroaster by name seems to be the
reference in the Platonic Alcibiades (Alcibiades I, 122, p.131, ed. Schanz), although
according to Diogenes Laertius (Proem. 2), he was mentioned by the earlier Xanthus
of Lydia (Jackson 1965:9). Zoroastrian teaching, at least in its general features, was
definitely known to the ancient Greek scholars, such as Plato, Eudoxus, Aristotle,
Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius and others (Dandamaev 1994:297). The opinion has been
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expressed (Dandamaev 1994:297) that the basic tenets of Zoroastrian teaching exerted
a "definite influence on the philosophical conceptions of the ancient Greeks", and a
resemblance between the thought of Zoroaster and Plato is specifically noted
(Dandamaev 1994:326). Scholars researching both Judaism and Greek philosophy
suggest that Zoroastrian influence began to be exerted on these and other cultures in
the ancient world as early as the sixth century BCE (Boyce 1982:xii).
It is commonly assumed, according to Dannenfeld (1952:435), that the belief during
the Renaissance was that true civilisation began with the Greeks and that everything
that preceded the classical age was consequently ignored, but the 'intellectual leaders'
of the Renaissance were well aware of the ancient oriental civilisations, although they
did emphasise Greek and Roman culture. The debt that Greece and Rome owed to the
'oriental civilisations' was not ignored either, and a scrutiny of the classical traditions
necessarily led to a scrutiny of the cultures with which they interacted and which
influenced them and which they influenced in tum. One example of this recognition
was Ficino's postulate of a continuous philosophical tradition, which included many
great thinkers, such as Plato and Zoroaster.
This theory came about because of the revival of Platonism during the Renaissance,
which was greatly stimulated by the arrival at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence
(1438-1442) of the Platonist Plethon (Dannenfeld 1952:437). Cosimo de Medici,
enamoured with Platonism, sought to make Florence the centre of Platonic studies,
and appointed Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) as head of the New Academy in 1462
(Dannenfeld 1952:437). Ficino, although a philosopher in his own right, derived most
of his concepts from Plato and the Neo-Platonists and was influenced by Plethon, as
was Cosimo de Medici (Dannenfeld 1952:438). Along with Plethon, Ficino believed
in a continuous philosophical tradition that began with Zoroaster, and could be traced
through wise men such as Eumolpos, the giver of the EIeusian Mysteries, King Minos
of Crete, Lycurgos the Spartan Lawgiver, the Brahmans of India, the Magi of the
Medes and Hermes Trismegistus of Egypt, and from these, in tum, the tradition
continued its procession of learning through Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato to the
Neo-Platonists, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proelus (Dannenfeld 1952:438).
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Ficino believed it was as if by "divine providence" that this particular philosophy
originated with Zoroaster among the Persians and Mercurius among the Egyptians, to
be adopted by Orpheus, developed later by Pythagoras and perfected by Plato
(Dannenfeld 1952:438-439). Although the Chaldean Oracles found in the writings of
the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists, and attributed to Zoroaster, played an important role
in Ficino's doctrines, there were other sources of classical writers who had written
about or mentioned Zoroaster, as well as the works and chronicles of the early church
historians, such as Eusebius, Orosius and Augustine, available to Ficino at the time
(Dannenfeld 1952:439). Although Zoroaster's original doctrine, as it is expressed in
the Gathas, was not known, many Gathic concepts filtered down into other sources,
such as Gnosticism, and Ficino's understanding of Zoroastrianism would therefore not
be devoid of any relation to reality, nor would his comparisons between the ancient
Persian and Greek philosophies be without merit.
Afnan (1965 :xiv) believes that the Greek and Zoroastrian philosophies are fully
complementary. Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:70) notes that there undoubtedly are
"striking similarities of doctrine" between Iran and Greece, leading him to confess
that he finds it "difficult entirely to resist the temptation of a comparison of
Zoroastrianism with other great minds and with other religious movements"
(Duchesne-Guillemin 1979: 159).
Comford (1957: 176) states that "whether one accepts or not the hypothesis of a direct
influence of Persia on the Ionians in the sixth century, no student of Orphic or
Pythagorean thought will fail to see between it and the Persian religion such close
resemblances that we can regard both systems as expressions of one and the same
conception of life, and use either of them to interpret the other". It is, according to
Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:71), perhaps analogous to Aristotle's perception of a
connection between the dualism of the Magi and Plato's system, for although it is not
certain whether Aristotle meant to indicate a historical connection, it serves at least to
illustrate that he thought the two systems analogous.
It has often been assumed that similarity must necessarily imply historical contact and
influence, and attempts have been made to place Zoroaster and Plato within
reasonable chronological concurrence with each other, for instance, Herzfeld and
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others argued for a link between Zoroaster's patron Vishtaspa and Darius's father,
Vishtaspa's namesake (Herzfeld 1947:161,204).
Another instance of an attempt at postulating a historical influence of one on the other
was Darmesteter ("Le Zend-Avesta" vol. iii p. iii (1892) Histoire des Etudes
Zoroastriennes) who saw the Gathas as suspiciously similar to Platonic philosophy
and therefore postulated a later date for the Gathas as a corpus of Platonic ideas and
not an Iranian religious text at all (Moulton 1972:9). Most scholars rejected
Darmesteter's theory, such as Moulton, who states that James Darmesteter "startled
the world of scholarship with his daring paradox, according to which the Gathas must
be regarded as owing their most central conceptions to Philo of Alexandria, or to a
school of thought of which Philo is the leading exponent" (Moulton 1972:9).
Darmesteter also speculated that the system of abstract entities surrounding Ahura
Mazda was to him so 'redolent' of Neo-Platonism that the Gathas must be late
forgeries composed under the influence of Hellenising Jews, like Philo of Alexandria
(Duchesne-Guillemin 1958:24). Dandamaev (1994:324) notes that modem scholars
unanimously reject Darmesteter's view that the terms expressing abstract concepts
that characterise the Gathas must have been influenced by the ideas of Plato and
Philo, and therefore must be dated to the first century BeE or later.
Both Herzfeld's and Darmesteter' s views have, in fact, been universally refuted. Yet
the problem persists whether or not Plato's and Zoroaster's works are comparable,
and if so, how to compare them. It has proven impossible to relate them historically
on the evidence gathered to date, but their philosophical ideas may still be compared
as an example of two systems of thought dealing with the same universal questions,
such as those of cosmology, metaphysics, dualism and teleology. That is why I have
chosen to compare Plato and Zoroaster in terms of their philosophy.
Philosophy and religion are related in many ways, and I VIew the varIOUS
methodological approaches commonly used to study religion as under-emphasising its
philosophical aspect, if not preventing such an interpretation outright. This has been
discussed in chapter 1 (Methodology). I· believe that there is philosophical
speculation at the basis of Zoroaster's views on religion, as there is in Plato's views
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on the subject, and I shall proceed to interpret the philosophical aspect of the Gathas,
and the philosophical aspect only, since ample literature is available on the religious
and historical aspects of the text. History and religion must be taken into account,
however, since both texts have a historical context and deal mainly with 'religious'
topics such as a creator and the life of the soul after death. Another factor that should
be kept in mind is the contribution that Plato and Zoroaster have made to the Western
tradition in terms of philosophy and religion.
1.3. Plato and Zoroaster as contributors to the Western tradition
Both Plato and Zoroaster have been seen as great contributors to the Western
tradition, and are particularly well known for their dualism. But Plato has radically
influenced the entire Western tradition of philosophy, and to a degree, of religion,
whereas Zoroaster has influenced the entire western tradition of religion, and to a
degree, of philosophy. The influence of Plato is widely known, whereas Zoroaster's
role is still relatively obscure.
European culture and philosophy, according to Duchesne-Guillemin (1979:1), was
shaped and moulded by Greek and Jewish thought, which in tum were influenced by
Zoroastrianism. Duchesne-Guillemin (1979: 1-2) bases this thesis not on the ancient
astrology attributed to Zoroaster's authority or the legend of the three Magi who
followed the star to Bethlehem, but on what he calls the "more important contacts"
which must have influenced both traditions greatly, specifically dualism in Greek
philosophy, to have inspired Eudoxus of Cnidus, both Plato's contemporary and
disciple, to compare Plato to Zoroaster. Zoroastrianism's extensive influence on
Judaism, and the possible reciprocal exchange of thought, has also received more
attention recently (cf Louw 1998; Barr 1985).
A notable contribution that Zoroastrianism made to the Jewish tradition was the
concept of linear time, although there is some contention as to whether the concept
was already known to them. Eliade (1976:302) argues that, linear time aside, many
other religious concepts originated in Iran, such as: the formulation of several
dualistic systems (cosmological, ethical, religious), the myth of a saviour, a concept of
what is referred to as an "optimistic eschatology" - heavenly reward and punishment
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in hell, as opposed to a uniform fate of semi-existence in Hades, and a proclamation
of the final triumph of Good and universal salvation, the doctrine of the resurrection
of bodies, very probably, certain Gnostic myths, and the mythology of the Magi, re-
elaborated during the Renaissance, both by the Italian Neo- Platonists and by
Paracelsus.
The influence of Zoroastrianism on the modem VIew of philosophy was also
considerable, if indirect. The word dualismus, from the Latin dualis ("containing
two"), was coined by Thomas Hyde (The Ancient Persian Religions) in 1700 to
characterise the conflict between good and evil, or of Ohrmazd and Ahriman, in later
Zoroastrianism (Reese 1980:136). Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:71) notes that the term
was subsequently taken over by Bayle and Leibnitz, and Christian Wolff (Kant's
master) extended its use to metaphysics, applying it to the Cartesian system which
viewed thought and matter as mutually independent substances. Kant reacted against
this dualism, as Spinoza had before, and it was then Fichte and Hegel who opposed
the concept with idealism, as did the positivists with materialism (Duchesne-
Guillemin 1958:71). The Cartesian attitude, Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:71) argues,
may in tum be considered as a revival of the Platonic reaction which deposed the
Aristotelian scholasticism during the Renaissance; the entire tradition of Western
philosophy, he claims, can be viewed as an alternation of dualism and monism,
beginning with Aristotle's reaction of monism against Plato's dualism, and Aristotle's
and the Stoics' monism was in tum ousted by a period of pagan and Christian neo-
Platonism up to the Aristotelian revival in the twelfth century .
. The term 'dualism' has since been applied to many types of polarity in religion,
metaphysics and epistemology (Reese 1980: 136). Dualism in religion refers to the
opposition of good and evil, as it occurs in Manichaeism and Gnosticism, generally,
although it is also applied to the Taoist and neo-Confucian contrast of Yin and Yang,
for example (Reese 1980: 136). The earliest instance of a complete metaphysical
dualism is found in the philosophy of Plato, who attributed true existence to "Ideas",
but additionally recognised an inferior and opposing principle, and whose dualism
was ethical insofar as he identified "the Good" with the Ideas and evil with the
opposing principle (Reese 1980: 136).
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There is also the dualism of God and the world, the divine and the corporeal, the soul
and the body. The concept of the soul in the body as being the divine in the corporeal,
a concept that is often expressed as the result of a primordial sacrifice (either of a bull,
as in India and Iran, or of a god, as in Greece) left the person in a state of mixture
between these two elements (Duchesne-Guillemin 1958:81). The goal, Duchesne-
Guillernin (1958:81) argues, was to separate again what had been mixed (an attitude
which he notes was to be typical of Manichaeism) and so free the soul to return to its
heavenly home. It was believed, however, that the method of freeing the soul could
be bought from "wandering sorcerers, sellers of charms, etc.". But Duchesne-
Guillemin (1958:81) argues that Plato rejected and condemned these means in favour
of a purely contemplative process of salvation. This accent on the contemplative as a
means of salvation was common to Plato and Zoroaster.
Both Plato and Zoroaster believed that the attainment of the divine was by means of
the emulation of the divine, as Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:81) notes, but since Plato,
influenced by Anaxagoras and Xenophanes, emphasised the spiritual and non-
corporeal nature of God, he perhaps inadvertently caused an opposition between God
and creation like that of good and evil. This was. not the case in Zoroastrianism, as the
material world was not evil per se, and the spiritual was the only realm in which evil
could have any existence. The Zoroastrian 'Forms' (Amesha Spentas), moreover,
were not only abstract concepts to be pondered and emulated, but also had physical
manifestations in creation, much like Plato's Forms are visible on earth.
Zoroaster did not view creation as a misleading copy of the Ideal, but simply in an
imperfect thing in the process of being perfected. The imperfection of creation was
the result of destructive activity by the forces of evil. Perfection could be attained for
creation through emulation of the Good, however. The creation is therefore in an
intermediate state of becoming perfect, and care of the creation as the physical
domains of the Amesha Spentas, furthered the perfection of creation and was an
emulation of the Good. This is analogous to Plato's views of the corporeal as
imperfect, although he took a more negative view of the corporeal and did not believe
it could be perfected. Despite this negative view of the material, Plato believed that
proper care ofthe environment surrounding man was positive, and calls "anything that
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harms or destroys a thing evil, and anything that preserves and benefits it good"
(Republic 608e).
The similarities between the doctrines of Zoroaster and Plato, especially the accent on
the contemplative, are what catches the eye, not the differences, and it could be
argued that Plato and Zoroaster were both part of what appears to be an intellectual
flowering throughout the ancient world, and their contributions stand alongside many
other influential thinkers. Gnuse (1997:210) states that the blossoming of the
intellectual in the "civilised centres of the Old World" has been referred to by modem
scholars studying the social, religious, philosophical and technological achievements
of this period as the "Axial Age" (approximately 800-400 BCE). Gnuse (1997 :210)
further notes that this period was the bedrock on which the intellectual and religious
heritage of today was built, during which important concepts such as monotheism
emerged.
This is evidenced by the fact that, as Gnuse (1997 :210) states, this period saw the
fruition of great traditions such as "the teachings of Confucius and Lao-Tzu in China;
the final collections of the Rig- Veda and the Atharva- Veda from the Brahmanic
priestly circles in India; the Upanishads from the great sunnyasi and other
intellectuals in India; Siddharta Gautama (the Buddha), the most successful
Upanishadic teacher in India and founder of Buddhism; perhaps Zoroaster in Persia
(unless he lived earlier); the great intellectual tradition of the Greek historians
(Hecataeus, Herodotus, Thucydides, etc.), playwrights (Sophocles, Aeschylus,
Euripides, Aristophanes, etc.), and philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc.); as
well as the Jewish faith and scriptures in the exile and early Second Temple period".
This period in history is reminiscent of the great revival of thought during the
Renaissance, which indeed sought to copy at least part of the original flowering of the
Axial Age, and has something of Jung's synchronicity about it. Just as the
Renaissance, if seen holistically, appears all the richer for such a comparison, so could
the Axial Age, if a comparison were attempted.
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2. Problems in this study
2.1. Problems with studying Zoroastrianism
The study of the history of Zoroastrianism is a discipline that involves "great efforts
of speculation and imagination", according to De Jong (1997:39), and it has been an
academic "battlefield" with no concord in sight, although some subjects have been
agreed upon. There appears to be agreement, for instance, on the date of Zoroaster
(around 1 000 BeE) and on the fact that the religion of the Achaemenian dynasts is
related, at least, to Zoroastrianism, but other issues remain points of contention, such
as the reconstruction of the pre-Gathic religion, the status of Zurvanism, use of Vedic
literature or contemporary Iranian religions as comparative evidence, and the relation
between linguistic and historical interpretation, amongst others (De Jong 1997:39).
This lack of agreement on even the basic 'facts' of Zoroastrianism has led De Jong
(1997:39-40) to comment that, although there are numerous introductory works
published in this field of study, "a comparison between two of these would easily lead
the non-specialist reader to the conclusion that a balanced view of Zoroastrianism is
impossible". The situation is compounded by the lack of objective discussion in these
works of the validity of the arguments that propose different interpretations, since
opposing views are usually dismissed as "unhistorical" or "methodologically
deficient", although the absence of homogeneity serves to illustrate, according to De
Jong (1997:40), the difficulty of the subject. Zoroastrianism is still misrepresented,
however, even by scholars who study it.
Of all the great religions of the world, Zaehner (1961: 15) writes, Zoroastrianism
presents the "most intractable problems". Zaehner (1961:15) argues that the principle
of Zoroastrianism, that there is one true God, was not well received in the traditionally
polytheistic society in which Zoroaster lived, and therefore a "modified version of the
older religion was grafted onto Zoroaster's doctrines", and modified yet again when it
was later accepted as the official religion by the first Persian Empire and came under
the control of the Magi priestly caste.
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"Never has a.religious thinker been more grossly travestied" either, argues Zaehner
(1961: 19): firstly by his own disciples who obscured the purity of what Zaehner
believes was Zoroaster's monotheistic vision; secondly by the Magi who presented
Zoroaster to the Graeco-Roman world "not only as the author of a rigid religious
dualism which made good and evil two rival and co-eternal principles, but also as a
magician, astrologer, and quack"; thirdly by Nietzsche who "fathered on him
doctrines he would have found little to his taste"; and lastly by scholars today "whose
fuddled imaginations have seen in him either a witch-doctor bemusing himself with
the fumes of Indian hemp or a political intriguer plotting behind the scenes at the
court of the Persian kings" (Zaehner 1961: 19).
It is most unfortunate that scholars, who have neither religious beliefs nor artistic
licence as an excuse, should misinterpret Zoroaster to such an extent, and surprising
that a negative reaction instead of an objective analysis should happen so often and so
vehemently. That the points of view scholars have about Zoroaster have often been
far from complimentary, is perhaps best illustrated by Herzfeld and Nyberg's
descriptions of him. Henning (1951: 13) remarks that although Herzfeld and Nyberg'
worked with the same sources, they nevertheless arrived at vastly different
reconstructions of Zoroaster, but both opinions were resoundingly negative.
Herzfeld's Zoroaster is "a backstairs politician, an exiled nobleman who goes to the
races when not engaged in malicious gossip", and Nyberg's Zoroaster is "a prehistoric
man, a drunken witch-doctor muttering gibberish on his ludicrous Maga [trance]"
(Henning 1951:13). Henning's conclusion (1951:13-14) is that these scholars'
opinions, which are either extremely patronising or scornful, are based on opinion
devoid of supporting fact, and that they leave the student perplexed rather than
enlightened. What Henning fails to note is that views on Zoroaster and his teachings
still often unintentionally reflect rather biased perspectives, even though bias is
overtly rejected.
Moreover, there is often an emphasis, in comparisons of 'Eastern' and 'Western'
traditions, on the differences between the secular and the religious. This emphasis on
differences has been a problem in the comparisons between human and natural
sciences as well, and belies a basic assumption of the fundamental incompatibility of
science, philosophy and religion, resulting in an ever-widening gap between these
48
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49
fields and their methods of interpretation as well as an increased antagonism between
their various proponents. The religious reaction (not only of Creationists) against
Darwin's theory of evolution is a case in point. I believe one possibility is that this
opposition was aggravated from the Renaissance and Enlightenment movement
onwards, and has yet to be resolved, because it has not been fully recognised as a
pertinent problem that will persist as long as this division is inherent in even the most
basic education.
2.2. The problem of comparing philosophy, religion, and science
Religion/mythology, philosophy and science are interrelated in that they pose the
same universal questions (in order to make sense of the world that surrounds us) and
only differ in their method of achieving answers and in their purposes for doing so. It
is a basic interrelationship between the physical world of sense perception and natural
phenomena, the mental world of reason and rationalisation and cognitive phenomena,.
and the spiritual world of myth, belief and supernatural phenomena. These categories
(artificial though they are) must once have been aspects of the same thing,
religion/myth splitting from philosophy/science in the fifth century with the Greek
thinkers' secular approach to nature, and philosophy and science splitting in the
seventeenth century CE, although the scientists of that age still called their field of
study a 'Philosophy of Nature' .
I believe that not only are philosophy, religion and science mutually very compatible,
but that they are united in the doctrines of Plato and Zoroaster. Current thinking,
however, has not facilitated the study of such a unity between these spheres.
Moreover, this perceived opposition between human and natural sciences continues to
be a problem in methodology - as has been mentioned among the problems listed by
Deist & Le Roux (1993:11-19) in the previous chapter on methodology. Other
aspects have also hindered this interpretation, such as Phenomenology of Religion,
which precludes comparing religion with anything critically for Phenomenology of
Religion advocates a mere description of religious phenomena, in case value
judgements are made. This, interestingly, implies two things, though: firstly, that if
religion is critically investigated it will be found lacking: and secondly, that the terms
'value judgements' and 'critical thinking' are not examples of an oxymoron.
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Another aspect is the perceived superiority of philosophy over religion (which started
with our post-medieval view of Greek philosophy as distinct from Greek religion),
and the more recently perceived superiority of science over both religion and
philosophy (as can be seen in the conflict between the human and the natural
sciences). A tendency to unify these concepts is found in both Plato and Zoroaster,
who each observed their surroundings, concluded mind is the only possible method
for assigning meaning and coherence to the physical phenomena, and inferred that
there must be a similar characteristic in the higher being they postulated as creator.
Not only do these fields all occur in the same doctrine, but they are related to each
other as well.
Therefore, in this study I shall not treat religion as sacrosanct, but interpret it in terms
of one of its aspects, namely philosophy. This is necessarily rather tentative, but I
believe large parts of many religions consists of philosophy (including the Zoroastrian
religion). The two need not be mutually exclusive, although they have been seen to
be because of the (untenable) opinion that Greek philosophy and Greek religion are
separate and incompatible. One very obvious instance contrary to this perceived
incompatibility is, of course, Indian philosophy, which was initially separate from
religion, but which became fully incorporated into the religious tradition. It is on the
basis that Zoroaster must have had a well thought-out concept of metaphysics and
cosmology before he composed the Gathas that I wish to compare two philosophers
and their respective philosophies.
Although similar to other comparisons of Zoroastrianism to related fields such as the
Iranian pagan religion with the Vedic Indian religion, the Avesta with the Rigveda,
ancient Zoroastrianism with modern Zoroastrianism, and so on, the comparison of
Zoroaster with Plato is a-historical, and necessarily excludes any need for historical
contact and influence. Another way of seeing it is as a comparison of philosophies in
the Platonic sense, e.g. as simply another dialogue of the philosophical tradition, and
such an approach could be described for convenience's sake as a 'Platonic' reading of
Zoroastrianism.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE CREATOR AND THE CREATION
Plato
1. Identifying the Creator
To identify the Creator is a task that even Plato complains about. He states that the
Demiurge is not easily discovered, and even if he is, to tell all men about it would be
impossible (Timaeus 28c). But by following the descriptions of the creator and his
activities, one can piece together the general idea that Plato had in mind. The creator
is not a dogmatic figure to be worshipped, however, and Plato wisely leaves most
conclusions about the creator to whomsoever chooses to contemplate him. What can
be safely inferred will be discussed below.
Whether or not Plato sought to depict his Demiurge as anthropomorphic is unclear.
As Bevan (1962:224) notes, the Platonic school certainly saw the traditional concept
of an anthropomorphic deity as symbolic of a reality which could only be
apprehended by "Mind", and therefore had no characteristics perceivable by the
senses. Platonically, things apprehended by Mind could not be seen with the senses,
only imperfect imitations had concrete physical existence. So, even if the Demiurge
were to be anthropomorphic he could not have physical existence, for it would imply
imperfection. But the tradition of anthropomorphic gods was neither negated nor
affirmed by Plato's concept of the Creator nor of the traditional Greek pantheon.
Although the Creator and the gods he creates all display anthropomorphic
characteristics, the human form resembles the divine only in the spherical microcosm
of the soul, centred in the cranium. The rest of the human form is created in addition
to the spherical microcosm of the soul, only to aid in the six different motions as a
navigational mechanism or "convenient vehicle" under the direction of the soul
(Timaeus 44d). The concept of creating, although referring to a type of craftsmanship
and a physical cutting and shaping of materials, does not imply any anthropomorphic
characteristics in terms of physical appearance (other than the visible spherical planets
that are gods).
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The question of morality and religion necessarily arises when contemplating Plato's
Demiurge, but his role in these two spheres is very obscure. Although it could be
argued that a division between these two domains is apparent in fifth-century Athens,
religion and morality are inherently associated in most cultures, and it is likely to have
been the case (however subtly) in Greece. Stewart (1960:76-77) argues that the God
of religious consciousness is first and foremost a separate individual, and that the idea
of a separate individuality or personality of God is as important to the religious
consciousness as the idea of a separate individuality or personality of the 'Self is to
the moral consciousness, and they are irrevocably dependent upon and linked to each
other. It is therefore also important that the creator's relation to the 'Self be
considered.
Although the Demiurge is not portrayed as an individual, nor as a power that involves
itself further than creation, he is repeatedly associated with the Good, or creating the
best. Plato might not have commented much on a type of personal god, but morality
and the fate of the soul were concerns that he did address at length. Regarding the
fate of the soul (and morality, which seems intertwined with it), the idea of the Good
repeatedly arises. Having the Good in mind (grasping it philosophically) is all the
soul needs to do to attain 'salvation' from its physical trap, for knowing the Good will
necessarily make the actions initiated by the soul moral and good (according to Plato,
and to Socrates before him). The Demiurge is perhaps not an individual 'Self (in the
moral or religious tradition), but he is axial to the salvation of the Platonic soul in that
he is not only associated with the Good, but also the creator of the best of all possible
physical worlds that are to reflect the Forms, and he can thus be contemplated along
with the Forms.
How he must be contemplated is not made clear, although the detail Plato gives to the
process of creating the physical world from the Forms seems to be a practical
suggestion of how to accomplish the task. Why he should be contemplated is not
stated explicitly either, but, once again, Plato supplies an example rather than the
reason in that in the Timaeus the discussion of how the Forms were used as model for
the creation of the physical world is given even more contemplation and detailed
attention than the discussion of the Forms. Moreover, the Demiurge is associated
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with the Form of the Good, and as such both are the culmination of what should be
realised in terms of contemplation and action.
The process of creation seems to be very important in the Timaeus as well, but to the
question why this was the focus, there is no definite answer. I suggest that, keeping in
mind that Plato himself calls it a myth (Timaeus 29c, 48c), the mythical concept of
creation should be explored further. Creating the ideal soul in oneself is the first step
to creating the ideal 'soul' for society, or rather a perfect polity, like the Demiurge
creating the ideal universe. The ultimate goal Plato has in addressing a philosopher is,
after all, to provoke action, not passive reception, and the creation-theme is well
suited for the purpose of inciting action for the good.
The creator himself does not appear to have a soul, however, and is rather identified
with the higher principle, Mind, which is the route to the improvement of the soul.
Hackforth (1936:439), from the descriptions of nous (intelligence) in the Philebus
(23c-30e) and the Timaeus (34c), and of psyche (soul) in the Philebus (30b) and the
Timaeus (29a), infers that the creator is identified with Reason or Intelligence (nous),
and it seems that, contrary to popular belief, he is not identified with Soul (psyche).
The description of nous (intelligence) in the Philebus (23c-30e), which is the cause
that combines peras (limit) and apeiron (the boundless), corresponds to the Demiurge
in the Timaeus (29a), who brings chaos into order by "Forms and Numbers". The
description of psyche in the Philebus (30b), that the Soul of the Universe is distinct
from the nous that created it, corresponds to the Demiurge in the Timaeus (34c), who
is described as devising a soul for the world as well as a body. The Timaeus (34c)
does postulate that the gods have souls, but these are the planetary gods whom the
Demiurge has made, and whose souls he created. The Demiurge, by contrast, is not
described as having a soul, but as making souls.
Hackforth (1936:439) draws two conclusions from these correlations, namely that the
Demiurge is to be identified with nous (reason), i.e. that he is the "mythical"
equivalent of reason, and that nous is a more ultimate principle than the psyche of the
cosmos. Hackforth (1936:439-440), considering in his analysis how these factors in
the Philebus and the Timaeus tally with Plato's argument to refute atheists in the Laws
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X, believes that the same relation between the World-Soul and Reason is present in all
three dialogues, and that Plutarch's argument for a hierarchy of souls culminating in a
single supreme soul is absent from Plato's theories entirely.
Whether or not the good and evil World-Souls exist, the creator does not seem to be
identified with "soul" at all. In order to establish where Plato's theism fits in with
these indications, for the identification of the creator is complicated by Plato's wide
application of the term theos (god or divinity), Hackforth (1936:440-441) proposes
two dogmatic criteria for his identification of Plato's God: firstly, God must have
independent, not derivative, existence, and secondly, he must be the source, or cause,
of all that is "good, orderly and rational" in the universe, but not of anything that is
"evil, disorderly or irrational".
Hackforth's first criterion (1936:441-442) cannot be satisfied by psyche, for psyche is
asserted to be (or have) a genesis, or "participate in birth" (Laws 892c, 967d). This
application of the term genesis to psyche does not imply creation in time any more
than the application of genesis in the Timaeus (28b) means that the Universe was
created in time; rather, the meaning in both cases is that they are "derivative
existents", and their being is therefore dependent on a more ultimate principle
(Hackforth 1936: 442).
Hackforth (1936:442) argues that the reason scholars have disregarded the attribution
of genesis to psyche is that they have assumed that Plato set out to prove that the gods
of the Laws (Bk. X) are ultimate principles, but Hackforth points out that Plato did not
intend to communicate his "full metaphysical theories, or even his philosophy of
religion, in the Laws", but rather to create a sound basis of religion and morality for
the greater population with the minimum philosophical doctrine. Hackforth
(1936:442) also points out that what Plato considered "impossible" in the Timaeus
(28c) cannot be expected to be executed by a rather simplistic argument in the Laws,
and the complex issue of the relation of nous to the Universe or to psyche should not
be sought in the Laws.
In fact, the arguments refuting atheism in the Laws (Bk. X) postulate gods that are
very similar to the gods that are the heavenly bodies in the Timaeus. The argument in
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the Laws (Bk. X) establishes the processes of the umverse as dependent upon
movement, and further establishes soul as the only self-mover (896a), which means
that the universe is directed by souls, good or bad. As Hackforth points out
(1936:442), it is not specified whether there is one good soul or many, nor whether
there is one bad soul or many, but merely that there must be at least two souls, one
good and one bad. Furthermore, there is no indication that the good soul or souls
control the bad soul or souls, but it is said (Laws 897c-898c) that the regular
movements of the heaven and "all that is in it" (such as the stars, sun, moon, and
planets) are controlled by "one soul, or more than one, possessing all excellence"
(898c) (Hackforth 1936:442-443).
The gods of the Timaeus have heavenly spheres for bodies, but their movements are
directed by the movements of their souls, the regularity of which are to form "time" as
a "moving image of eternity" (37c-39d). In the Timaeus these souls were created, and
therefore the gods of the Laws could be viewed as the creations of the Demiurge of
the Timaeus, although it would have been unnecessary to point this out in the Laws. It
is only reasonable to assume that the gods used for proof in the Laws are to be
worshipped by the common people, but that the ultimate deity of the Timaeus cannot
be proven, and need not be proven to the non-philosophers of Plato's Magnesian
society. The Demiurge is to be contemplated only by those who are philosophers,
such as Timaeus, although they themselves cannot hope to fully understand the
creator himself. The concept of God in the Timaeus leaves room for doubt if, even if
contemplated by the philosopher, and could not possibly serve as a watertight
argument for unbelievers in the Laws.
The elite audience for whom the Timaeus was intended is linked with the
inaccessibility of the Demiurge, even to philosophical enquiry, and this inaccessibility
certainly seems to explain the complete exclusion of the Demiurge from the practical
manifesto of the Laws. Furthermore, the Demiurge in the Timaeus was also the
creator of the psyche, and most likely therefore did not have a soul himself. The
sovereignty of the souls of the gods in the Laws (897c-898c) therefore refers to the
sovereignty granted by the Demiurge of the Timaeus to the souls of the gods he
created (Timaeus 37c-40c), and does not imply that the Demiurge himself is to be
identified with soul. Hackforth (1936:443) argues that the creator, as described in the
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Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws, cannot be or have a psyche, for psyche does not satisfy
the first criterion he set, namely that God must have independent, not derivative,
existence, and therefore the Demiurge must not be identified with psyche, but with
nous. It remains to be seen whether or not psyche satisfies Hackforth's second
criterion, that it cannot be the author of evil but solely of good.
Hackforth (1936:443-444) notes that, in the Laws, the movements belonging to
psyche itself include wish, deliberation, tendency, true and false judgement, love and
hate, etc. (Laws 897a), but it is carefully added that the psyche is good or bad in
accordance with its association with nous or its lack of association with nous
respectively. This correlates to the section in the Philebus (30b), which says that
cause devises psyche, and the section in the Timaeus (2ge-30b), which states that God
wanted to make all things as good as possible, and hence "as like himself as possible"
(2ge), and therefore planted nous (reason) into psyche (soul) and soul into body to
ensure that his work would result in the highest and best nature (Hackforth 1936:444).
Hackforth (1936:444) concludes that Reason and Soul are both found in the universe,
owing to the action of God, but God himself is identified with Reason, and the
universe remains good and rational as far as God's reason and goodness are imparted
to it, whereas the absence of these factors causes the universe to be evil and irrational.
It is therefore nous and not psyche that satisfies both criteria relating to the nature of
Plato's God.
2. Reason/Intelligence and the Persuasion of Necessity in Creation
Timaeus's account of the world is divided into three sections. The first describes the
work of reason and the construction of the soul of the world by the Demiurge
(Timaeus 30c-47e); the second explains the role of necessity (Timaeus 48a-68e); and
the third attempts to explain the reconciliation of reason and necessity in the objects
and persons of the phenomenal world (Timaeus 69a-92c).
It has already been established that the creator is to be identified with nous (Reason or
Intelligence), but we must now examine how Reason operates, and thereby discover
how the creator operates. Plato states that Necessity was "persuaded" by Intelligence
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to form the orderly cosmos (Timaeus 48a). According to Morrow (1950:421), this
passage (the second part of the division mentioned above) is generally regarded as
asserting something of central importance in Plato's cosmology, but exactly what it
asserts is not always clear. The identification of Reason with the creator aids
understanding, however.
Morrow (1950:421) argues that the "latent personification" of Ananke (Necessity),
Peitho (Persuasion), and Nous (Mind or Reason) is suggestive of mythology. Plato
indeed describes the entire dialogue as myth (Timaeus 29c), but Morrow (1950:421)
notes that it is perhaps referred to as myth or allegory for, if concepts such as the
"persuasion of nature" are taken literally, they create a logical paradox. However,
Morrow (1950:421-423) argues that these difficulties in interpretation dissipate, and a
lucid doctrine emerges from the Timaeus, if they are seen in the light of the problem
that confronts Plato in the Timaeus, namely how to make "the working of intelligence
intelligible" .
Certain assumptions are clearly made by Plato, such as the assumption of intelligent
design in the cosmos, and these assumptions are open to two types of criticism, as
Morrow (1950:421-422) argues any conception of the cosmos that makes teleology
fundamental must be, arising from "difficulties of faith and difficulties of logic".
Plato perceives the cosmos to be "the fairest of creations", a living and intelligent
entity which conforms to the pattern of and consciously imitates in space and time the
divine and supersensible world of Ideas (as far as it is possible) (Timaeus 29a, 30d,
38b, 39c). The likeness of creation to the divine pattern is exhibited in the
mathematical perfection of its spherical form (Timaeus 34b) and in the orderliness of
the celestial movements that form the "moving image" of eternity, namely time
(Timaeus 37c-38b). The various parts of this visible cosmos are also made with a
view to the best (Timaeus 30a), including man, who is given a soul that is intelligent
and akin to the soul of the cosmos (Timaeus 41d). Man's soul is also in a body, but it
is trapped there, and his physical state exposes him to confusion, shock and damage,
yet still provides the means to facilitate the mastery of intelligence over disorder
(Timaeus 42a-43d).
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Not all sensations that the body is capable of confuse man, however, since the organs
of vision were given to man to enable him to behold the celestial movements of the
planetary gods and so attain to philosophy (Timaeus 46d-47a), and vision is called
"the greatest gift the gods have given or ever will give to mortals" (Timaeus 47a).
Speech and hearing can also serve as allies of reason against the corporeal confusion,
and creating order and harmony in the corporeal world, just as the Demiurge created
order and harmony in the cosmos, allows man to imitate the divine according to the
intelligent design (Timaeus 46a-47d). Now, if intelligent design is a genuine cause of
natural processes, the problem that remained for Plato was to formulate its relation to
the other causes involved in these processes, or, as Morrow (1950:423) puts it, "the
problem of how to make the working of intelligence intelligible".
Morrow (1950:423) argues that nature is demonstrably causal and follows what seems
to be a pattern of predictability, which is intelligible, and which, furthermore, can be
successfully combined with a concept of "designing intelligence" without destroying
the intelligibility of the whole. Morrow (1950:423) believes that the inherent
causality of nature, "more than any absence of cosmic emotion or cosmic faith, is the
real reason why philosophers and scientists today are reluctant to make commitments
to teleology". To be able to demonstrate the presence or absence of cosmic purpose,
it must first be demonstrated that purposive activity is thinkable, but cosmic teleology
cannot be ruled out simply by assuming that causality and purpose are mutually
exclusive, although this non-teleological view of nature persists (Morrow 1950:423-
424).
Morrow (1950:424) argues that a similar dilemma confronted Plato's contemporaries
and predecessors, and believes that the pre-Platonic cosmologists, from Thales to
Democritus, have not unfairly been described as exhibiting a steady development
from "animism" to "mechanism". Morrow (1950:424) states that, although this
interest in the mechanisms of nature cannot be said to have been universal or even
clear to those who propounded it, in the later pre-Platonic cosmologies, such as those
of Leucippus and Democritus, it received "clear formulation and exclusive
importance", for their atomic theories picture the cosmos as an inevitable and
unintended or undesigned result of the collisions between eternally moving particles,
a cosmos that operates, in short, by necessity rather than design.
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Morrow (1950:424) notes that Democritus also constructed an ethical system, but it
seems to bear little resemblance to his theories on physics and is a set of basic maxims
advising moderation and other precepts that credit people with a degree of freedom
and intelligent self-control, a concept which his physics would rule out. Democritus,
says Morrow (1950:424), "exhibits the same order of confusion that may be found
amongst any well-bred scientist of today". Plato's Timaeus could therefore be viewed
as a partial answer to this "confusing" problem of combining causality and purpose.
The accent in the Timaeus on the process of creation, rather than the creator, could
also be explained if the Timaeus is viewed as a reaction to the mechanistic views of
nature mentioned above. Plato's dissatisfaction with the animistic and mechanistic
theories about the cosmos is attested to in the Phaedo (96a-99c), where Socrates
relates his early interest in "that branch of learning which is called natural science",
but says that he was dissatisfied with them because it took no account of the universal
good. This passage, according to Morrow (1950:424), contains most of the principles
that Plato was later to use in the Timaeus.
The distinction in the Phaedo (99b) is between real cause and the conditions "without
which the cause would not be a cause". This is illustrated by Socrates when he argues
that the seemingly objective observations of natural phenomena are relative (Phaedo
99d-1 01a), and his remaining to drink the hemlock is because he "thought it better to
sit here and more right to stay and submit [to the process of justice]", not because his
sinews and bones are currently in this specific position (Phaedo 98e), the latter being
the total interpretation that observation of natural science could offer. In fact,
Socrates says that his bones and sinews "would have been in the neighbourhood of
Megara or Boetia long ago (impelled by a conviction of what is best!)", if he did not
judge it best to remain. The implication is that the non-physical cause of Socrates's
judgement controls the physical.
It is important to note, however, that the physical conditions that enable the cause to
act are not unimportant to the process, although they do not dictate the outcome.
Without the bones and sinews, Socrates admits that he could not do what he deemed
best, for they enable him to act, but to say that the physical conditions are the true
cause, and not his choice or judgement in the matter, "would be a very lax and
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inaccurate form of expression" (Phaedo 98e). Morrow (1950:424) argues that this not
only indicates that these secondary causes are necessary, but that it implies that a
knowledge of them is a good thing to have.
Socrates extends the analogy to the cosmos, which he argues has been interpreted as
operating on physical causes, such as Anaxagoras' s vortex, which are not sufficient
causes for the reason of the operation of the cosmos (Phaedo 99b-c). In both cases,
an account of the good is necessary for an adequate understanding, and it is goodness
which binds everything together (Phaedo 99c). Socrates does not elaborate on this
operation of the good, but Morrow (1950:425) argues that its use becomes clear and
fully adumbrated in the Timaeus. Morrow (1950:425) also argues that the distinction
made in the Phaedo between the true cause and the conditions enabling that cause
becomes in the Timaeus a distinction between two different causes, for the corporeal
is a cause as well, although merely an auxiliary cause devoid of intelligence (Timaeus
46c-e).
The true cause of the Timaeus, sometimes called the divine or intelligent cause, is an
agency working for the best, and is conceived of as a craftsman (Demiurge), a
designation which has often been described as poetical or mythical, but which
Morrow (1950:425) believes has a very literal meanmg. The Demiurge, as a
craftsman, uses materials whose natures playa part in determining the product that the
Demiurge is to fashion. In this way they are causes as well, although only in a
secondary sense, for they are said to be "auxiliary causes" (Timaeus 46c-d, 68e, 76d).
Timaeus states that both kinds of cause must be dealt with, "keeping those that
operate intelligently and produce results that are good separate from those that operate
without reason and produce effects which are causal and random" (Timaeus 46d).
This is the programme of inquiry that Timaeus follows, and it is done, according to
Morrow (1950:425), in a manner so emphatic as to show itself in the very structure of
the dialogue. This can be seen when the stages of the discussion are analysed. In the
first part of his discourse, Timaeus is primarily concerned with the operations and
intentions of the Demiurge, and the reason that operates according to a pattern. The
discussion centres around the reason the Demiurge created the world and why he
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made only one world, made it spherical and gave it a soul which IS guided by
intelligence tTimaeus 29d-31 b).
The discus 'on continues with an account of the World-Soul and its character, the
creation of man and the good intentions of the Demiurge that can be deduced from the
harmonious and ordered proportions of man's body and soul (Timaeus 31b-37b, 39d-
47c). Having discussed these works of intelligence adequately, Plato continues with
an analysis of the materials with which the Demiurge has worked thus far (Timaeus
47c-48d), and therefore with a discussion of the secondary causes. At this point
(Timaeus 48a) Timaeus retraces his steps and must "begin again from the beginning"
in order to take account of "the indeterminate cause" and to consider what is "the
nature of fire, water, earth and air before the beginning of the world and what their
state was then" (Timaeus 48b).
These elements are the causes of the cosmos according to the Pre-Socratics, but Plato
calls them "indeterminate", refers to their operations as the "work of necessity", and
views them as causes secondary or auxiliary to the prime cause in the cosmos, the
Demiurge. The third section in the dialogue (Timaeus 68d-92c) is a demonstration of
how the works of intelligence, the primary cause, and the works of necessity, the
secondary causes, cooperate to produce the cosmos according to the pattern which
intelligence or reason seeks to follow.
According to Morrow (1950:426), Plato, much like his predecessors, conceives of the
initial state of these materials and their powers as a world "in unstable equilibrium
and in continuous motion, with things being pushed by others and being compelled,
for there is no void, to push others in turn". The four traditional elements of fire, air,
earth, and water, as well as the familiar opposites of pre-Socratic thought, the wet and
dry, hot and cold, dense and rare, are present, as Morrow (1950:426) notes. The
continuous motion of these elements results in the dense and heavy things separating
from the rare and light things, and each additionally has the tendency to move or be
thrust towards its kindred element, causing perpetual motion in the elements, "rather
like the contents of a winnowing basket" (Timaeus 52d-53b).
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Plato's theory of the elements included a postulate that Morrow (1950:427) calls a
"novelty", namely that the elements had inherent geometric structures, such as a cube
form for earth atoms and a pyramid structure for fire particles. Plato also viewed the
differences in the character of these elements as inherently connected to their
geometry, and postulated that they could combine to form new geometric figures (and
therefore one element could transform into another element), which would explain
their continuous motion as well (Timaeus 53c-61 b). The constant movement and
transformation of the elements meant that they caused each other to form and disband,
and is part of the cause that Plato refers to as "necessity", but what Plato means by the
term "necessity" is more complicated than the formations of the various elements.
Necessity, according to Morrow (1950:427), refers to the causal effect which A has
on B, and therefore, if B is to be in the state that it is, it needs A, and the necessity that
characterises this world before intelligence comes into play is therefore simply its
necessity as a means to the ends that intelligence would produce. Furthermore,
Morrow (1950:428) points out that there is a "definite dependable structure and
behaviour" of the elements, which must be a characteristic of these means if they are
to be usable for the creator's ends, and it is therefore also the dependable nature and
regularity of the effects the elements produce upon each other that Plato means by
"necessity" .
The proof that this is Plato's meanmg, according to Morrow (1950:428), is the
amount of attention he gives (from page 48 to almost the end of the Timaeus) to the
analysis of the works of necessity. Plato discussed everything from the elements
themselves to their transformation into each other; the formation of the various fluids,
metals, and other substances; their operation in the phenomena of melting and
cooling, freezing and thawing; in the production of qualities of hot and cold, heavy
and light; as well as tastes, smells, sounds, colours, and sensations of pleasure and
pain. Plato also explains their involvement in the structure of the human body, with
specific reference to internal anatomy, such as the structure of bone and sinew, the
flow of blood and air, and the various afflictions that are possible. In short, the world
on which the creator sets to work "is characterised by necessity in the sense that
specific effects follow regularly from specific causes. It is because this is true that the
creator can use these works of necessity for his purpose" (Morrow 1950:428).
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By the same logic, necessity, which is a neutral motion of cause and effect, is infused
with intelligence and ordered according to a design by the creator for good. The
creator creates from these materials a world that interacts on their inherent laws, but
by the same token is limited by these inherent laws and cannot make a perfect or exact
'moving copy' of the Forms. Therefore, necessity is also the secondary cause of all
that occurs, for good or evil. But before one attributes evil to matter, one must note
that necessity is not matter, but the way in which matter causally interacts without
purpose or intelligence. This is reminiscent of human acts of morality or immorality,
for a person acts morally when he has knowledge about what is best, but if his actions
are devoid of this intelligence, they are purposeless and could be immoral. The
moralor immoral behaviour of man is therefore analogous to the good or evil working
of necessity, when it is either infused with or devoid of intelligence.
The question that remains is how the Demiurge (as the intelligent cause) uses the
works of necessity to accomplish his purposes. Here we must come to terms with the
metaphor of the craftsman whose purpose is reflected in the cosmic design, because
the problem, according to Morrow (1950:428-429), is explaining how intelligent
purpose relates to causal order, and the analogy of the craftsman is an instance of just
such an intelligent design and purpose. Morrow (1950:429) argues that the origin of
Plato's analogy comes from "universal and familiar human experience in guiding the
works of necessity to an end we regard as good", and the problem of how to make this
experience intelligible is solved by showing that craftsmanship is possible anywhere,
in however limited a measure. This analogy is possible because the microcosm
inevitably reflects the macrocosm, no matter how imperfectly, and the same principles
can be applied to (and purposive and creative activity can be inferred from) everyday
experiences, which would help to clarify the method of such activity and help relate it
to the activity of the Demiurge in the creation of the cosmos.
How intelligence "persuades" necessity seems to be another metaphor, according to
Morrow (1950:429), but the precise meaning of this persuasion needs clarification.
Persuasion is contrasted with compulsion, and Morrow (1950:429) argues that "every
competent craftsman knows that he cannot force material to take on forms or perform
functions that go against their nature". The description of persuasion would therefore
appear to refer to the existing characteristics of the elements which the craftsman has
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to utilise to his own ends, but which he cannot alter, only employ intelligently. To
serve certain purposes, however, some materials are more suited than others, Morrow
(1950:429) argues, and the innate qualities of the materials must be used, while their
shortcomings must be suppressed as far as possible. The Demiurge can therefore use
the innate qualities of the elements themselves in a mechanistic way, such as
employing opposites to regulate effects, but all is done with reason persuading
necessity to cooperate in fulfilment of the design and purpose.
Importantly, intelligence is responsible not for the specific effects of any given power
or set of powers, but for bringing together these specific powers into such
juxtapositions and collocations that their joint natural effects are good. Persuasion is
therefore the technique of intelligence, in the sense that it is the "proper means for
accomplishing what we will with others - whether inanimate materials or thinking
men - by understanding them so thoroughly that we can use the forces inherent in
them to bring about the end we desire" (Morrow 1950:430-431). According to this
analysis, then, we can interpret the roles in the Timaeus of necessity and intelligence
in the creation.
When the craftsman finds "the visible universe III a state not of rest but of
inharmonious and disorderly motion. [and reduces it] to order from disorder"
(Timaeus 30a), the elements of the material world are in a state of disorder because
the causal process has no harmony or purpose, and therefore works to a counter-
purpose or no purpose. Necessity is also called the "wandering", "errant" or
"indeterminate" cause (Timaeus 48a) and it produces effects which are "causal and
random" (Timaeus 46e), yet it is not a state of primordial chaos without any
observable pattern, for there is some form of causal operation in the motions of the
elements, determined by their physical states. Nevertheless, all this causal and
random activity is devoid of intelligence, for causality does not preclude randomness
(or chance), and the motion remains devoid of purpose.
Morrow (1950:432) argues, from Timaeus 46e, that it is not the lack of intelligence
which makes this state chaotic, but the combination of necessity and chance, an
emphasis on chance which Plato describes as a feature of the pre-Platonic materialist
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cosmologies in the Laws Bk. X. 'Chance' (tuche), along with 'nature' (phusis) and
'matter' (soma), are opposed to 'soul' (psyche) and 'design' (techne) (Laws 888c-
890b), but 'chance', as it appears in the Timaeus, could also be viewed as exactly the
opposite of reason, insofar as reason is connected with purpose or design, which is the
operation of reason. This causal motion, which is random insofar as it is devoid of
intelligence and thus devoid of purpose or plan, is therefore the basic material from
which the creator observes the causal structure and then orders it with intelligence
according to its predictable interactions.
Morrow (1950:433) argues that necessity is represented by causal sequences, whereas
chance is the intersection and conjunction of these causal sequences, whether relevant
to a purpose or not, because they are unplanned. Thus, when intelligence enters the
equation, according to Morrow (1950:434), certain sequences, which are not
necessarily connected, occur together and occur habitually, therefore ruling out their
occurrence as chance, producing effects that could not have been predetermined by
their chance interaction, but only from their continual collective occurrence. This
means that the repeated occurrence follows a pattern, and that this pattern is the result
of reason or intelligence persuading necessity to conform to it. The reason for the
specific pattern which necessity follows is directly related to the good of the effect
produced, according to Morrow (1950:434), for it is the good that "binds things
together", as Plato states in the Phaedo (99d). The purpose is therefore good, and so
the effect of applying this purpose to necessity makes the outcome good as well.
It is not only the purpose that is good, however, as Plato also indicates in the Timaeus
that the good is realised by persuasion. Morrow (1950:436) argues that this is a good
distinct from the outcome of persuasion, since persuasion is a process that encourages
cooperation between indifferent forces, and by this process of persuasion the creator
makes the forces or elements into a unity that has "acquired concord" (Timaeus 32c,
88e), producing not only the foundation for higher ends, but an intrinsic good, "the
kind of good that is essential to any community".
The cooperation of materials as a means to the good, and an end in itself, can be seen
in the Timaeus as a cooperation of the cosmic materials, but Morrow (1950:437)
argues that the analogy extends to the proposed trilogy, the Critias and Hermocrates,
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and is carried out in the Laws. Morrow (1950:437) believes that, if it is kept in mind
that the two later sections of the intended trilogy were to deal with human history and
politics, the problem confronting the statesman is essentially one of bringing about
concord and cooperation among his "human materials", at which he will succeed,
according to Plato (Laws 708d-712b), if he uses "persuasion" to guide the state, be it
in the form of legislation or moral prerequisites.
The divine craftsman therefore sets the example and provides the setting for the
activity of the intelligent statesman, by bringing into being a cosmos built upon the
friendly cooperation of its varied parts (Morrow 1950:437). It is not insignificant, I
believe, that the dialogues of the proposed Timaeus-Critias-Hermocrates trilogy have
a pervading theme of intelligence that persuades necessity, and was abandoned
halfway into the Critias only to be taken up again in the Laws. It is more than
probable that the theme of the creation of the ideal cosmos that led to the theme of the
creation of the ideal state was discussed in the Timaeus and the Laws respectively, as
many coinciding details bear out.
The completion of the Critias in the Laws is not necessarily an indication of
chronological order, however, although both the Timaeus and the Laws belong to the
latter years of Plato's life. There is a very strong suggestion that continuity of thought
is traceable, however, with the activity of intelligence as the theme of both the
Timaeus and the Laws. In the Timaeus it has a theoretical application (contemplation
of the Forms and deductions about the well-ordered and harmonious cosmos) and in
the Laws it has a practical application (contemplation of justice leading to just laws
and a well-run and harmonious state). The role of Plato's philosopher-statesman is
well-known, and it is not difficult to conceive of how he is to bring harmony and
order to the state, but his cosmic counterpart in the Timaeus, the Demiurge, is a far
more obscure figure, and although the Demiurge may be compared to the
philosopher-ruler, the analogy is limited, and certain assumptions must be made about
both the Demiurge and the cosmos.
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3. Creation as modelled on the Creature (Forms)
The Timaeus (29a-31 b) states that since the Demiurge is entirely good and desired all
things to be like himself, he set about creating order in the chaotic universe. The
Demiurge created the cosmos from a model, which ties in well with his status as
craftsman. This model had to consist of the ideal of which all living beings
"individually and generically are parts, and which comprises in itself all intelligible
beings, just as this world contains ourselves and all visible creatures", and as such, the
model was the highest and most completely perfect of intelligible things itself, and
therefore the Demiurge created its copy as "a single living being containing all living
beings of the same natural order" (Timaeus 30b). The creation of only one world also
conforms with the fact that the model is singular because it is unique, or "one" and
"whole", and therefore the copy must also be singular (Timaeus 30c, 55d, 92c).
There is a constant correlation between the intelligible world of Forms and the
phenomenal world, although the latter is an imperfect copy and only imitates the
intelligible world as closely as its material allows. McCabe (1994:163) argues that,
because of the imitation of the model by the Demiurge, the cosmos can be explained
teleologically, and, furthermore, that in order to understand the visible cosmos (or
copy), the intelligible universe (or original model) must be kept in mind. Another
factor to be considered is that the Demiurge, desiring the good, creates the world in
imitation of the model, and is therefore an analogy for any purposive activity in the
sense that the model or ideal must be imitated if the good is to be attained. The
correlation between the world of Forms and the corporeal world extends to a
correlation of the microcosm and the macrocosm, and an interrelation between the
parts of the whole.
What Timaeus means by describing the universe as "whole", as well as its related
description of being "one", needs clarification, however. McCabe (1994:165) argues
that Aristotle (Politics III.2) saw the "one" and "whole" as "syncategorematic
expressions, incomplete without some qualifier", but it becomes apparent that their
meaning entails a lot more than that, which becomes clear if the passage is analysed in
its entirety. McCabe (1994:164) interprets this qualifying aspect of the terms "one"
and "whole" as a problem that is to be understood not contextually, but internally.
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The term "whole" refers to the universe as a whole because it entails everything, and
excludes nothing, which means that it not only includes all possible forms or "visible
copies" of every intelligible thing that exists, but also that it does not leave any visible
copy of an intelligible thing out of its "whole". It is therefore exhaustive and all-
inclusive, according to McCabe (1994: 164-165), and the use of the term is absolute,
for it also implies an internal coherence in the complex whole, and its internal parts
are well ordered to form a coherent whole.
The wholeness of the cosmos (and the model) in tum implies that it is "one", because
if it is to be whole, and leaves no aspect unaccounted for and every aspect within it is
well ordered, it must therefore also be one and not many, as many would need a
bigger whole to account for the multiplicity of their existence as many worlds. Like
"whole", the expression of it being "one" is absolute and complete. This analysis of
the entire universe and its model could also apply equally to the constituent parts and
to individuals, and therefore it is also a general statement. It is perhaps possible that
what is expressed as one and whole could be better described as having singularity
and unity. It is also possible to describe the unity and singularity of the universe in
terms of both external context and internal constitution. By comparison, Timaeus's
description of the material world also has the same two aspects that lend credence to
the interpretation of context and content.
Timaeus's discussion (Timaeus 31b) deals with the visible cosmos, and therefore with
its material constitution, for, as McCabe (1994: 165) points out, since it is visible, it
must be fiery, since it is tangible it must be earthy, since it is three-dimensional, it
must have geometrical proportion, since it is geometrically proportioned it needs two
"middle terms" to act as bonds, and thus it has air and water. The creator constructed
the world in this way to ensure that it is a complete living being, a whole of complete
parts, and further, that it should be single, and there should be nothing left over out of
which another such whole could come into being (Timaeus 31b-33a). Again the
argument about internal constitution and external context is applicable.
Firstly, the cosmos is a unity "from within" by virtue of the internal order of its parts,
an account of it being an individual, which is markedly Eleatic, according to McCabe
(1994: 166), who specifically refers to the description of the spherical shape as ideal
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(Timaeus 33b) and the fact that the universe is single-generated (Timaeus 92c) as
concepts which correlate to the Eleatic sphairoeides and mounogenes respectively.
Parmenides argued that his "one" is one and the same as itself because of its internal
consistency and coherence (DK28B8.22-30, 42-49), and he infers from that premise
that it is the only "individual" there is. Elsewhere Parmenides also provides Plato
with a discussion of the questions of how many things there are and how each counts
as one (cf Parmenides 137ff, Sophist 244f£). If we understand 'being one' in this
way, we treat individuation absolutely (McCabe 1994: 166).
Secondly, the cosmos is a unity of something from without by virtue of its exhaustion
of all the materials from which universes are made, for exhausting the "without", or
the possibility of anything that could be external ensures unity ensured (McCabe
1994:166). Therefore context is important to individuation, and McCabe (1994:166-
167) argues that individuation is relative because of this context, and interprets
Timaeus's argument that the cosmos is one because it exhausts all there is around it,
in spirit at least, as an argument for "context-relative individuation".
McCabe (1994: 167) substantiates this by saying Timaeus suggests "not that we can
count the universe by sorting universes, but that we can count it by looking at the
context in which it exists and by considering its possible differences from everything
else". Because the context is exhausted, according to McCabe (1994: 167), there is no
possibility but to have one universe only, and the two perspectives on individuation,
one internal and absolute, the other external and context-relative, are complementary.
If the assumption of a context is explored further, one must necessarily arrive at the
factor of the interrelatedness in the cosmos, and specifically between its "parts", again
returning to the relation between microcosm and macrocosm; The interrelatedness of
the parts of the physical world is also connected with the bond that ties together these
parts and pervades the world, namely the substance of soul. Once again, this aspect of
creation can be related to the unity and singularity of the internal constitution and
external exhaustion of the cosmos.
The section in the Timaeus that deals with the creation of the soul (34c-37c) describes
the Demiurge creating soul out of a mixture of intermediate Existence, Sameness and
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Difference, which is then divided and cut into strips which infuse and permeate the
cosmos in strands of World-Soul. This explains the teleology and unity of the world,
according to McCabe (1994: 168), as well as the cognitive capacities of the universe,
because the World-Soul can identify Sameness, Difference, Existence, and the
interrelatedness of all of these. The earlier argument of the universe being one and
whole is now offered in equivalent form regarding its self-identity - namely, that it is
one and the same because it has the appropriate layers of the right sort of Sameness,
Difference, and Existence (McCabe 1994: 168).
The Platonic concepts of Sameness and Difference probably originated with the
Greek idea that reasoning consisted essentially of discriminating between sameness
(affirmation) and difference (negation) (Lee 1977:47), and the Platonic concepts
therefore imply a context-relative meaning. Because identity is also fundamentally
context-relative, as has been argued by McCabe (1994: 167), it is easy to assume that
individuation relies on the differences and similarities that aid in the identification of
individuals, but McCabe (1994: 169) also points out that Timaeus approaches
Sameness and Difference otherwise, and treats Sameness, Difference, and Existence
as "extended quasi-material ingredients" and absolutes (the latter in the sense of his
absolute treatment of the terms "whole" and "one").
The intermediate Sameness and Difference that are parts of the cosmic psyche are
therefore not relative (the same as one thing, different from another) but absolute, just
Sameness, Difference "simpliciter" (McCabe 1994: 169). Once again the account of
the identity of the World-Soul can be seen as having general application to accounting
for any identity within the world (or World-Soul). The emphasis that Timaeus places
on the analogy between the things in the world and the world itself recurs many times
(Timaeus 30c, 32d, 33a, 34b, 55d). Individuation, therefore, operates on the level of
both macrocosm and microcosm.
In dealing with the creation of soul and the problem of individuation, Timaeus now
limits the previous qualification of the context-relative individuation of the physical
world to the absolute individuation of the World-Soul. The reason for this becomes
apparent as soon as one remembers that the soul's constituents of being Same and
Different enable the cognitive capacities to operate in terms of identification of
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sameness and difference in specific instances. Individuation was previously satisfied
by a context-relative identification, but if everything is context-relative, one succumbs
to the ultimate relativism of the Sophists, and only through absolute individuation can
there be any standard or final measure from which context-relativity can operate.
Thus, there must be a standard that is not context-specific or dependent on anything.
It follows that the material cannot fulfil these criteria, and material needs to be
ordered by intelligence into an association with the standard (Forms) in order for
material to be in any way good, or individual. This individuality remains derivative,
however. The elements, therefore, as candidates for the basic principles of the
universe, despite their central role in some earlier cosmologies as well as in Plato's
cosmology, are not the ultimately basic principles that the pre-Socratic philosophers
assumed they were. Instead, they are described as constantly changing into one
another, and because of this flux they are not only impermanent but they cannot be
described in speech, nor can they be the principles of order in the universe.
In the identification of an element (for instance, fire), McCabe (1994:178) argues that
the first impulse is to identify it as fire, but when it changes into air it can neither be
said that it is fire (for it has ceased to be fire and become air) nor can it be said that it
is air (for it has only just become air) (cf the discussion of the "process of cyclic
transformation" of the elements in Timaeus 49c-d). The transitory nature of the
elements does not enable them to suffice as principles, and the search for what is basic
(the underlying principle) is therefore still unresolved. This search, as McCabe
(1994: 178) describes it, is for "what came first in time (what underlies cosmogony),
and also for what comes first in constitution (what underlies what is here and now)".
Put differently, this can be described as the search for what is "one" (and thus first)
and "whole", or has unity (and is thus fundamental to the phenomenal). According to
McCabe (1994: 178), Heraclitus (Theaetetus 183a-b) faced similar difficulties with the
instability of the elements and their failure to supply an adequate solution to the
problem that for the world to be arranged properly, it needs to be based on fixed
elements, and likewise, if speech is possible, there must be a proper subject to speak
about. The elements also defy reason because they are neither Same nor Different,
and have no Existence or Being, for they are constantly becoming.
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4. The Receptacle
This problem is solved by Timaeus with the introduction of the receptacle (Timaeus
48d-51 b), the "nurse of becoming" (Timaeus 52c), which serves as the underlying
principle by which these problems may be solved. This substrate, also described as
space, underlies all change, but does not change itself. It is the basis in which non-
basic qualities such as fire can inhere. The receptacle of becoming performs several
functions, such as allowing something to persist through change and providing the
space in which change can occur, as well as being a referent for sensible speech by
providing the "this", without which sentences cannot be constructed, or the constant,
from which the perpetual change can be described.
In the receptacle, McCabe (1994: 180) notes, the imitations of the intelligible Forms
come to be, change and perish, while the substrate remains changeless throughout
because it itself has no qualities or properties save indeterminacy. This lack of
properties is likened to the odourless liquid which forms the base of perfume, or to
gold that can be moulded into shapes, for the receptacle provides the tabula rasa for
change and difference, while it remains constant itself (Timaeus 50d-51 b). McCabe
(1994:180-182) describes the receptacle as "itself remaining just 'this' and nothing
else", thus by elimination, the receptacle is self-identical and non-identical with
anything else, it is individual - just itself and no more.
The individuation of the receptacle is also absolute, therefore, but in being
characteristically characterless, it is difficult to describe. lts existence is really only
conceivable (and therefore attested to) by the need for something which underlies the
changing elements and what they form, without being subject to this flux itself. By
satisfying these criteria, it must itself display criteria such as indeterminateness and
unqualified existence of absolute individualism. Although the criteria are logically
deductible, there can be no description because of these selfsame criteria.
Yet, like soul, albeit for a different function, the receptacle has to have absolute
individuation. Because of the relation between the parts of the phenomenal world, for
which the bond is the World-Soul, there also has to be a spatial bond, which is
fulfilled by the receptacle. Both the World-Soul and the receptacle are described as
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individuals and entities in themselves, and both perform a function in the visible
universe according to the wishes of the Demiurge and the plan of the intelligible
uruverse.
According to McCabe (1994: 184), it could be argued against this that, although myth
is readily profligate with its entities, science and philosophy are "parsimonious",
which results in the philosopher, in reading a myth, perhaps being inclined to be
skeptical about its claims and rethinking the assumptions it makes, as well as the
ontology it proposes. The Timaeus, however, which is described as a myth, was not
written as a manifesto, or the dialogue form would not have been chosen, no matter
how like a manifesto the section by Timaeus is, nor would the various references have
been made to the provisional character of the discourse. It was written in order to
prompt speculation, even skepticism, and especially rethinking.
The Receptacle has also been associated with the concept of chaos in the Septuagint
version of Genesis, a result of possible Platonic influence on ancient authors such as
Philo Judaeus and Clemens of Alexandria, as well as modem scholars, such as
Gerleman, Hengel, Sandelin and Deist, who accentuate the influence of Greek
philosophy (and especially cosmology) on these texts (Cook 1998: 180). Against this
argument of the influence of Greek philosophy at the cost of the recognition of the
unique ideological aspects. of the Septuagint, Cook (1998: 177-189) argues that the
Greek influence has been overestimated.
Zoroaster
Zoroaster inherited some beliefs about cosmology from his predecessors, and also
seems to have partially incorporated them, much as in the case of Plato. Yet in the
case of both, there was a radical shift from the previous tradition in that there is a
hitherto unique combination of factors: there is a supreme creator, the creator creates
the universe for a good purpose, and this is done through intelligence. Both describe
how this is discovered, and this discovery of the order of the universe in tum pertains
to the discovery of order within the human sphere. I shall therefore discuss
Zoroaster's thoughts on the process of creation and the creator, as well as the problem
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of evil in creation, and lastly discuss how the presence of a creator influenced both
Plato's and Zoroaster's philosophies.
Zoroaster seems to have held to the ancient belief in the sevenfold creation that he
inherited from the pagan Iranian mythological tradition. Yet Zoroaster made some
fundamental alterations as well. Collinson (1994:6) summarises the ancient tradition
of the sevenfold creation as a cosmology in which there was first the enclosing shell
of the sky, made of stone, with the world created within it, then water added to the
shell, followed by the earth flat upon it, the creation of a plant, an animal and a man in
the centre of the earth. The pagan tradition also states that there was a primordial
sacrifice of the animal and human creation by the gods, thereby causing their
multiplication and beginning the cycle of life and death (Collinson 1994:6).
Zoroaster diverged from this tradition in that he postulated one God, and also from the
divine sacrifice of the primordial bull and man, in that he postulated the one God as
the sole creator, though the later Zoroastrian tradition revived the concept of the
primordial sacrifice, believing it to be an evil act committed by Ahriman, which is
then turned to good by the benevolent Ahura Mazda, who creates earthly life from
death. This later Zoroastrian concept is not readily apparent in the Ga/has, although it
is stated that the daevas and Ako Manah (Evil Mind) have defrauded mankind of the
good life and ofImmortality (Yasna 32.3-5).
The Gathas describe this loss of the good life and immortality as the result of false
and distorted doctrines, spread by false teachers, that rob the devout of the desire for
the possession of Good Mind, a situation which will be rectified at the final Ordeal of
Fire, when only the true doctrine (i.e. of Ahura Mazda) will remain (Yasna 32.6-9).
Yet nowhere do the Gathas mention the primordial sacrifice, though they claim that
the universe will return to an unmoving primordial state at the end of time. It is
stated, however, that life and non-life were created when the Twin Spirits (Spenta
Mainyu and Angra Mainyu) first met (Yasna 30.4), and it is implied that evil entered
the world as a corrupting force against the good. The possibility of the origin of the
concept that Angra Mainyu is responsible for the sacrifice of the first life (and the
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implied sacrifice of immortality) will be discussed later in this chapter, along with the
problems of the origin of evil in the universe.
Another important aspect of the creation account of the Gathas is in the fact that the
creation, which is made by one God only, for the furtherance of the Good, is executed
through intelligence. God is the artisan who does not simply fashion existence, but
does so through the workings of the mind, with wisdom and purpose. As Duchesne-
Guillemin (1979: 17) points out, Zoroaster purged his cosmology of the sacrifice of
the primordial ox, just as he had proscribed blood sacrifices, and therefore expounded
that the world was created by God "who was conceived not merely as an artisan but as
acting directly through the mind". But before the creator is discovered, however, the
creation will be discussed.
It is said in Yasna 44.7 that creation is a free act of the divine goodness of Ahura
Mazda. He has created the universe through his wisdom and rules it through wisdom.
In the beginning, when he lived in his supreme self-sufficiency, he conceived the
thought to clothe the heavenly realm with light (Yasna 31.7). He created light, and
darkness was there, for darkness shadows light (Yasna 44.5). He upholds the earth
and the firmament from falling (Yasna 44.4). He made the moon wax and wane, and
determined the path of the sun and stars (Yasna 44.3). He yoked swiftness to the
winds and clouds (Yasna 44.4). He made morning, noon, and night (Yasna 44.5). It
is important to note that in Yasna 44.5, the shadow (which is identified with evil)
enters as soon as light is created. This could indicate that the advent of evil coincides
with the advent of creation, although creation is not evil per se.
He created kine, waters and plants (Yasna 44.4; 48.6; 51.7). The joy-giving cattle and
this universe (i.e. earth and its inhabitants, for cattle stand for all animals) are his
creations (Yasna 44.6; 50.11). He created human beings and their spirits, breathed
life into their bodies and endowed them with the freedom of will (Yasna 31.11; 46.6).
He inspired love between father and son (Yasna 44.7). He made sleep and
wakefulness (Yasna 44.5). He is the beneficent dispenser of blessings on mankind
(Yasna 28.5; 33.11; 48.3). Weal and woe are ordained by him (Yasna 45.9). He is the
father and creator of Vohu Manah (Yasna 31.8; 44.4; 45.4), of Asha (Yasna 31.7-8;
44.3; 47.2), of Khshathra (Yasna 44.7), of Armaiti (Yasna 31.9; 44.7; 45.4), of
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Haurvatat and Ameretat (Yasna 51.7), and of Geush Tashan (the Architect of
Creation) (Yasna 29.1-11; 31.9; 46.9; 47.3).
The Gathas also indicate that at the end of time, when evil is finally defeated, the
evolution of creation will have reached its culmination and the cycle of change will be
ended and perfection attained (Yasna 43.5; 51.6). The process of creation will then
come to the Final Consummation ordained by Ahura Mazda at the beginning of
creation and stop its progress, having reached the desired ultimate perfection
(Panthaki 1999:2). This end of creation is linked to the Zoroastrian belief in the
progress of sacred time, and in the eventual end of time. The belief among
Zoroastrians today, according to Shapero (1995a: 1), is that the collective good acts of
humanity will gradually transform the evil-ridden, and therefore imperfect, material
world into its heavenly ideal, a process known as the frasho-kereti (making-fresh or
renewal). Shapero (1995a:2) also notes that this process of perfection is interpreted
by Zoroastrians as implying that every individual will be purified along with creation,
even the souls in hell, and that hell is therefore not eternal.
This Final Consummation of creation is the last in three stages of the Zoroastrian
cosmogony, as Gnoli (1987:584) notes, the first two being the creation of the world
and the revelation of Mazda's "good religion". Gnoli (1987:584) further argues that,
like most ancient texts, the cosmogonic doctrine is not systematically worked out in
the Gathas, although all three stages are mentioned, and it is only later, in the Pahlavi
texts, that these three stages, respectively the Bundahishn (creation), Gumezishn (the
mingling of the two opposing spirits in the corporeal realm that is situated between
them), and Wizarishn (their final separation) are fully adumbrated.
Gnoli (1987:584) also notes that everything that exists does so in a "double state", the
physical or material (Avestan geithya, Pahlavi getig) and the mental or spiritual
(Avestan mainyava, Pahlavi menog), and that the spiritual state possesses an
"embryonic, seminal value" in relation to the material one, which reflects it. Evil,
however, only has a spiritual or mental existence, and according to the Pahlavi
literature, evil is "incapable of transforming its creation from the spiritual to the
physical state because it is innately sterile and destructive" (Gnoli 1987:584). Unlike
most dualistic concepts of the material and the spiritual, Zoroastrianism does not
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regard the material existence as evil itself, but rather as being, according to later
literature, in a state of "mixture", contaminated by destructive evil (Gnoli 1987:584).
The Gathas also speak of this negative quality of evil, which opposes the creation of
life by the good force with a negation of life, or non-life (Yasna 30.4) (Gnoli
1987:584).
2. The Creator
The first consideration in the problem of identifying the nature of Zoroaster's creator
is in establishing what Ahura Mazda was before he became the supreme God in the
Gathas, or whether antecedents can be found for Zoroaster's deity. There is much
uncertainty regarding this problem, and even regarding the name "Ahura Mazda",
which generally is translated as "Lord Wisdom", but still seems to be a concept of
which the antiquity and the meaning cannot be readily ascertained. Boyce (1975:38-
40) discusses the possible meanings of the word "mazda" and the varIOUS
interpretations that scholars have given, which I shall briefly mention below.
Boyce (1975:38) states that the word mazda has been a problematic term for
grammarians because the inflection is irregular, though they unite in regarding it as an
adjective meaning "wise". Jackson, as early as the late nineteenth century, had
interpreted the term mazda as a substantive, corresponding to the Vedic feminine
noun medha- ("mental vigour, perceptive power, wisdom"), and therefore translated
Ahura Mazda's name as "Lord Wisdom" (Boyce 1975:38). Many other scholars,
Boyce (1975:38) notes, adopted this interpretation, including Benveniste, who argued
that the concept must be an ancient one originating with the asuras of Vedic
literature, a view which was seconded by Konow (1937:217-222).
Konow (1937:218) proposed the terms "insight", "wisdom" and "prudence" as
adequate English translations of the Vedic medha-, terms apparently abstract but for
the fact that an independent existence was often attributed to such terms (Boyce
1975:38-39), much like Plato's Forms were abstract concepts that had their own
existence. Boyce (1975:39) notes that Konow and Jackson both concluded that
"Mazda" was the name of the Iranian supreme deity, from the ancient Aryan term
denoting the mental, "a highly valued and important factor in life". There was,
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however, no deification of the concept in Vedic which led to Konow's assumption
(unlike Benveniste) that Zoroaster's own "inspiration" led to the deification of the
principle mazda as the highest principle, Lord Wisdom, an argument supported by
Zoroaster's similar treatment of the "abstract" Amesha Spentas (Boyce 1975:39).
Boyce (1975:39) notes that Konow's interpretation was rejected by Humbach and
Kuiper, who argued that Ahura Mazda was an ancient god and was worshipped before
Zoroaster's reformation, whereas Thieme and Benveniste were in agreement with
Konow' s interpretation and connected Ahura Mazda with the nameless but supreme
Asura of the Rigveda. Thieme further suggested that in naming the unnamed Asura of
the Rigveda Ahura Mazda, the irregularities in grammar may have arisen from
attempts to distinguish the inflection of the proper name belonging to a masculine god
from the feminine abstract noun (Boyce 1975:39).
Support for this argument may be found in the fact that the abstract noun mazda
(meaning "memory" or "recollection"), occurs once in the Avesta, in the Yasna
Haptanhaiti, where it is in immediate juxtaposition to Ahura Mazda's own name, just
as mithra is juxtaposed to Mithra's name in his Yasht (hymn) (Yasht 10.3) (Boyce
1975:39). Boyce (1975:40) also mentions that the associated verb mazda- ("fix in
one's thoughts, remember"), which has a number of archaic elements, occurs in the
Gathas (Yasna 45.1) and in the Hom Yasht (Yasna 9.31), and the Gathic noun
mazdatha- ("a memorable thing") also occurs once in the Gathas (Yasna 30.1).
Boyce (1975:40) argues that the verb and nouns mentioned might all have vanished
from common use because of Zoroaster's reform and a possibly greater sanctity being
attached to Ahura Mazda's name.
Whatever the preceding meaning of the term, however, Ahura Mazda as the supreme
deity and creator (specifically of order) in the Gathas appears to have a striking
resemblance to the Jewish deity Jehovah. Geiger (1977:34-35) notes that there is a
correspondence between the religious ideas in Yasna 44.3-5, 7 and Psalm 104, namely
the conformity to law in nature, such as the course of the stars, the waxing and the
waning of the moon, and the succession of the day-time during which man's activity
is fixed, which is unique to both the Gathas and the Psalms, and in both cases the
supreme deity is the creator of the Order of the world. As such Mazda is freely and
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frequently mentioned in the Gathas: he is "the essential Creator of the Order of the
World" in Yasna 31.8, an appellation that must be emphasised if Ahura Mazda's
relation to the Amesha Spentas is to be understood (Geiger 1977:35).
Geiger (1977:35) further argues that if Ahura Mazda is the Creator of the world, he
too deserves all those attributes that are ascribed to Jehovah in the Old Testament.
Geiger lists some epithets to illustrate the point:
"Ahura Mazda is the Holy and Al/-just; he hates the evil or wicked, and punishes
them in this world and the next according to their due; but he takes the pious under
his protection, and bestows eternal life upon them. He is the Immutable, who is 'also
now the same' (Yasna 31.7) as he has been from eternity; he is the Almighty, who
does what he wills (Yasna 43.1); he is the All-knowing, who looks down upon man
from heaven, and watches all their projects and designs which are open or secret
(Yasna 31.13). Furthermore, Ahura Mazda is a Spirit; he is a Being, who cannot be
invested with human traits of character; he is the Spenishta Mainyu, "Most Bountiful
Spirit" (Yasna 43.2), the Absolute Goodness or Bounty. In fact, anthropomorphic
ideas or representations are very rare in the Gathas. Where such ideas occur, they are
to be interpreted as the simple result of poetical usage or licence. To Zoroaster Ahura
Mazda was doubtless as much a spiritual, supersensible, incomprehensible and
indescribable Being as Jehovah was to the poets of the Psalms" (Geiger 1977:35-36).
Although it is apparent that Ahura Mazda and Jehovah share many characteristics, it
seems the latter's inconceivability (presumably resulting in the aniconic tradition)
does not seem to be an absolute characteristic of the Gathic creator. Ahura Mazda,
although he seems only sensible in the sense of the sum of his characteristics (the
Amesha Spentas), is also the Lord of Wisdom, and operates through this wisdom,
making him comprehensible through wisdom, a concept which is partly the
philosophical principle of a mind being able to fathom universal reason which is its
like. This is also found in Plato's doctrine, though he too denies that ultimate
understanding of the creator is possible.
Zoroaster himself states, however, that Ahura Mazda is grasped through Vohu Manah
(Good Mind) (Yasna 28.2; 31.8), and God's might and majesty shall reach man and
grow within him through the same Vohu Manah (Yasna 31.5; 32.1). God's virtue can
be attained by emulation of the virtues embodied in the Amesha Spentas (Yasna 30.9),
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and this will lead to the attainment of the Kingdom of the Good Mind along the
straight paths of Asha (Cosmic Law and Order or Truth), where the most wise and
living God himself is found (Yasna 33.5).
It seems, however, that God as the creator and supreme artificer is not immanent in
the universe but transcendent to creation (Afnan 1960:121), as immanence was
perhaps a concept too closely linked to the immanence of divinity found in the nature-
worship that Zoroaster sought to counteract. If the Creator and the created are
considered to be separate, as Afnan (1960:121) argues, it gives rise to the problem of
the contact between such a transcendent God and humanity, which must understand
his purpose and reach his ideals. Dhalla (1938:158) believes that there is a "quasi-
independent spirit intermediary between the godhead and the universe", e.g. between
Ahura Mazda and the creation, namely Spenta Mainyu, and that this in tum has
influenced Greek thinking on an intermediate principle.
Dhalla (1938: 158) argues that this principle of intermediate existence can be observed
in Anaxagoras's nous and Plato's World-Soul (Timaeus 36d), as well as in the
Hellenising of some Old Testament doctrines, such as Philo ludaeus's Logos (De
Somniis I 182, 228-239), the first-born son of God who acts as vice-regent, and in
whose image all men are created. According to Dhalla (1938: 158), Logos is most like
Spenta Mainyu because he is actively creative, and that neither are personal beings,
but are sometimes identified with and at other times separate attributes of God.
The postulate that Spenta Mainyu embodies God's creative activity, if accepted,
would partially answer the question of how the process of creation, and perhaps its
creator, are to be discovered. God's activity of creation is therefore discovered
through his creative aspect. It seems that Spenta Mainyu is indeed the link or
intermediary spirit between the Creator and his creation, although the possibility of
discovering the Creator himself and his Order in the universe seems to entail not only
Spenta Mainyu, but all the Amesha Spentas, and some natural phenomena as well.
For God is reflected in all his creation, and only the sum of the good things visible
and thinkable can approximate God.
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3. Discovering the creator and his creation
Although God is visible in 'parts' through his attributes, the Amesha Spentas, he is
primarily conceived of through one of them, Vohu Manah (Good Mind), or its
presence in the human mind. This relates to the fact that God is the Lord Wisdom,
who created through mind, and is thereby recognisable. It is Vohu Manah (Good
Mind) and. Asha (Cosmic Order, Truth and Reality) who are mentioned most
frequently, and are intimately connected to the discovery of God and his purpose.
Eliade (1976:309) argues that the Ahura Mazda's creation in the Gathas of the world
by thought (Yasna 31.7.11) is equivalent to a creatio ex nihilo. Eliade (1976:309)
also points out that Zoroaster declares that he "recognised" Ahura Mazda "by
thought", "as the first and the last" (Yasna 31.8). Stated differently by Kotwal &
Boyd (1982:xii), Zoroaster therefore 'saw', or conceived of, the Lord Wisdom
through Good Mind (Vohu Manah). This would therefore imply that the basis for
existence is thought, whether pertaining to God, creation, or the ability to apprehend
either, and to function successfully within such a system.
Although God is transcendent, he is visible through the workings of the mind (his and
his creations'). God is therefore, as Carus (1996:464) describes it, that feature in the
world which "conditions and produces reason, and reason, in tum, is nothing but a
reflection of the world-order", which in the Zoroastrian philosophy is known as Asha.
Carus (1996:464) concludes that "the cosmic order of existence, the harmony of its
laws, its systematic regularity, makes intelligence possible, and sentient beings will
naturally develop into minds". Regarding the order of the universe and the
conception of this order as the result of a beneficent creator, as opposed to other views
regarding universal order, more will be said later in a discussion on how this concept
influences the philosophy (of both Zoroaster and Plato) that takes a creator into
account.
The order in the universe is also displayed on a physical level, through the ordered
movements of creation itself. Therefore, many of these ordered phenomenal instances
are seen as proof of divinity or even as divine powers themselves. Both the sun and
the moon are visible spiritual powers (yazads) to whom litanies are to be recited, and
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who are described as shining, like the stars, with a radiant glory, similar to the
consecrated fire and are therefore "sparks of the infinite light of Ahura Mazda himself
and are replete with divine presence" (Kotwal & Boyd 1982:xiv-xv).
This doctrine is, of course, reminiscent of the planets that Plato describes as visible
deities, which he uses as proof of the existence of the divine. They too are aspects of
the divine order in the creation, but Plato attributes disorder to matter, whereas
Zoroaster attributes the disorder of the universe not to matter (which is considered as
inherently good because it was made by the good creator, unlike the existing material
which the Demiurge ordered), but to evil in the creation. The doctrine that Zoroaster
held on good and evil will be more fully discussed in chapter 5 (Dualism), and a brief
discussion of the role of evil in creation will suffice here.
4. Evil in creation
Verryn (1982: 162) is of the opinion that later Zoroastrianism has always sought to
"safeguard God from the accusation of having created the Evil One", which is
achieved by claiming that both Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu are uncreated.
Verryn further points out that this has led to certain heretical sects and movements in
Zoroastrian history positing the same eternal quality for the future, e.g. that the
conflict between good and evil will simply go on forever, since the two Contestants
are both eternal. Orthodox Zoroastrianism, however, believes that evil will be
vanquished, despite assigning to both Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu existence
from eternity and therefore presumably an indestructible mode of being.
The Gathas, however, oppose Angra Mainyu not with Ahura Mazda himself, but with
Spenta Mainyu, and it is because of the loss of division between Spenta Mainyu and
Ahura Mazda in later Zoroastrianism that the coeval and coeternal nature of the good
and the evil was postulated, because Ahura Mazda is eternal, and Angra Mainyu
(having become his equal and opposite) therefore became regarded as eternal as well.
Yet evil was held to have had an origin, that the later Zoroastrian proposition could
not explain. The dilemma regarding the origin of evil led to the formation of
Zurvanism, which sought to solve this dilemma by postulating an amoral creator for
Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu, called Zurvan or 'Time'. More importantly,
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however, these equal and opposite forces of good and evil would cast doubt on the
Zoroastrian eschatology and the doctrine that evil will be eradicated. In the
interpretation of the Gathas, however, the basic problem lies in the question of Spenta
Mainyu's relation to Ahura Mazda.
In the Gathas, Spenta Mainyu seems to be as much an attribute of God as are the
other Amesha Spentas, and specifically God's creative aspect, as it is stated that God
created all through his Holy Spirit, Spenta Mainyu (Yasna 47.3). Spenta Mainyu is
also referred to as the son of God (Yasna 47.3), although Armaiti (Yasna 45.4), Asha
(Yasna 47.2), Vohu Manah (Yasna 31.8, 45.4) are also thus referred to, whereas God
is said to have created Khshathra (Yasna 44.7), Haurvetat and Ameretat (Yasna 51.7).
There are also two references in the Gathas (Yasna 30.9 and 31.4) that mention Ahura
Mazda in the plural, indicating that he forms a unity with the sum of his powers or
attributes. Importantly, all of the attributes of God are good, and there is little reason
to believe that there would be an evil attribute originating from a God who is
perpetually described as wholly good himself.
The Gathas also contain a passage describing the twin spirits who chose good and evil
respectively (Yasna 30), and the evil (Angra) spirit (Mainyu) is contrasted to the good
(Spenta) spirit (Mainyu), not to Ahura Mazda, although by opposing Ahura Mazda's
Good Spirit, the Evil Spirit opposes Ahura Mazda and all that he created, because of
the unity mentioned above. It is this passage that has caused some problems of
interpretation in the later Zoroastrian tradition, as Spenta Mainyu became
synonymous with Ahura Mazda. As Pangborn (1983:16) points out, this would
constitute and ethical as well as theological dualism, but as Ahura Mazda is referred
to as the good spirit's father (Yasna 47.3), it would lead to the idea that Ahura Mazda
had created both with the free will to choose good or evil. This belief is reminiscent
of the Zurvanite heresy, which postulated the same situation, but replacing the Gathic
position of Ahura Mazda with the amoral Zurvan, and demoting Ahura Mazda to the
opposite of the evil spirit.
The Gathas therefore have a different doctrine to the later Zoroastrian belief in the
opposition of Ahura Mazda and Ahriman, in that the opposition is one between
Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu, and nowhere is God's authority challenged, other
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
than through an opposition to his creative aspect. The connection of evil with
creation, in that it opposes creation because it opposes Spenta Mainyu and as it is also
referred to as the Destructive Spirit, will be discussed below. This opposition of
Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu, however, still leaves open the question as to
where Angra Mainyu comes from if he was not created by nor eternal like God.
One possibility is that this entity is to be seen as a negative rather than an opposing
concept. The reference in the Gathas to the spirits being 'twins' is mostly interpreted
as signifying that they are exactly equal though opposite, and not as an indication that
they had the same progenitor. The concept of 'twin' may not signify their opposite
and equal status only, however, but also indicates an opposition of functions, namely
a creative and a destructive function. This has further implications, such as an
opposition of Truth to the Lie, which relates to morality and is necessarily an
opposition to Asha (who is Truth). This, however, is in tum connected to the creation
in that the epithets of Asha are Truth as Order, or rather Cosmic Order.
Malandra (1983:12) points out that the concept of 'truth' or the 'true' in the Old
Iranian religion (Avestan haithya, Old Persian hashya), directly corresponds to the
Old Indian concept satya ('true', 'truth'), literally 'that which is related, that which
corresponds to the real (sat)'. This correspondence has further implications, as
Malandra (1983:12) shows: the real 'sat' ('being', hence 'the real', 'the cosmos') was
opposed to the unreal 'asat', not absolute non-being, but rather non-being in the sense
of 'non-ordered being', 'the unreal', 'chaos'. The opposition, therefore, of Truth and
the Lie not only has moral implications, but is directly related to the reality of the
cosmos against chaos. It is safe to assume that this was the principle of evil, a force
that counteracted creation and order. In this sense, Angra Mainyu only became a
fixed personification in later Zoroastrianism, and the opposition between the twin
spirits in the Gathas is one of creation versus chaos, which is the destruction of
creation. The destruction will end when creation returns to its primordial state of
static being, before non-ordered being brought mortality and change. It is therefore
the Lie and Chaos that define Evil. Interestingly, in the sixth book of the Republic
Plato also mentions the Good as the source of both truth (508d) and reality (509b).
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To add to the abstract nature of the opposing forces, the epithets in the Gathas (only
really attained in the later doctrines by the evil entities) speak of evil not as evil in
itself, but as an opposite to the good, devoid of an own existence other than a counter-
existence to a good creation. Nothing evil is created, only good creations are marred,
but nothing of this is said in the Gathas, other than the destruction of cattle, which
might refer to the earth as a whole, or to all living things. It therefore seems that evil,
which is always described as the opposite of good creation, is somehow dependent on
creation for existence, and in being so related, it is not eternal, and can be vanquished.
The twin spirits are called into being "in the beginning" (which is mostly taken to
refer to their eternity), but given that Zoroastrianism has a clear doctrine of linear time
that begins with creation, it is not inconceivable that the beginning refers to this
moment at the beginning of time. If this is the case, the spirits (being entities of
creation and destruction) could have arisen as a result of the intention to create, and
the resulting resistance in the execution of such a purpose, respectively. The
destruction does not appear before the creation, that is for certain, and it most
certainly ceases according to the Gathas, when the earth is made anew, i.e. without
the chaos of flux. When, and how, the twin spirits came to be is uncertain, but the
Gathas clearly state that Ahura Mazda is "the First and the Last for all eternity"
(Yasna 31.8). The twin spirits may also serve to illustrate the moral choice facing
every individual, and the centrality of the concept of free will in the Gathas would
seem to support this possibility.
The Gathas repeatedly state that the choice in favour of evil and destruction is made
by the unenlightened and the misled, by the "wilfully deaf.[and] blind" (Yasna
32.15), but, despite the manifestly better choice of the good, Pangborn (1983:114)
speculates that it was Zoroaster's perception that society persistently chose evil and
destruction. Pangborn (1983: 114-116) argues that this destruction which Zoroaster
lamented belies features of a "socio-economic revolution" and was directly related to
the abuse of the natural order which was life-giving. The care for the order of the life-
giving creation (personified as an ox) was in many ways the model of Zoroaster's
teachings about order in society, as the importance of the bovine (the mainstay of the
settled agrarian economy) in the Gathas attests to. Evil (often related to the invading
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nomads who pillaged settlements) acts on society as it does on nature, and must be
opposed.
The problem of evil, its societal as well as cosmic presence, its origin and function, is
a philosophical problem that has never been and possibly can never be solved,
however, and many scholars conclude that in order to have a concept of the good, a
concept of evil is a necessary opposite qualification. Carus (1996:483) is one such
scholar who believes in the connectedness of good and evil, to the point of their
interdependence, and he has taken his premise that God and the Devil are relative
terms to its logical conclusion by stating that God would cease to be God if there were
no Devil. This subject will be discussed more fully in chapter 5 (Dualism). What
concerns this chapter, however, is ultimately how a doctrine of creation affects
philosophy, especially philosophy that pertains to the reformation of culture.
5. The concept of Creation and its effect on philosophy
Afnan (1960:252) identifies three main outlooks on life: the skeptic, the naturalistic,
which is essentially immanential, and the spiritualistic, or rather mytho-philosophical,
which is transcendent. Afnan (1960:252) considers the skeptic viewpoint a weak
stand from the point of view of culture, for he argues that there can be no system of
thought or high cultural values that can afford to disregard ultimate issues such as the
nature of God, and the reality and destiny of man, as skeptics do, and the
consequences of a skeptical attitude towards such basic principles is detrimental to
such elements in society for it does not admit a purpose to life or recognise an
absolute source of human values and norms of conduct.
Zoroaster's doctrine is diametrically opposite to a skeptical point of view, since he
proposes a highly ethical system that is dependent on an ultimate and objective
standard of the Good. Plato likewise proposed such an external and absolute
standard, and overtly rejected skeptical views such as those held by the Sophists.
Both Zoroaster's and Plato's doctrines postulated a separate and autonomous
existence of the values to be emulated, and both proposed that the values were to be
discovered through contemplation, but Afnan (1960:252) believes that values generate
from, or rather are recognised by, the interaction between the creative purpose that
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directs human conduct, on the one hand, and the intervening circumstances that help
or hinder its realisation, on the other. This, too, can be seen in both Zoroaster's and
Plato's beliefs, as Zoroaster postulated the existence of evil that wishes to undo and
oppose the good in creation, and Plato postulated the existence of chaos or evil that
reigns if anything does not realise the order that comes from the Good. Most
importantly, however, the values which, if deviated from, would cause evil, were
abstract ideals or what Afnan (1960:252) calls "higher values" that were perceived by
(or perhaps the product of) reasoning-not skepticism.
According to Afnan (1960:252), a skeptical attitude towards "ultimate issues of life
and being" cannot advance any goal or purpose that would give the "higher values",
such as goodness, justice, truth and beauty, the significance, unity and orientation they
require, nor can it advance the certainty of those principles as ruling elements in a
'good' existence. Afnan (1960:252-253) argues that no culture can sustain any
system of moral laws, social institutions or aesthetic ideals if the major premises of
belief for such systems are "enshrouded in doubt", or if the nature of the reality whose
ideals and interests are to be reflected and promoted, is not known.
Doubt in the major premises vitiates all systems of reasoning deduced from them
(Afnan 1960:253), and that is why skepticism will not serve to illustrate the problem
of the interaction of philosophy with science and religion, as (in a sense) it negates all
three. One example of a non-theistic system is that of Marxism, but it has replaced
what would have been religious convictions with a very strong system of secular
beliefs that dictates its culture's moral, legal and even artistic traditions. Therefore,
though negating the premise of a creator, it substitutes the role of creator with the
state, and religious ideology with political and economic ideology. Skepticism of all
beliefs, however, whether religious or political or economic, will cause chaos within
any group.
As skepticism is unable to form the basis for a cultural system of belief and values,
Afnan (1960:253) believes that man is therefore forced to choose between the
naturalistic, immanent and the spiritualistic, transcendent systems of value, based
upon "antithetical conceptions of the nature of God and the reality and destiny of
man". The purpose of human existence cannot be known and basic cultural values
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cannot be formulated until society subscribes to either the naturalistic belief system,
which is based on the premise that ultimate reality is immanent in nature as mind, or
identical with it as matter itself, or to the transcendental system of belief, which is
based on the premise that there exists a transcendent God who is the Prime Mover and
Efficient Cause of all physical and spiritual phenomena (Afnan 1960:253).
Furthermore, Afnan (1960:253) argues that the standpoint of the observer, as
naturalistic philosophy assumes, gives ground for uncertainty and skepticism, whereas
the standpoint of the creator does not vitiate or impair its system of thought or
contaminate it with doubt. Afnan argues that Plato considered both these points of
view in the Republic and the Timaeus respectively. In the Republic, while seeking the
Idea of the different values such as justice, Plato assumes the tole of the observer and
Afnan (1960:253) believes that, although Plato does not overtly state this as his
intention, he tries to arrive at the universal and eternal via the particulars of
experience. In the Timaeus, on the other hand, Plato deals with creation and takes up
the standpoint of the creator, according to Afnan (1960:253-254), since he identifies
God with the universal Idea of the good and as the supreme artificer who conceives
the Idea as a pattern and executes it accordingly.
Following Afnan's classifications, one could argue that both Plato and Zoroaster
postulated philosophies that operated from the vantage point of the creator, since both
transcend empiricism and its accent on the role of the observer and his sense-
perception in favour of a mental observation of the creation's purpose and the
metaphysical reality that necessarily transcends the physical. Both philosophers only
consider nature insofar as it is a representative of the metaphysical value that they
sought to contemplate, although Zoroaster's attitude towards the corporeal was less
negative than Plato's. Neither could be said to have favoured the observational role if
such a role is confined to sense-perception, but they both advocated observation
through the mind.
The creativity of the creator; in the Timaeus as well as in the Ga/has, starts with a
mentally perceived plan or purpose entirely free from the material. Afnan (1960:254)
argues that this purpose, when it has proceeded to the stage of 'will' and is
objectified, encounters "outside intervening forces" that obstruct the creative process.
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In the case of the Timaeus, the creator must understand these forces and the problems
they present, as well as conceive of a way in which to harness them to his purpose
(Afnan 1960:254). In the case of the Gathas, the creator has created something that
has become corrupt as well, but instead of harnessing the corruption to his own
purposes, the doctrine postulates that creation itself must choose to oppose it. This
could possibly imply that the creation itself, as in the Timaeus, is the source of the
problem. However, the purpose in the Gathas is not to escape the imperfection of
creation as it is in the Timaeus, but to perfect itself with the exercise of free will. This
further implies that the corruption of creation was the result of free will, and creation
becomes the stage for the perfection of creation, not the punishment of imperfection,
which souls must free themselves of.
Afnan (1960:254) argues that creative activity, unlike theoretical understanding that
underlies it, does not abstract itself completely from sensual considerations, although
it transcends them, and theoretical knowledge, therefore, is still in an elevated
position above sense perception, although both are instrumental in creative activity.
This can be seen in Plato's as well as Zoroaster's doctrines on the creation, which as a
process necessarily comes into contact and even conflicts with chaos (or evil), and
which can be subjugated by the same process by which creation was intended and
executed itself, namely reason.
Afnan (1960:254-255) points out the possibility that theoretical knowledge is obtained
primarily in answer to the questions that creative purpose poses, just as sense
perception obtains significance only in the light of queries that abstract speculation, or
theoretical thought, presents to it. The interconnected nature of thought and matter is
postulated in Zoroastrianism, but Plato's doctrines only conceive of an influence of
thought or the Ideas on matter, not vice versa. Plato does, however, believe that a
certain lifestyle will improve the individual's morality, such as the Spartan lifestyle he
proposed for the Guardians in the Republic, a concept he possibly inherited from the
Pythagoreans.
Afnan (1960:255) argues that it is the supreme purpose of man to improve his cultural
environment and achieve cultural growth, a purpose he believes has stimulated
philosophers to produce their systems of thought, and that it is only by keeping this
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purpose in mind that one can understand their philosophies. Afnan (1960:255) further
believes that it is through creative expression that this purpose is realised, and that
man's purpose, which gives meaning to his theoretical knowledge (and through the
latter, having been expressed in creative activity, significance to his sensory
perception), frees him from skepticism.
The implications of Afnan's argument lead him to conclude that true objects of
knowledge are the result of the formal aspects of things, or rather their 'forms', and it
logically follows that the Form is better known to him who "originally conceived it,
purposed and willed its realisation, and effected its production, or imposition upon
matter, to create that individual object", than by someone merely observing, through
sense perception, the individual instance from which the universal is inferred (Afnan
1960:255). The conclusion is therefore that divine purpose is a higher truth than what
observation can provide, and a belief in the good purpose of the Creator will aid the
discovery of the 'form' Good, more than sense perception will aid the observer to
infer such good, for this could lead to skepticism, though the creative truth of God and
the observed instances of truth in sense perception are not mutually exclusive if both
operate on the assumption of purpose and design.
Afnan (1960:255-256) states that "in an age when the intellect of man was militantly
against organised religion and its basic precepts", philosophy could not regard
anything from the point of view of the creator, for the creator was 'anathema' in
philosophical circles. Even the idea of creation was discredited, and all religious
phenomena were interpreted according to naturalism which dominated the thinking of
the age (Afnan 1960:256). This led to the sole aspect that remained interesting to
philosophy, i.e. the Greek emphasis on the observer who discovers the laws of nature
empirically, and this exaggeration of the role of the observer influenced
interpretations such as Hume's study of the principle of causation, which Afnan
believes could not have resulted in anything but the doubt that it cast (Afnan
1960:256).
Afnan (1960:256) believes this skepticism is justified, for he argues that man had not
entered "the age of invention and creation, to which that accumulated theoretical
knowledge was a mere prelude", and likens the situation to that of the observer of a
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chemical compound, to whom the substances, purpose and cause of the composition
remain a mystery, whereas the chemist who has produced it, followed a purpose,
combined the chemicals according to theoretical knowledge, and expects an outcome
which can be confirmed by sense perception, but this empirical verification is the only
means of understanding available to the mere observer who is separated from divining
the purpose. Afnan (1960:256) also notes that a creative process not only implies a
purpose, but a conclusion to that purpose, or a "destiny" that is the certain outcome if
the purpose is pursued, the will to pursue it is "mustered", and the intervening forces
that determine it are "envisaged and harnessed".
These stages in the "causal entailment" and the principles involved all proceed from
the purpose of the creator, according to Afnan (1960:256), and they become essential
conditions which the observer has to assume in order to interpret the creative purpose
he observes. Smith (1978:xxxvii) notes that Kant concluded that more ultimate
principles must be assumed by reason if sense is to be made of observation, for Kant
was in agreement with Hume's conclusion that the principle of causation is "neither
self-evident nor capable of logical demonstration", and that this is true of all
principles fundamental to science and philosophy. Smith (1978:xxxvii) also notes
that "Kant further agreed that inductive inference from the data of experience is only
possible upon the prior acceptance of rational principles independently established;
and that we may not, therefore, look to experience for proof of their validity".
Causation and other principles fundamental to science and philosophy still remain
fraught with doubt, for philosophy, according to Afnan (1960:257), still does not
study nature and the moral and cultural evolution of man from the standpoint of the
creator. Afnan (1960:257) argues that that these principles seem like dogma because
of doubt, but knowledge of these principles in fact "exists at first solely in the form of
propensity to influences of the kind that they justify". It is by reflecting upon such
inferences, Afnan (1960:257) argues, that these principles are made explicit, and it is
by the use of logical technique that they are improved, for they are known in the same
sense that we generalise in accordance with them.
Although the creator is primary in the system of thought that Afnan discusses, the
observer is also an integral part of the process. The observer is necessarily connected
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to the role of the mind and the purpose of understanding, which has commonly been
identified with a movement away from belief and myth. Yet what is observed by the
mind in creation (including the implied creator) is transcendental, and only a portion
can be glimpsed through sense-perception. Even if intuition and reason are employed,
the only understanding that can be drawn is a verisimilar picture, and this is a return
to the sphere of myth (though belief is not necessarily involved). Myth is meant not
in the sense of blind acceptance, but of inquiry into the metaphysical (in all senses)
and an attempt at its understanding and expiation in order to improve our own
knowledge and direct our own actions. This is an aspect of philosophy that is found
in both Plato's and Zoroaster's doctrines, in which the creator is transcendental, but
mind is the agent with which to interpret creative purpose and with which to react.
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CHAPTER4-THESOUL
Plato
1. The discovery of the subject: the psyche
Towards the end of the fifth century BeE the concept of the 'soul' had progressed,
according to Havelock (1963: 197), from being viewed as some sort of natural force,
for instance, a fragment of the atmosphere or as a cosmic life force, to being viewed
as an autonomous entity and personality. This change of perspective was initially
only accessible to the more sophisticated intellectual elite, as there is evidence to
show that as late as the last quarter of the fifth century the majority of people did not
understand the concept, but that it had filtered down into common consciousness by
the end of the fourth century (Havelock 1963: 197).
The emergence of this concept is often connected with Socrates (cf Brumbaugh
1964:46, Havelock 1963:197) and the change introduced by him in the meaning of the
word psyche. Instead of signifying a man's "ghost or wraith, a man's breath or life
blood, a thing devoid of sense and self-consciousness", it came to mean "the ghost
that thinks", capable of scientific cognition and moral judgement, and therefore
morally responsible (Havelock 1963: 197). Most importantly, however, the soul was
something unique to the person (Havelock 1963: 197), perhaps best described once
more as a person's essence, though not devoid of individuality and mental capacity as
the original use of the term implied.
The idea of a psyche as connected to an individual, specifically with a sense of
morality, or at least a capacity for guilt, was known before in the sphere of mystery
cults, however. These cults offered a system by which only the initiated can save his
soul through the proper rituals, but these cult teachings were a secret kept from the
uninitiated, and therefore no accurate and public knowledge of their concept of the
soul could have existed. Three popularly known notions of the 'Self did predate
Socrates, and his interest in the 'Self, according to Brumbaugh (1964:46-47), led
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logically from a questioning of the various other interpretations with which he was
dissatisfied.
Firstly, Brumbaugh (1964:46) notes that the Homeric heroes possessed a psyche
which survived the body at death to descend to Hades as a breath or powerless
shadow, but Homer does not elaborate on the psyche and says nothing of its
insubstantial nature, nor of the operation of Fate. The fate of the psyche after death
could not have been believed to be a pleasant one, or Homer (Odyssey Bk.XI.485),
would not have mentioned Achilles's lament that he "would rather work the soil as a
serf on hire to some landless impoverished peasant than be King of all these lifeless
dead". There is, therefore, mention of the afterlife, but reward and punishment are not
included, and no standard of morality is set, bar the set forms of behaviour appropriate
to the individual's specific social status.
Secondly, Brumbaugh (1964:46-47) mentions that the Ionian scientists believed that
the psyche was a natural force, although they all had diverse ideas of its substance,
such as a dry breath, a cosmic spark or a source of magnetism, and human conduct
would therefore be governed by the natural laws they were discovering, and as such
would be not only predictable, but also determined. This, once again, relieves the
individual of all moral responsibility and reduces the soul to something governed by
deterministic fatalism or amoral and inherent nature, leaving little room for
speculation about an afterlife other than in the capacity of the natural force it was
believed to be. Brumbaugh (1964:36) also notes that, as an elaboration of the
scientific substance of the psyche, Pythagoras believed that the soul is a harmony, an
"accompaniment or overtone of the mechanical operations of the body, as music
springs from the vibrating strings of the lyre". Both the Ionian and the Pythagorean
descriptions of the psyche maintain a link between the soul and the material world, as
both believe it to be part of or affected by the physical.
Socrates, on the other hand, saw the soul as the driving force and direct cause of the
behaviour of the body, as Brumbaugh (1964:37) notes, rather than a passive reflection
of the physical. Brumbaugh summarises the Socratic counterpoint according to Plato
as follows:
94
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
"As against the 'harmony of the body' hypothesis, we must recognise that a soul (1)
directs the body; (2) is able to know truths that are unchanging; (3) feels the
attraction of "ideals" - it has some "divination" or "vision" of wisdom, courage, and
justice as qualities that have intrinsic value; (4) realises, reflecting on this, that its
true identity as a human soul lies in the unchanging realm of ideals and ideas; these
are the causes, not merely the conditions of a good human life. Seen in this way, the
soul is different in kind from any physical process, and its nature must reach beyond
the immediate adventures of the body; and insofar as a man's true identity is an
unchanging ideal goal, he can claim immortality." (Brumbaugh 1964:38).
Thirdly, Brumbaugh (1964:47) argues that Sophistry, despite its stress on the
uniqueness of individual experience, ignored the issue of the destiny of the soul after
death, which is not surprising, considering that the Sophists' concern was for the
acquisition of material rewards and avoidance of punishment in the here and now, not
the hereafter. Socrates's contribution to the evolving concept of the psyche was,
according to Brumbaugh (1964:47), to show how inadequate the previous viewpoints
were in explaining the subjective experience and outer behaviour of human beings.
Socrates himself had a theory about the psyche, as Brumbaugh (1964:47) notes, and
believed that the soul desires the good, and that all actions in a person are motivated
by the soul's search for it, although he recognised that not all individuals are always
capable of recognising the good and therefore sometimes do wrong involuntarily and
out of ignorance (cf Sophist 228c, Laws 860d)
Brumbaugh (1964:48) summanses four points in illustration of the theory of and
implications of Socrates's theory of' self:
1) "I have a natural desire to attain something intrinsically good;
2) I evidently have freedom to act on the basis of incomplete or incorrect belief;
3) I am surrounded by appearances that seem good yet are not really so;
4) I am able, if 1 put my mind to it, to discover at least some of the differences
between appearances and reality - both as to what is 'good' objectively and what
is 'good' for me."
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In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that while the discovery was affirmed and
exploited by Socrates, the concept was the slow creation of many minds among his
predecessors and contemporaries, such as Heraclitus and Democritus.
The doctrine of an autonomous psyche is also a counterpart of the rejection of the oral
culture, where psyche is not autonomous, and the subjective identification with the
oral tradition is encouraged, as opposed to the objective and critical analysis
encouraged by the speculative tradition responsible for the concept of an autonomous
psyche. This discovery of the self was of the thinking self, and the 'personality' could
no longer be that nexus of motor responses, unconscious reflexes, and passions or
emotions which had been mobilised for countless times in the service of the
mnemonic process. On the contrary, it was precisely these that were seen to be an
obstacle to realisation of a self-consciousness emancipated from the condition of an
oral culture. The soul as thinker had further implications, specifically in terms of the
discovery of inquiry and reason.
This is attested to by the upsurge in the last quarter of the fifth century of words such
as 'thought' and 'thinking' accompanying 'soul' and 'self, and in other syntactical
contexts the word psyche was used as a verb of cognition, an antithesis to 'body' or
'corpse' (Havelock 1963: 198). The change in syntax betrays a change in thinking,
signifying the 'thought revolution' from the Homeric to the Platonic state of mind,
and this novelty expresses a possibility that the psychic mechanism which exploited
memorisation through association was being replaced by a mechanism of reasoned
calculation (Havelock 1963:198-201).
The next implication of the discovery of the 'subject' (since it was a thinking subject
that would imply something to think about) was the 'object' (the object being that
which can be known or thought about by the subject). This led to the abstraction of
knowledge and influenced Plato's metaphysics and epistemology.
2. The Nature and Divisions of the Soul
The tripartite division of the soul by Plato, into the upper reason, middle spirit and
lower appetite, may well have had Pythagorean antecedents, according to Bevan
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(1962: 174). The soul is also referred to in some passages as a dichotomy, however,
and Bevan (1962: 174-175) argues that this is not such a stretch of the imagination if
one contrasts reason with the other two parts in the trichotomy to form the opposition
between the rational and the irrational. Plato himself described the middle spirit as of
intermediary status, which could ally itself with the baser appetites but should
properly aid the reason (Timaeus 70a-c). The division of the soul, whether into two or
three parts, leads to the implication that certain forms of behaviour are caused by
certain parts of the soul, and raises interesting questions about whether the entire soul
is good and therefore immortal, or only parts of it, as Plato postulated in the Timaeus
(69d-73a). Yet the divisions of the soul seem to indicate that the status of its
goodness depends on many factors, which results in some of the "charioteers and
horses" being good and others "a mixture of good and bad" (Phaedrus 246a).
Although Plato propounds a tripartite division of the soul, Havelock (1963 :203)
argues that, without falling into a dichotomy, the soul can nonetheless be divided into
two main categories: the 'calculative' or 'rational', and the 'appetitive capacities', the
third part or intermediary being the spirit or will, which is "potentially the ally of
either". Plato intended his psychological doctrine to support his moral doctrine, and
this would therefore also translate into the instance of the soul's reason being
supported by the soul's will, and together controlling the baser appetites and unifying
the psyche into a "harmonised and unified condition", within which each faculty
performs its proper functions (Havelock 1963:203). This naturally would have
applications further afield than the microcosm of the soul, but the spirit does not
always properly ally itself to reason, and this raises the question of irrationality in,
amongst other things, the soul.
The appetites are, in fact, seen as the fall of the soul, and the two remaining aspects of
the soul need to work in unison to be able to attain salvation, failing which, the
process of reincarnation simply repeats itself. Stewart (1960:8) states that the concept
of the fall and redemption of the soul had antecedents in ancient Greek culture,
originating with primitive totemic clans who believed in descent from divine
ancestors, and it comes to the fore in historic Greece with the 'disappearances' and
'new births' of Dionysus, part of the Orphic doctrine that was incorporated into
philosophy by Empedocles, Pythagoras, and others.
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The main questions raised by Guthrie (1971 :231) about Plato's views on the nature of
the soul are whether Plato considered the soul as simple or composite in essence, and
if the latter were the case, whether he believed that the soul was immortal in its
entirety or only its highest part. Before these questions can be examined, however,
there are some things that Guthrie (1971 :230) assumes about Plato and his philosophy
which will be discussed below.
Firstly, Guthrie (1971:230), like Dodds (1971 :207), believes that it must be taken into
account that neither Socrates's nor Plato's philosophy was fully developed and set out
before being committed to writing, but was an "organic thing which changed", partly
as a result of internal development and partly in response to external stimuli.
Secondly, Guthrie (1971 :230) argues that Plato believed there are two levels of truth,
which Guthrie calls "truths of religion and truths of reason", and which are
necessarily explained differently, for Guthrie believes that "there will always be some
truths, and those the highest, which cannot be proven didactically but must be
conveyed in the form of myth, the details of which can claim only probability, not
precise accuracy". As an example of how Plato distinguished between these two
truths, Guthrie (1971 :231) explains that Plato viewed the immortality of the soul as
rationally provable, whereas the destiny of the soul after death "could only be hinted
at in a sacred story (hieros logos)".
Plato's idea of the soul was also influenced by Socrates, and Guthrie (1971 :231) gives
a synoptic view ofthe influence that Socrates exerted. Guthrie (1971 :231) argues that
Plato learnt from Socrates that the primary purpose of man is to tend to the well-being
of his soul, and that this care of the soul is "an art acquired by rigorous self-
examination and an understanding of the meaning of ethical terms". This, in tum, is
gained by the method of dialogue, or the question and answer formula which both
Plato and Socrates employed (Guthrie 1971 :231). Plato was also influenced by
Socrates's belief that understanding would inevitably reveal itself in right action, that
virtue is knowledge and that nobody therefore sins willingly, for both believed that
understanding edified the soul, and that the part of the soul that should therefore be
cultivated is clearly the mind or understanding (nous), and the life extolled is the
rational life (Guthrie 1971 :231).
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Guthrie (1971 :230) states that the Phaedo "reads like a defence of this Socratic view",
but adds that the doctrine in the Phaedo "goes far beyond anything Socrates himself is
likely to have said". Guthrie (1971 :231-232) further notes that Plato emphasised
aspects such as the supremacy of the soul, the importance of the intellect and the
necessity of cultivating the intellect to enable the soul to escape the fetters of the
body, but, most importantly, Plato renders the immortality of the soul dependent on
"its singleness of nature", for anything composite cannot be indestructible or immortal
(Phaedo 78c). This is in apparent contrast to some of his later dialogues, which will
be discussed below.
The idea of a composite soul is found repeatedly in the Republic (Bk. X) and also in
the Gorgias (503f). Plato employs an analogy with the crafts, and has Socrates
describe the process of manufacturing an artefact as a process of arranging and fitting
different parts together according to a structure, forming of a "new whole" which is to
be a "regularly ordered product" (Guthrie 1971 :232). Just as trainers "regulate" the
body and set it "in order", so the health or well-being of the soul depends on order and
regulation, which implies, as Guthrie (1971 :232) points out, the presence of parts
within it.
In the Republic (Bk. IV 434d-449a), Plato likens the justice of the state to the justice
of the individual, and describes both as having a tripartite division of three natural
constituents. In the case of the soul, these are reason, the intermediate spirit and the
base appetites, and Plato further believes that reason should be supreme, and
supported by or allied with the other two constituents. This correlates with another
section in the Republic (Bk. X 611b), in which Plato states that it is impossible to
believe that the soul is in a state of internal conflict, or variable and unstable in its
essential nature, and that one cannot suppose that anything "made up of many ill-
assorted parts" can be eternal.
The soul in its entirety, therefore, is made up of constituent parts, and so cannot be
immortal, according to Plato's previous postulate in the Phaedo (78c). But Plato
argues that the soul is, in fact, immortal, although this immortal soul is seen in a
deformed state, because of its association with the body and other evils, and is
described as "encrusted" with a "strange and earthy shell" (Republic 612a). The soul,
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in its true nature, is therefore not composite, but a lover of truth or wisdom, akin to
the "divine and immortal and eternal" (Republic 611c, Phaedo 79d). The only
reasonable conclusion, Guthrie (1971 :232-233) argues, is that the soul, for Plato, is
still in essence simple, and only appears composite as the result of its association with
the body.
In the Timaeus, the idea of the composition of the soul is quite lengthily described
(69c-73 b), and Plato also discusses related issues, such as the destructibility of a
composite creation (Timaeus 41a), in detail. This is to be expected from a dialogue
that seeks to incorporate all the important metaphysical and eschatological theories.
Plato also discusses in the Timaeus which part of the soul is immortal, and expresses
there essentially the same theory as is found in the Republic. The soul is an immortal
principle, but when it is incarnated in a mortal body, the mortal form of soul is
attached to it (Timaeus 69c). The mortal soul is located in the lower regions of the
body, whereas the head is the seat of that part which Plato calls divine (Timaeus 44d).
Plato also says (Timaeus 90a) that the immortal part of the soul has been given by god
as a guardian spirit, or daimon, attaching the individual to heaven by the head.
Guthrie (1971 :234) argues that when Plato wrote the Phaedo, the "twin currents of
intellectualism and puritanism" still influenced him, and he therefore assigned only
reason to the soul, holding in contempt passion and emotion, as well as physical
appetite, as the work of the body attempting to drag down the soul to its own level.
This led to Plato's theory that the base appetites and emotions must be repressed, in
order for the rational soul to be properly cultivated in preparation for its disembodied
future (Guthrie 1971 :234). Plato later developed the doctrine of the immortal soul
more fully, and in the Republic the conflict advances to within the soul itself, a
concept which is also discussed in the Sophist (228b). This, Guthrie (1971:234)
argues, leads to a change of emphasis in practice as well as in theory, as the passions
and appetites are acknowledged to have an influence on existence, and the attention is
therefore directed to their regulation rather than to their complete suppression.
Reason, as the immortal part of the soul, is still afflicted by the body, however, since
the baser parts of the soul, as they are described in Plato's later doctrine, are still
connected with the body (cf Republic Bk. X; Timaeus 41c-45a, 69c-73a). In the
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Timaeus (86a-90c), Plato also discusses how diseases of the body can affect the soul,
as well as how the soul and body should be in harmony, although he still identifies the
immortal soul solely with reason. Guthrie (1971 :234) suggests that reason as a term
is too "cold" to convey the full import of a philosophy based on Eros, as Plato's is,
and considers it better to describe this immortality as the result of that part of the soul
which strives constantly after wisdom and knowledge (and the necessary
accompanying ethical goodness) and which can, in so doing, belong to the eternal
world.
The identification of reason as the only immortal part of the soul seems plausible, and
Guthrie (1971 :234) adds that it is difficult to think of a disembodied soul retaining its
appetites, as these are linked with bodily organs and serve the purpose of the body
alone. The theory that the highest part of the soul is the only immortal part, instead of
all three levels being immortal, also correlates more closely with Plato's other
theories, specifically that reason, and reason alone, is the way to attain immortality,
and that reason is the only definite link between the individual and the eternal world
of Forms, while other elements such as the sensory world are merely auxiliary to
reasoned contemplation.
Just as the soul is connected with reason, so both are related to the afterlife and to
reincarnation, because of Plato's theory that knowledge is recollection, as propounded
in the Meno, the Phaedo, the Republic and the Timaeus. The Phaedrus, however,
offers a different condition for the immortality of the soul, according to Guthrie
(1971 :235), namely its self-motion, a unique attribute of the soul, as Plato believed
the soul to be the ultimate cause of motion (Lee 1977 :46-47). Unlike his views in the
other dialogues, Plato implies in the Phaedrus that the composite nature of the soul
does not preclude its immortality, and that the baser parts of the soul accompany the
higher part (reason) in the afterlife, for the myth of the charioteer depicts the soul as
composite, yet discarnate.
The myth of the charioteer in the Phaedrus speaks of the soul as a chariot that is
drawn by two winged horses (Phaedrus 246a), the charioteer representing reason, the
noble horse representing the passionate or emotional attributes, and the base horse
representing the base physical appetites. The gods' souls are also depicted as
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charioteers with horses, although they suffer no strife, since they, according to
Guthrie (1971 :235), contain no possibility of evil. Guthrie (1971 :235 also notes that
souls already have all three elements (driver, obedient horse and unruly horse) prior to
incarnation or rather before their fall from heaven, when they are still striving to
follow the train of the gods and get a glimpse of the vision of reality in the plain of
truth (Guthrie 1971:235).
Guthrie (1971 :235-236) states that the Phaedrus has caused much speculation because
of its apparent contradiction of the eschatology in the other dialogues, although the
doctrine of the Phaedrus is also found in the doctrines of Empedocles, as well as in
the system taught to initiates of Orphism. The doctrine is essentially that the soul is
divine (the daimon found in both Empedocles and Timaeus 90a, and the theos which
the dead man is to become according to the Orphic tablets of Thurii), but that the soul
has been forced to be incarnated as punishment for some not very clearly defined
original sin or impurity (Guthrie 1971 :236).
It is not very clear how or why this impurity occurs, especially in something divine.
Guthrie (1971 :232) points out that as soon as the soul has sinned it has lost its purity,
and thereafter it is doomed to the wheel of reincarnation for ten thousand years,
incarnating as various forms, but never freeing itself from the "contamination of the
sublunary world, exemplified in, but not confined to its direct association with a
body". In the Phaedrus the soul's only hope of escape, once it has failed to keep up
with the gods and is doomed to incarnation, is to live a philosophic life three times in
succession (Phaedrus 248d-249a). Moreover, each circuit from one birth to the next
lasts a thousand years, from which it follows that in the cycle of reincarnation much
more time is spent out of the body than in it (Phaedrus 249b). Guthrie (1971:236)
states that we can learn from the myth of Er in the Republic how this time is spent.
The conclusion which Guthrie (1971 :236) draws is that for someone who holds these
beliefs the essential contrast is not between an incarnate and a discarnate soul, for
whether the soul is in the body or not is unimportant if it is "caught in the wheel, and
destined for incarnation and reincarnation". The essential contrast is that difference
between a soul that is in, or destined for, a bodily incarnation, and one that has
escaped from it and returned to the eternal, for only by escaping the wheel of
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incarnation can the soul become immortal, not in the sense of outlasting the body, but
of attaining purity and divinity (Guthrie 1971 :236-237).
Souls that are trapped in the cycle of birth have "the taint of the earthly still clinging
to them", during incarnations and between, and therefore Guthrie (1971 :237) believes
that the myth of the charioteer in the Phaedrus does not present a contradiction of
Plato's other doctrines, for it could be argued that the lower parts clinging to the soul
are the result of incarnation. Guthrie (1971 :237) argues that it can be affirmed that
the composite nature of the soul in the Phaedrus is "bound up, if not with actual
inclusion in a body, at any rate with its involvement in the doom of repeated
incarnation". Reason therefore remains the only part of the individual that can attain
divine purity and is truly immortal.
According to the Timaeus (40a-b), the gods themselves were created, and this could
explain their perfect lower natures, since they had perfect bodies and were free from
the confusion which degraded human existence upon its incarnation, and the gods also
had purer souls to start with (Timaeus 41d). Whether Plato had already formulated
this theory when he wrote the Phaedrus, however, is not known. But despite these
problematic details, the immortal nature of the soul remains constant, and constantly
dependent on reason. The control of the lower parts and their eventual subjugation is
the work of reason, as is the contemplation of the good in order to escape the lower
parts of the body entirely. Either option leads to a purification of the soul and an
assurance of its immortality and divinity (Timaeus 44d).
3. The Soul and the Irrational
Dodds (1971 :206) proposes that Plato reacted to the situation created by the collapse
of the inherited beliefs that set in during the fifth century, arguing that Plato clearly
perceived "the dangers inherent in the decay of an Inherited Conglomerate", amd that
he formulated proposals for stabilising the position by means of a counter-
reformation. In this analysis, Dodds (1971 :206) focuses specifically on the
importance Plato attached to irrational factors in human behaviour (and therefore in
the soul), and on how he interpreted them, as well as on what concessions he was
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prepared to make to "the irrationalism of popular belief for the sake of stabilising the
Conglomerate" (Dodds 1971 :206).
The historical milieu within which Plato wrote, especially the political developments
(including those before Plato), such as the death of Pericles and the advent of
Macedonian hegemony, as well as the philosophical developments of Plato's
predecessors and contemporaries, is very important to the understanding of the
external stimuli that shaped Plato's thought (Dodds 1971 :207). Plato wrote in the
fourth century, but Dodds (1971:207) argues that his personal convictions were
shaped and moulded in the fifth century, as his earlier dialogues, such as the
Pro/agoras, attest to. It is certainly safe to assume that Plato's philosophy was
historically conditioned. This aids the analysis of how Plato viewed the irrational
soul, and Dodds (1971 :207-208) believes that the most important historical influence,
the dilemma of the democracy that opposed the tyrants, but executed Socrates, and
Plato's intimate connection with both parties (because he was Charmides 's nephew
and Socrates's disciple), led him to formulate his particular "metaphysical extension"
of rationalism.
Socrates's concepts of the soul certainly influenced Plato, as has been discussed
previously in this chapter, but Plato expanded these concepts considerably. Dodds
(1971:208) argues that the Platonic expansion of the Socratic ideas (that the soul is
divine and its health is man's primary concern) into a "new transcendental
psychology" was influenced, to an even greater extent, by the Pythagoreans. This
proposal is not at all unlikely if it is remembered that Plato had personal contact with
the Pythagoreans of Western Greece in 390 BC, and that he "cross-fertilised" Greek
rationalism with "magi co-religious ideas whose remoter origins belong to the northern
shamanistic culture" Dodds (1971 :208). These magico-religious ideas are not easily
recognisable in Plato's philosophy, however, since they have been interpreted and
transformed from the plane of revelation to that of rational argument (Dodds
1971 :208-209).
There are certainly many parallel concepts of the soul to be found in the Platonic,
Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines, but Dodds (1971 :209) argues that the crucial factor
connecting Plato's concept of the soul to the beliefs found in these doctrines was the
identification of the "detachable occult self' (a repository of "guilt-feelings" which
has the potential to be divine), with the rational psyche as Socrates saw it (whose
potential for the divine is by virtue of its knowledge). Although this was a complete
reinterpretation of the shamanistic concepts, Dodds (1971 :209) argues that there are
many features of these beliefs still recognisable in Plato's concept of the soul, such as
reincarnation.
Some aspects of the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines were reinterpreted in such a
way as to perspicuously resemble their original source, however, such as the
shamanistic trance, a "deliberate detachment of the occult self from the body", which
became for Plato a "mental withdrawal and concentration which purifies the rational
soul", a practice for which Plato in fact claims the authority of a traditional logos
(Dodds 1971 :209). The occult knowledge resulting from a shamanistic trance state
therefore becomes a mentally visible metaphysical truth, the shamanistic recollection
of past lives, a recollection of Forms, which became the basis of a new epistemology,
and the mythical "long sleep" and "underworld journey" is echoed in the experiences
of Er, and other such eschatological examples (Dodds 1971 :209).
The distinction between the mythical and the philosophical is by no means clear in the
first place, and it is not difficult to imagine how Plato could employ such mythical
concepts in his own philosophy, since objectivity and purely mental activity and
perception are concepts completely analogous to the altered states of consciousness
which these shamanistic cults practise. Plato's philosophy is based entirely on the
assumption that the objective and rational mental states reveal a higher truth not
readily visible in the everyday existence of the corporeal world, and that this activity
is the path to the purification of the self, the salvation of the soul and, eventually, to
the attainment of the divine. These results and revelations remain valid for the belief
that a shamanistic trance, as much as an objective speculation, is the path to
enlightenment.
Many other aspects of Plato's philosophy are not as readily identifiable as being
shamanistically influenced, and may not even be so, but the possibility of viewing
these aspects as possibly connected to the shamanistic influences are nonetheless
fruitful to the interpretation of Plato's philosophy. Dodds (1971 :209), for instance,
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argues that it is possible that the Guardians could be better understood if they are
thought of as a new kind of "rationalised shaman". The Guardians, like their
shamanistic predecessors, endure a disciplined process designed to "modify the whole
psychic structure" in order to prepare themselves for their high office, submit to a
form of dedication that is similar to asceticism and denies them the distracting
pleasures of the rest of society, renew their contact with the sources of wisdom by
periodic "retreats", and will be rewarded with special status in the afterlife (Dodds
1971 :209-210).
It is also likely, according to Dodds (1971 :210), that some class, similar to the
Guardians, existed in the Pythagorean societies, and that Plato sought to "carry the
experiment further" by giving this practice a scientific basis and employing it as an
instrument in the fulfilment of his "counter-reformation". Even if there were no
separate class analogous to the Guardians in Pythagorean societies, the general
Pythagorean practices are already similar to those prescribed for the Guardians,
practices which improved suitable initiates, provided the means for a ritualised
purification of the soul, and which were, above all, not meant for the general
population.
Dodds (1971 :210) notes that Plato's visionary picture of the Guardians as a new kind
of ruling class has often been criticised and cited as evidence that his estimate of
human nature was "grossly unrealistic", but points out that shamanistic institutions are
not devised for ordinary people and their concern is to exploit the possibilities of an
"exceptional type of personality". The Republic (428e-429a) also follows this line of
reasoning, for Plato states that his Guardian class will be a minority, picked for
exceptional abilities not commonly found in the general population. Each section of
the population has its own abilities and the various sections are compared to metals,
but the metals that represent the higher classes of the Guardians and the philosopher-
ruler are, tellingly , also the rarest metals.
The remainder of the inhabitants of Plato's ideal state form the majority, and Plato's
interest in their welfare seems to have extended only to a sort of protection from
external evils and a regulation of the expression of internal evils, with a view to their
happiness rather than their excellence. Dodds (1971 :210) argues that, in all the stages
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of Plato's thought, Plato recognised that, for the common people, provided they are
not exposed to the temptations of power, an "intelligent hedonism" sufficed as a
practical guide to a satisfactory life (cf Phaedo 82a-b; Republic 500d, Philebus 21d-e;
Laws 653b, 663b-664a, 733a).
Although Plato's dialogues in the middle period show, according to Dodds
(1971 :210), a "preoccupation" with exceptional natures and their exceptional
possibilities, he nevertheless maintains an interest in the "psychology of the ordinary
man". Plato, in his later work, after he had abandoned the idea of a philosopher-king
in favour of the rule of law, pays increased attention to the conduct of ordinary
people, and his aim becomes an encouragement of goodness and honesty as a means
of attaining happiness (Dodds 1971 :211).
This is in stark contrast to Plato's more optimistic views that happiness and goodness
are both results of knowledge or contemplation of the Forms, but in the Laws (653D),
as Dodds (1971:211) points out, the virtue of the common man is evidently not based
on knowledge, but on a process of "conditioning" or "habituation", which induces
him to accept and act according to certain "salutary" beliefs. Plato seems to have
abandoned the Socratic belief that the unexamined life is not worth living (Apology
38a), and Dodds (1971 :211-212) is convinced that, although Plato would not admit to
a divergence from any Socratic principle, Socrates's inherent respect for the human
mind is diametrically opposite to the assumptions on which Plato's educational policy
of the Republic and the techniques for indoctrination he recommended in the Laws are
based.
Dodds (1971 :212) argues that Plato seems to have thought that the general population
could be kept in "tolerable moral health only by a carefully chosen diet of
incantations" (cf Laws 65ge, 664b, 665c, 666c, 670e, 773d, 812c, 903b, 944b), which
are to be "edifying myths and bracing ethical slogans". Dodds (1971:212) compares
this to Burckhardt's dichotomy, "rationalism for the few, magic for the many", and
notes that rationalism was not only influenced by ideas that once were magical, but
that "incantations" were later to serve rational ends. It is possible that, underlying this
differentiation between philosophers and ordinary people, was the concept that the
conflict within the soul is different for those who can master it with reason, and who
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therefore act willingly for the good, as opposed to those who have to forcefully
subdue their baser natures.
It is likely that Plato believed that the conflicts of the irrational soul (or the conflict
between the body and the soul) were very different for philosophers than for the mass
population. Philosophers are able to contemplate the effects of and solutions to an
inner conflict, and are also able to overcome this conflict and purify their souls by
means of rational pondering and truthseeking. Yet the peasants cannot hope to attain
salvation through metaphysical contemplation, but must merely try to live ascetically
in the hope that the immortality of their souls is not affected by the body. They
should live morally and religiously, believing in ethical gods and strengthening their
resolve through religious incantations. If knowledge of the good compels action for
the good, then Plato's proposals for standards and guidelines to be applied to the
common people can be understood as a solution to the lack of good which is the result
of a lack of philosophical contemplation.
The realisation that philosophical contemplation is most uncommon, and the
accompanying problem of formulating an alternate method for attaining the good can
be seen to have confronted Plato in the Laws, and was at least partially apparent in the
Republic, but the Timaeus is a discussion of the higher principles of philosophical
thought par excellence. Yet the doctrine in all three dialogues forms a unity, for they
apply the same principles of philosophy to different situations. The dialogues, though
aimed at similar audiences, clearly discuss two different groups of people and
therefore contain different foci for discussion. They also propose two different
methods for putting the postulated philosophy into practice.
Plato probably wrote the Laws with the intention of postulating a practical method for
ruling the common people and for preserving them from corruption (foreign and
bodily), but the ultimate aim Plato had was to demonstrate how order and harmony
could be created. The same aim of the creation of order and harmony is present in the
Timaeus, but the discussion in this dialogue is not about the practicalities of ruling a
state, but of ruling the self. This would also explain the more abstract and tentative
themes in the Timaeus, which Plato wrote, it seems, for the intellectual elite whom he
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hoped existed, and therefore he could discuss more fully (if less certainly) the
affective elements that he left unexplored in his other dialogues.
In other ways too, Plato's growing recognition of the importance of affective elements
carried him beyond the limits of fifth century rationalism, and this appears very
clearly, according to Dodds (1971 :212), in the development of his theory of evil.
Although Plato maintained that the Socratic dictum that "no man errs willingly" was
true, Dodds (1971:212) argues that Plato was in fact discontented with the
simplification of reducing moral error to a mistake in perspective. Plato adopted
another simplified view of evil, however, namely the puritan dualism inherent in the
magico-religious view of the psyche, which attributed all evil to the corrupting
influence of the body or the corporeal, but Dodds (1971:212-213) argues that Plato
came to different insights on this matter in his later writings.
In the Phaedo (67a) Plato adheres to the absolute dualism of the spiritual and the
material, and views the corporeal as a trap which pollutes the soul as long as it is
incarnate, becoming free of the "folly of the body" only if it can deny its ties with the
physical, by asceticism or, failing that, by death. Dodds (1971 :213) argues that Plato
was later compelled to recognise a further possibility, an "irrational factor" in the
mind itself, and therefore to view moral evil as a "psychological conflict". This
recognition becomes apparent in the Republic, which describes the soul's struggle as
an internal conflict between two parts of the soul (Republic 441b-e), unlike the earlier
passage in the Phaedo (94d-e) that describes the soul's struggle with the passions of
the body.
Dodds (1971 :213) argues that, not only are the bodily passions no longer viewed as an
extraneous source of infection which plagues the soul, but they are also recognised as
a necessary part of the life of the mind, and even as a form of energy, like Freud's
libido, which can be "canalised" either towards sensuous or intellectual activity. The
theory of inner conflict, as illustrated in the Republic (43ge) by the story of Leontion,
is more clearly stated in the Sophist (227d-228e), where it is said to be a
psychological maladjustment resulting from "some sort of injury", a disease of the
soul and the cause of cowardice, intemperance, injustice, and moral evil in general,
which are all distinct from ignorance or intellectual failure (Dodds 1971 :214).
Yet Plato had not abandoned the transcendent rational self, according to Dodds
(1971 :214), nor had he dismissed the assumption that its unity was the prerequisite for
the soul's immortality. Dodds (1971:214) argues that Plato, in the Timaeus (90a),
tries to reformulate his earlier ideas of the destiny of man to make them compatible
with his later psychology and cosmology, and so returns to the concept of a unitary
soul that was previously found in the Phaedo, using the old religious term that
Empedocles had used for the "occult self', namely daimon. The reference to the
guardian spirit (Timaeus 90a) is preceded by another reference, this time to all three
parts of the soul, for Timaeus 69c discusses how the gods who shape man receive the
divine soul from the Demiurge and encase it in a body, but the gods add to it "another
mortal part, containing terrible and necessary feelings", and Plato continues the
discussion of the mortal parts of the soul up to par. 73a.
It is by no means clear how Plato proposed to unite the divine daimon of reason with
the lowest part of the soul, which he describes as being secured in the lower midriff
"like a wild beast" (Timaeus 70c), but Dodds (1971 :221) argues that it could be Eros
that unites the parts of the soul, for it is Eros that links the human with the divine in
the Symposium (202e). Eros is rooted the procreative desire which man and animal
alike share, but Dodds (1971 :221) argues that Eros also supplies the dynamic impulse
which drives the soul forward in its quest for a form of satisfaction transcending
earthly experience, and it therefore "spans the whole compass of human personality,
and makes the one empirical bridge between man as he is and man as he might be".
The connection with Eros may be an attempt at the unification of the two concepts of
the soul discussed above, combining the theory of the magi co-religious psyche which
is corrupted by mortal flesh and the theory of a rational part of the psyche that is in
conflict with an irrational part of the psyche. Whether the mortal and corrupting body
is causally related, not just metaphysically through Eros, to the irrational psyche, is
not overtly stated, for it is only stated that the irrational part of the soul is necessary.
It seems likely, however, that the two are connected, as many of the desires of the
irrational soul are directly related to the wish to satisfy the mortal body. This same
connection would therefore also apply to a connection between the irrational and the
rational parts of the soul, for the irrational soul sometimes desires things that aid
reason and its control of the lower appetites.
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Even without the mediating factor of the irrational soul, the fission of man into
daimon and beast is similar to the fission in Plato's view of human nature, according
to Dodds (1971 :215); the gulf Plato perceived between the immortal and the mortal
soul corresponds to the gulf between Plato's vision of man as he might be and his
estimate of man as he is, the latter being apparent in the Laws as the culmination of
what Plato had come to think of human life as it is actually lived. Plato indicates,
furthermore, that he not only views the life man leads as largely uncontrolled, but
uncontrollable, for he regards man as a "puppet", who is "hardly real and worthless,
and whose purpose cannot be known" (Laws 803c, 804a-b).
Plato suggests a religious origin for this way of thinking, which, according to Dodds
(1971 :216), resembles the opinions of later religious thinkers such as Marcus Aurelius
and T. S. Eliot, who said that human nature is able to endure only very little reality.
Dodds (1971:216) also believes that this view is consistent with the rest of the Laws,
for Plato thought that man was unfit to rule himself, as unfit as a flock of sheep (Laws
713c-d), that God, not man, must therefore be the measure of all things (Laws 716c),
that man is God's property (Laws 902b, 906a, Critias 109b), and furthermore, that if
he wishes to be happy, he must be "abject" before God (Laws 716a).
This may seem like uncharacteristic pessimism and in direct juxtaposition to the
idealistic picture of the soul's divine nature and destiny as described in the middle
dialogues, a picture that was never abjured, according to Dodds (1971:216).
Nevertheless, there are various instances of a more cynical view of the mass
population, which constantly reappear in Plato's works, as Dodds (1971 :216-217)
points out. In the Republic (486a), for instance, the philosopher doubts whether
human life can be regarded "as a thing of any great consequence". In the Meno
(100a) the general population of men are likened to the shadows in Homer's Hades.
The conception of human beings as "chattels" of a god appears already in the Phaedo
(62b), and is a belief which Plato seems to have retained until the end of his life, for it
occurs in the Laws (906a).
Dodds (1971 :217) mentions another instance of Plato's cynicism, in the Phaedo (81e-
82b), where Plato predicts with "relish" the future of his fellow men, some of whom
will be donkeys, others wolves, and the respectable bourgeoisie will be ants and bees
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in their next incarnation. This is no doubt humorously intended, but it is humour in
the vein of Jonathan Swift's, according to Dodds (1971:217), as it carries the
implication that everybody but the philosopher is on the verge of becoming
"subhuman", a view that is hard to reconcile with the theory that every human soul is
essentially rational.
Plato seems to have retained this cynicism throughout his career as well, or at least to
have periodically relapsed into it, for in the Timaeus (90d-92b) he explains the origins
of animals through examples of how certain types of men would be reincarnated as
animals appropriate to their imperfections, for instance "Birds were produced by a
process of transformation, growing feathers instead of hair, from harmless, empty-
headed men, who were interested in the heavens but were silly enough to think that
visible evidence is all the foundation astronomy needs" (Timaeus 91c). Whether or
not this instance was the product of professional jealousy, cannot be said, but the
theme continues throughout the section in the Swiftian manner of the Phaedo.
In the light of these passages, Dodds (1971 :217) argues that one is led to recognise
two tendencies or strains in Plato's thinking about the status of man: firstly, there is
the "faith and pride" in human reason which was a remnant of the thinking of the fifth
century, and for which Plato found religious sanction by equating the detached reason
with the detached occult self of shamanistic tradition, and secondly, there is the "bitter
recognition of human worthlessness" which was the direct result of his experience of
contemporary Athens and Syracuse.
Dodds (1971 :217) adds that the relationship between these two points of view was not
one of simple opposition, for the disillusionment which Plato experienced with
humanity's everyday existence could also be expressed in the language of religion, as
a denial of attaching any value to the activities and interests of this world in
comparison with the things of the next world, but the extreme pessimism of the later
period seems to have been a compensation for the extreme optimism in the early
period. Dodds (1971:217-218) believes that Plato's underlying despair and
pessimism became increasingly apparent, eventually translating itself into religious
terms, until it found its logical expression in his final proposals for a completely
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closed society, to be ruled not by the illuminated reason, but (under God) by custom
and religious law.
Plato's basic proposals in the Laws, that the ideal society must be based on a
foundation of logical and proven religious convictions (Bk. X), an unalterable code of
law (Bk. IV, especially 712b-722c, 772b), a solid educational background of
indoctrination in these legal and religious precepts (Bk. VII), and a social system
which combines religious and civic life (738b-d), are viewed by Dodds (1971:221) as
his final attempt at formulating proposals for reforming and stabilising the "Inherited
Conglomerate". Dodds (1971 :222) further argues that Plato's proposals could be
interpreted as being designed merely to strengthen and generalise existing Athenian
practice, but that, as a whole, they actually represent the first attempt to deal
systematically with the problem of standardising religious belief.
The problem of standardising religious belief was new, according to Dodds
(1971 :222), for faith was taken for granted and neither proving the existence of the
gods to induce belief, nor proposing the importance of early religious training as a
means of conditioning the future adult, had occurred to anyone. Dodds (1971 :222)
further argues that Plato's proposals sought not only to stabilise, but also to reform the
traditional structure. These proposals do not appear to fall properly within the field of
science or philosophy, since they mainly deal with religion and myth (or myth-
making), and popular religion for the masses. It must be kept in mind that Plato's
state theory is inextricably linked to these religious reformations, however, and he
seems not to have had in mind a religious revelation so much as a means of social
transformation.
It could be argued that Plato's primary aim was not an attempt to convert the citizens
to a new religion, but rather that this conversion to the new religion was a means to an
end. The ultimate goal that Plato probably had in mind was to provide the population
with a belief in deities they were familiar with, who could act as a form of authority
for Plato's moral reforms, the gods therefore serving the function of all-seeing
. policemen, or as a kind of smoke-screen behind which the state's interference in the
citizens' lives could behidden. This argument could be supported by the difference
between the gods described in the Laws (Bk. IV 717a-b, 738d), who are basically the
traditional gods of Greece, and the description of the Demiurge in the Timaeus - the
"supreme god of Plato's personal faith", according to Dodds (1971:223).
Plato does not reveal the Demiurge himself to the citizens of the ideal state, although
he would be a far more moral entity than the Greek gods (whose past immoralities
would have to be erased from the common literature and memory for them to be able
to warrant respect and inspire moral behaviour). The reason for this is clearly stated
in the Timaeus (28c), however, where Plato states that to "discover" the Demiurge is a
hard task, and even if he were to be discovered, it would be impossible to tell
everyone about him. Dodds (1971 :223) argues that Plato chose to advocate to the
common people a belief in the kind of gods whom everyone could see, and thus, by
implication, whose divinity could be recognised by the masses and about whom the
philosophers could make logically valid statements.
An example of these recognisable deities would be Plato's depiction of the planets as
gods, who are to be sacrificed and prayed to, and revered (Laws 821b), for their
movements are not "wandering", as the name "planet" (literally "wanderer") implies,
but orderly. These then are the planetary gods of the Timaeus, who are visible
celestial bodies that move in orderly circles, some larger and some smaller, and who
therefore embody the visual incarnation of the Form "eternity" by indicating time.
These gods are also quite distinct from the Demiurge, who created them (Timaeus
4Ia).
Dodds (1971 :224) regards Plato's religious reforms as novel, not only in his depiction
of the celestial bodies as divinities (Laws 821b-d), but also in the instigation of their
cult. The "new State Church" was to be the joint cult of Apollo and the sun-god
Helios (Laws 946b-947a), a cult which Dodds (1971 :224-225) regards as a union of
the old and the new, Apollo representing the "traditionalism of the masses" and
Helios the new "natural religion" of the philosophers, and it should therefore be seen
as "Plato's last desperate attempt to build a bridge between the intellectuals and the
people, and thereby save the unity of Greek belief and of Greek culture".
By contrast there is little focus on these "national" gods in the Timaeus, and more
than ample focus on the Demiurge and his activities. Moreover, the Demiurge is the
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ultimate truth and goodness, and the planetary gods (by their regular movements of
soul) only reflect the order he created for the good. Most importantly, the planetary
gods are created, and therefore dependent on a more ultimate source or cause, i.e. the
Demiurge, who is outside of his creation and independent of it. This has implications
for those who are interested in escaping the wheel of incarnation and want to save
their souls, for the deities who are revered and contemplated must be directly linked
to these questions about the soul and its destiny.
The deities of the Laws and the Timaeus are not incompatible, but it seems clear that
if one takes account of the aim of the two dialogues and their proposed effect on the
audience, it is only for the philosopher to contemplate the Demiurge, his creation
(including the planetary gods), and his creature (the Forms), and not for the common
man in the Magnesian state. The common man just needs some proof of the existence
of a deity, whom he can emulate, and in so doing, conform to the order of the
creation. Technically, of course, both accounts of the gods are true, but they differ in
serving a specific need of, or goal for, the audience.
This could imply a different approach to salvation of souls, because, according to
Plato's doctrine, there is a difference between the philosopher's soul and the souls of
the masses, for the philosopher's soul is closer to being discarnate. It is therefore not
impossible for the masses to contemplate the Demiurge, but this should be seen as
something they might attain in a future life, after morality has been perfected by
emulation of the order exemplified in the planetary deities, whom they are to worship
until a more exhaustive view of the cosmos can be taken in.
Thus, the Demiurge serves as theoretical interest for the philosopher. Contemplation
of the Demiurge also has the practical application of furthering knowledge and
therefore morality, as well as the salvation of the individual soul once such knowledge
and morality have been attained. This practical application, especially the furthering
of morality, is the dominant concern in the Laws. In providing proof of the existence
of the gods for the layman, Plato ensures that the theocracy can function politically.
Yet the purpose of the furtherance of morality is not only to induce obedience to the
state's Laws, but also to instil a sense of god (or the gods), and therefore ultimately to
instil something higher and purer in the consciousness of the masses for their own
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moral good. As they are visible, the planetary gods may also be discussed, and this
might be a way of aspiring to a contemplation of the planetary gods in order one day
to speculate about their origins, and so arrive at contemplation of the greater whole.
The difference between the Demiurge and the lesser gods can be compared to the
difference, firstly, between Plato's view of the soul as rational, and the soul as a
combination of the rational and the irrational, as well as the difference, secondly,
between the philosopher and the common man. Plato's religion can therefore be
viewed as a combination of two realities, one encompassing the other, for the
common man would only be confused with metaphysical enquiries, and should rather
emulate the lesser divinities by regulating his irrational soul and behaving morally,
whereas the philosopher can improve his rational soul by contemplation of both the
Demiurge and the lesser divinities, and so arrive at morality, and at salvation via
enlightenment.
Zoroaster
The pre-Zoroastrian concept of the soul is much like the Homeric 'ghost', but the
Zoroastrian concept of the soul, like the Platonic soul, also has sense and self-
consciousness. It, too, is capable of thinking, moral decision and scientific cognition,
and is likewise the seat of moral responsibility. The concept of the autonomous soul,
akin to the Greek psyche, is very important to Zoroaster's doctrine, especially because
he emphasised free will. The exercising of a choice for or against the good, and the
tending of the well-being of the soul in so choosing, also has important repercussions
in Zoroaster's doctrine of the after-life.
The soul in Zoroastrianism is also identified with the intellect, and a soul that strives
constantly after wisdom and knowledge, and the necessary accompanying ethical
behaviour, can belong to the eternal world. This is achieved by rendering the soul
independent of evil, which, in tum, is identified with ignorance, and in so doing,
purifying the soul so that it may acquire immortality and heaven. Immortality is not
only the soul's freedom from the body (or the soul outlasting the body), but in both
Plato's and Zoroaster's doctrines it implies divinity and presupposes complete purity.
/1. Pre-Zoroastrian and Zoroastrian concepts of the soul
Zoroaster preached that leading a "good life" entailed more than sacrifice and
worship, Boyce (1992:74) argues, and required the proselyte to be an ashavan
(follower of Asha). This meant that, as a follower of Asha, the individual embraced
and maintained the truth, as well as the order and harmony of the world, which had
implications for both understanding and acting for the good. Boyce (1992:74) notes
that the followers are expected not only to have knowledge of the "revealed truth",
but to act on it by words and acts of good purpose (Yasna 53:2), which would
continue into the hereafter, as the soul survived the body. The concept, Boyce
(1992:74) points out, of two different fates awaiting souls in the afterlife, one of a
happy existence on high, and the other of a joyless existence in the underworld, was
not new to Zoroaster and was probably an old Indo-Iranian belief, but Zoroaster
reinterpreted these fates as outcomes that are ethically based, as the reward of God's
heaven (Khshathra) for the good souls, and punishment with the Evil Spirit in hell for
those who chose evil.
The new system of an ethically based fate after death, Boyce (1992:74) argues,
probably shared with the older beliefs the concept of storing up favour or merit with
the gods, but Zoroastrianism, unlike the old system which was based on the amount of
sacrifices, had to evolve a description of the method employed for establishing what
fate the soul deserved after death. Boyce (1992:74) argues that the ancient Iranians
were "evidently given to recourse to the law", and that this would have suggested to
Zoroaster a system of impartial judgement awaiting the soul at death, with a weighing
up of the good and the bad thoughts, words and deeds throughout life and the
consequences to these being meted out accordingly. Boyce (1992:75) further points
out that this opened up the possibility of salvation for any individual at any time, as
even the most evil could attempt to rectify their debit with good deeds.
The concept of judgement in the afterlife led to the instatement of a judge in later
Zoroastrian doctrine, namely Mithra (Yasht 10.94). Boyce (1992:75) believes that,
although it cannot be proven, Zoroaster must have considered Mithra as the proper
ahura to preside over the judgement of souls. It is likely, however, that since later
Zoroastrianism revived many of the earlier Iranian beliefs that were not originally
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found in the Ga/has, the role of Mithra as a judge of the dead was suggested by his
role as a judge in life. The process the soul had to go through after death is also
reminiscent of the Iranian practice of ordeal by fire, presided over by mainyus, and
common to many societies as an aid to the establishment of truth in a matter and
therefore a common form of judgement.
Another old belief that was reinterpreted by Zoroaster was that of the journey and
dangerous crossing that awaited the departed spirit. Once again, as Boyce (1992:75)
notes, this belief in a downward path towards the underworld, ending in a difficult
crossing, often of a river, before 'Hades' could be reached, was probably very old and
possibly had Indo-European roots. The many analogous examples, such as the Greek
belief in the soul's journey across the river Styx to enter Hades, would seem to
support this theory. Boyce (1992:75) argues that Zoroastrianism extended this theme
to include the passage of souls destined for heaven, and modified the river motif into a
crossing of the "Chinvat Bridge". This bridge is also known as the "Bridge of
Judgement", which discriminates between good and evil (Bode & Nanavutty
1952:85), although Boyce (1992:75) notes that the meaning is disputed. The Chinvat
Bridge widens to a broad, safe crossing for good souls, and narrows to a razor's edge
for the evil, who then fall into the abyss (Boyce 1992:75-76). Even the journey to the
next world is mentioned by Zoroaster, who states that he will yoke strong and swift
steeds of devotion to reach the Chinvat Bridge (Yasna 50.7).
Another old belief that was incorporated into the Zoroastrian faith was that the
departed spirit, bound for heaven, should be met by a girl - moreover, according to
Boyce (1992:76), a beautiful girl, who became its companion and led it to heaven,
probably a myth born of the belief that in heaven all delights, including the sexual,
would be available. Boyce (1992:76) notes that from this myth it is safe to deduce
that women were not destined to enjoy such eternal rewards as heaven, but Zoroaster
changed this old myth quite substantially. Firstly, he proclaimed that any good soul,
male or female, could cross the Chinvat Bridge (Yasna 46.10), and in the transformed
myth, as it appears in Zoroastrianism, the girl became a daena. Boyce (1992:76)
notes that the word daena escapes translation, but states that the best English
translation would be 'Inner Self.
The daena, as the person's inner self, was shaped, as Boyce (1992:76) points out, by
the individual's thoughts, words and deeds, which made the 'Self either beautiful or
ugly, and would therefore inspire either joy or revulsion when the daena finally meets
the departed soul at the Chinvat Bridge. Boyce (1992:76) quotes three verses from
the Gathas as illustration of this: "He who makes better or worse his thoughts, 0
Mazda, he by act and word makes better or worse his Inner Self; she follows his
leanings, wishes and likings. At Thy will the end shall be different for each" (Yasna
48:4); "The Inner Self of the wicked man destroys for him the reality of the straight
way. His soul shall surely vex him at the Chinvat Bridge" (Yasna 51:13); and "The
Karapans and the Kavayas (sacrificial priests of the Daevas) combine their powers to
destroy the spiritual life of man through their evil acts. But their own souls and their
own consciences will torment them when they be dwellers in Drujo Demana, the
House of the Lie" (Yasna 46:11).
The poetic justice in this postulate is striking, as there can be no more fitting fate than
simply having to live with what one has made of oneself or one's own conscience,
even in the afterlife. The power to shape the inner self lies with the individual, and is
a matter of making the right and informed choices for the welfare of the soul and the
conscience. The nature of the inner self is shaped by all thoughts, words and actions,
and the reinterpretation of the daena myth serves to make the populace vigilant about
their own morality for their own good, not only for the abstract good of the
community and its laws and mores. Nor is the fate of the person some predestined
thing, but something the individual has the power to choose for himself. The
individual alone is responsible for his conduct, and thereby his fate after death.
Free from the determinism that characterised the Homeric and pre-Zoroastrian beliefs
in the existence of shades, the fate of the soul in Zoroastrianism became inextricably
linked with responsibility, choice, and therefore thought. This is also akin to the
belief in metempsychosis, which teaches that the soul, being a responsible agent, will
be reincarnated in whatever form is fitting for its next life, considering its actions in
the previous life. In this regard, Plato (Timaeus 42a) states that if one lives a good
life, the soul may return to its native star (the equivalent of heaven) and therefore be
free of the wheel of incarnation, but warns that "anyone who failed to do so would be
changed into a woman at his second birth. [and] if he still refrained from doing
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wrong, he would be changed into some animal suitable to his particular wrongdoing"
(Timaeus 42b).
Boyce (1992:76) notes that Zoroaster not only abandoned the belief in "a houri-like
creature promising sexual delights", but also abandoned the belief that the physical
body was returned to the departed soul in heaven after one year, to enable it to enjoy
all the material pleasures again, and that Zoroaster believed the rewards in heaven, as
well as the punishments of hell, to be purely spiritual. Yet later Zoroastrianism
reincorporated the resurrection of the flesh, and the incumbent funerary practices.
The diverse traditions of burial that existed prior to Zoroastrianism indicate a diversity
in the beliefs about the afterlife, all of which could have influenced Zoroaster's
concept. One site (at Sintashta, situated in north Khazakstan, in a bend of the
Sintashta river in the province of Cheliabinsk), as Boyce (1992:35) points out,
contains all three types of burial practice, namely burial in the ground, exposure and
cremation, which is relevant to the burial practices of the Iranians because the steppe
society at Sintashta, was very similar to the society depicted in the Gathas.
The rites of exposure as well as cremation are generally linked with a belief in
heaven, whereas inhumation is associated with the older concept of a Hades or 'place
of shades', a joyless existence in the afterlife. Exposure was also connected with the
doctrine of a resurrection of the flesh. It is possible that the later Zoroastrian beliefs
reincorporated all three these concepts, e.g. a belief in heaven, hell and a bodily
resurrection, much like it reincorporated many of the pagan deities.
Another interesting development in the later Zoroastrian tradition is an account of a
priest, Arda Viraf, who dies and goes through the process of becoming a discarnate
soul, but returns to tell of what he saw. This is very similar to the Myth of Er in the
Republic. In this Dantean journey, Arda Viraf observes the souls being met by their
daenas, being judged according to their thoughts, words and deeds, and crossing the
Chinvat Bridge. He is also shown heaven and hell, and the retribution or rewards that
await the souls in the afterlife.
2. The Soul's choice between good and evil
Axial to the Zoroastrian doctrine of morality was the concept of the Twin Spirits,
Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu, who in the beginning chose good and evil
respectively (Yasna 30.1). Gnoli (2000:2) states that the paradigmatic nature of the
choice these two spirits make is the prototype of the choice that man must make
between the paths of truth and falsehood. There is an added dimension to this choice
exercised by both man and spirit which becomes clear when one considers that
'rnainyu' can be translated as 'spirit' as well as 'mentality', since the root of 'rnainyu'
is 'man', which means 'to think' (Schwartz 1985:641). This has led to the translation
by Bode and Nanavutty (1952:49) of the Twin Mainyu as "the twin aspects of the
human mind". The aspect of the mental is further accentuated by the fact that the
verse which directly follows the mention of the Twins states that "the greatest boon
[will be] given in truth to the wise" (Yasna 30.1). The accent on the choice of
morality is not limited to thought, however, but is linked to the words and deeds of the
individual as well.
The basis of the Zoroastrian ethical system is the triad of 'good thoughts, good words
and good deeds', andsin in thought is equated with sin in actions, which presupposes,
according to Geiger (1977:56), a high standard of moral culture. Because of the
equation of thoughts and actions, Geiger (1977:56) argues that both the basis for
actions and the basis for moral discernment are perceived in the mind. This accords
well with the supremacy of Mind in the Zoroastrian doctrine, and its relation to the
Good. The question of how man stands (through thought and action) in relation to the
two opposite principles of good and evil, necessarily also moves from ethics into the
field of eschatology, in that it relates to the end (and final judgement) of this
opposition.
The most noticeable aspect of the ethical system in the Gathas is the operation of
complete free will in every individual, and the absence of oppressive fatalistic
concepts. Nor is man himself evil; he rather only intemalises what is otherwise
completely separate when he actively chooses it of his own accord. Conversely,
Geiger (1977:57) points out that if man can choose to invite evil, he also has the
ability and power to resist and oppose it. This choice, however, is made by the
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individual's judgement, and the choice of evil is constantly referred to as the unwise,
indiscriminate and confused choice (Yasna 30.3, 6). The Kavis and Karapans (the
ruling princes and sacrificial priests of the Daevas) who follow the Lie are called
wilfully deaf and blind (Yasna 32.14-15). The implication here is that not only is the
choice between good and evil made of the individual's own accord, but that the
choice is one of reason and basically mental, not based on blind faith or merely on
piety, and the wrong choice is not made because of a basic or primordial flaw, but
because of ignorance of the good.
The choice of evil is therefore linked to ignorance, wilful or otherwise, and the lack of
understanding that makes people choose wrongly is a lack of hearkening to Vohu
Manah. Yet there is hope for those who choose incorrectly, though their subsequent
illumination seems to come at a dear price. The Gathas state that "when.retribution
overtakes these sinful men, then 0 Lord of Life and Wisdom, Thy Might and Majesty
will be revealed to them through the Good Mind who will teach these sinners to
deliver the Lie into the hands of Truth" (Yasna 30.8). This doctrine is much like the
Socratic belief that no man errs other than in ignorance, and there seems to be hope of
enlightenment despite choosing evil. The responsibility rests solely on the individual,
however, and he alone can choose right or wrong. Geiger (1977:57) believes that this
reinforces his opinion that Zoroastrian ethics belongs to a high standard of moral
culture and that it is certainly a "sound moral standpoint which places all
responsibility upon man himself, and deprives him of the possibility of making any
excuse for his laxity by saying that the matter did not lie in his power (or was a result
of destiny)".
The absence of a concept of predestined evil extends further than the mortal morality
discussed thus far, into the realm of the spirits. The Gathas state that the daevas did
not "discriminate aright, for confusion came upon them as they stood in doubt so that
they chose the Worst Mind" (Yasna 30.6). Geiger states that the daevas are therefore
not evil by nature but by choice (1977:58). But the concept of a choice extends even
to the Evil Spirit himself, as the preceding verse clearly states that "Of these two
mentalities, the Evil One chose to perform the worst deeds" (Yasna 30.5). It is also
emphasised, in Yasna 30.3, that the good choice was made by the wise, and that evil is
chosen in folly.
The importance of free will is related to the importance of good thought as well, in
that it implies concepts such as discrimination. As Geiger (1977: 58) points out, the
doctrine of free will "conforms with the opinion that religion is a matter of
understanding or judgement, and that righteousness and truth on the one hand, and
impiety and falsehood on the other hand, naturally stand in the closest connection".
The Zoroastrian doctrine clearly gives not only free will to all living beings, but also
the ability and power to use it, and aids recognition of the truth (Asha) with piety
(Armaiti) and wisdom (Vohu Manah). The inclination to choose the good is assumed,
and the absence of doing so is the absence of Good Mind. "The sinner is a fool, and
the fool a sinner" (Geiger 1977:58).
The possibility exists, however, that the individual is as of yet incapable of
understanding, or as Geiger (1977:58) would have it, a "fool", and that is why piety
(for the intelligent as well as the unenlightened) remains the highest goal. Piety can
be achieved by all, whether the individual employs his intellect in being pious or not.
It is explicitly stated that God fashioned physical bodies as well as discerning souls
and "directive intelligences" for humans, together with capacities to act, and true
doctrines to guide, so that one could choose beliefs at will (Yasna 31.11), and
therefore nobody is incapable of understanding. It is further stated that "each lifts up
his voice to proclaim his faith, whether a liar or a truthful speaker, whether learned or
unlearned, according to his own heart and mind." (Yasna 31.12).
For those individuals who are indecisive, however, Armaiti ("Piety") stands by to
deliberate with the spirit of whoever is perplexed by doubt (Yasna 31.12). Armaiti
also illumines the Daena (conscience or visionary perception) of men (Yasna 33.13),
which perhaps indicates that piety itself can provide understanding. In fact, Zoroaster
asks that God "bestow on [him], through loving Armaiti, the blessing of a perfect
illumination - the life of the Good Mind" (Yasna 43.1), and Armaiti is said to instruct
the prophets (Yasna 43.6). It seems that Piety (Armaiti) is as important to the
informed choice of the free will (that will lead to the good) as Good Mind (Vohu
Manah) is.
The connection between Good Mind (Vohu Manah) and Wisdom (Mazda) is
indisputable, but Piety (Armaiti) also appears to be connected to these concepts.
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Geiger (1977:59) states that Piety or Faith is the highest goodness (vahishtem) which
Zoroaster can receive from God, and he implores the Deity to grant this highest good
for himself as well as for his adherents (Yasna 28.8), but also notes that the highest
goodness is also described as the property of Mazda (wisdom). Therefore, Wisdom
(Mazda), as linked with Good Mind (Vohu Manah) as well as with Piety (Armaiti),
motivates thought and therefore action that is good.
Zoroastrian faith is often summarised as "good thoughts, good words and good deeds"
(Dhalla 1922:32), but it is furthermore a Zoroastrian belief that if the thoughts are
good, so are the words and deeds. A pure mind (in the sense of being in possession of
Wisdom, Good Mind and Piety) would therefore enable one to choose good above
evil.
3. The afterlife and the end of time
"The fate of man after death is a strict consequence of his life on earth" (Reese
1980:643). According to the Zoroastrian doctrine man is met after death by his own
conscience (Yasna 46.6; 49.9), and thus his future state depends solely on his own
actions in life and whether his conscience will torment him in the hereafter. Whatever
destiny awaits man rests on him, and happiness or misery is therefore the result of his
own thoughts, words, and deeds that determine his heaven or hell (Panthaki 1999:6).
Essentially, the souls can be faced with pure spiritual joys in Paradise, or with
spiritual torment in Hell, where the wicked soul is parted from Mazda and the blessed
spirits, to dwell with demons and be tormented by its own conscience (Yasna 46.11)
(Geiger 1977:64). Man's actions in life will not only shape his conscience into a
reward or torment, but there will also be a redress of all wrongs inflicted. Individuals
are therefore responsible for their own heaven or hell, and are punished by what they
inflict on themselves.
Zoroaster believed in the justice of God, according to Schroff (1999: 1), and in order
to address the injustices of society, Zoroaster maintained that men and women can
attain salvation and heaven by accepting and living in accordance with the divine
revelation of Ahura Mazda. The thoughts, words and deeds of the departed soul are
judged at the Bridge of the Separator, where the good and bad are weighed against
each other, allowing the good souls to enter heaven, but if the bad outweighs the
good, the soul descends to the underworld, a place of punishment and retribution
(Schroff 1999: 1).
When the Final Consummation occurs at the end of time, and evil is destroyed, the
Gathas speak of a river of molten metal which will not harm the just but burn away
all evil (Yasna 51.9). Schroff (1999:2) interprets this as signifying a resurrection of
the bodies and a last judgement and a purgation of all evil, a view held by later
Zoroastrianism as well. It is impossible to judge from .the Gathic text whether
Zoroaster saw the evil souls destroyed or purged, but it is perhaps an indication of
purgatory rather than destruction when Zoroaster refers to this process as an "ordeal",
which connotes the revelation or realisation of truth, rather than death. Whatever the
case is concerning the evil souls, evil itself is unequivocally destroyed at the end, but
this leads on to another aspect of Zoroaster's eschatological concept, namely the end
of time, which seems inherently linked with the end of the struggle with evil.
As Boyce (1992:76) notes, the phrase "the end of time" is now familiar, but it was
first conceived of by Zoroaster as meaning the end of historic time within the larger
span of eternity, which brought with it an end of birth and death or destruction and
renewal, e.g. a "cessation of all change". With the end of change will come the end of
evil, and the advent of perfection in creation, which in Platonic terms could be
described as when the creation passes from 'becoming' into 'being' and perfection.
Boyce (1992:76) states that, at the end of change, when the earth has been made
frasha ('glorious') by the defeat of evil, all heaven and its inhabitants will descend to
earth, as Mazda's kingdom (Khshathra) will be established upon it and it will be made
perfect again, with life on earth static and unchanging. Boyce (1992:76) argues that
this new concept of an end to time and history was a necessary component of
Zoroaster's concept of God's moral purpose for the creation. This is called the "Final
Consummation" of the "divine purpose" in Yasna 43.5-6, but there is not much
elaboration on the eschatology in the Gathas, except to state that the good shall
receive good blessings, and the evil shall receive evil until the "Final Consummation"
when, presumably, all will be atoned for.
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It is only in later Zoroastrianism, according to Zaehner (1961 :58), that there is a fully
developed system of eschatology which speaks of the Saoshyans or 'Saviour' who
will renew all existence at the end of time. This eschatology also preaches a
resurrection of the bodies of the dead, which, reuniting with their souls, will wade
through a purging stream of molten metal that will seem "like warm milk" to the just,
but bum the wicked (Zaehner 1961 :58). This ordeal by fiery metal therefore purges
the evildoers of their evil, and creation becomes perfect (Zaehner 1961 :58). The roots
of this eschatology can be found in the Gathas , but Zaehner (1961: 58) argues that
they do not have a "systematically worked out" eschatology, and that there is nothing
in them to suggest that the damned can atone for their sins.
There is of course no way to be certain whether the Gathas held that the wicked souls
would perish or merely be purified by the final ordeal, but the rest of the doctrines
held in the Gathas could possibly shed light on the issue. The idea of punishment in
the Gathas seems directly linked to the torment of the individual's soul only, and
furthermore the soul is plagued by its own conscience (Yasna 46.11). The torment or
reward awaiting the soul after death is directly proportionate, therefore, to what it has
inflicted on itself. This could be interpreted as a form of purgatory, but is no definite
indication that the complete extermination of all evil souls is an exaggeration. It is
asserted that evil itself will perish in the end (Yasna 53.7-8), but in the intermittent
period the followers of Asha (Truth) will dwell in Light whereas the followers of the
Druj (Lie) will endure a long period of darkness (Yasna 31.20). When the retribution
of molten metal finally overtakes the sinful men at the end of time, Ahura Mazda's
Might and Majesty (Khshathra) will be revealed to them and Good Mind (Vohu
Manah) will teach them to deliver Evil into the hands of the Good (Yasna 30.7-8).
The conclusion to these somewhat ambiguous statements are that Ahura Mazda
knows best what is to befall the sinners at the final end (Yasna 32.7).
A more definite point of divergence is found between the Gathas and the later
tradition in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, though this is not an absolute
certainty either. Haug (1971 :312) states that although no specific statement is made
in the Gathas regarding a resurrection of the dead, there is a phrase used which was
subsequently applied to signify a time of resurrection, and a restoration of all life that
has been lost in the duration of creation. This is the expression of frashem kerenaon
ahum (Yasna 30.9), which Haug translates as "they make the life everlasting", i.e.
they perpetuate the life, and out of this phrase the substantive frashá-kereti
("perpetuation" of life), was formed, by which all the Later Avestan books designate
the period of resurrection and palingenesis at the end of time (Haug 1971 :312).
Zoroaster's eschatology, as Zaehner (1961:59) states, is not entirely homogenous with
the eschatology in the Later Avesta or Pahlavi books, as the Gathas do not speak of
the Saoshyans as an eschatological figure, and the Frashkart or "Final Rehabilitation"
of existence is not described in any detail either. Zaehner (1961:59) notes that the
Gathas refer to a judgement of individual souls at the Bridge of Judgement, but
believes that the fire ordeal that awaits all at the end of time will finally separate the
souls into their "eternal destinies of weal and woe". Zaehner (1961 :59-60) points out
that the later doctrine only refers to a single judgement and views the fire ordeal as a
purging of evil, making all good. Yet the only reference in the Gathas to the final
destiny of the souls at the end of time describes no such destruction of evil souls.
Instead, the passage (Yasna 30.11) reads:
"If, 0 ye Mortals, ye mark those commandments which Mazda hath ordained - of
happiness and pain, the long punishment of the follower of the Druj, and the blessings
for the followers of the Right - then hereafter shall it be well" (transt. Mills 1898).
Two other translations cite the same reference to the punishment of the wicked as
lasting for a long time, but not for eternity:
"If ye, 0 Mortals, realise and understand the laws of happiness and pain ordained by
Mazda, and if you learn that liars and wicked persons shall face agelong punishment
but pious and righteous ones shall enjoy ever-lasting prosperity, then you shall reach
real contentment and salvation, by learning this principle" (transl. Azargoshasb
1998).
"So understand, 0 mortal men, the decrees which Mazda has ordained, regarding
happiness and misery. There will be a long period of suffering for the wicked, and
rewards for the pious, but thereafter eternal joy shall reign everywhere" (transt. Bode
& Nanavutty 1952).
It therefore seems that the hints in the Gathas at the purgation of evil at the end of
time make the interpretation of hell as a non-eternal purgatory not as untenable as
Zaehner believes, and that, at the very least, there is no indication that the evil will
suffer in hell for all eternity.
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An alternative view of this perplexing issue is that the end of time is an event that will
only come to be when the world is finally free of all evil, for it says that mankind
must choose good out of wisdom, "but due to man's blindness and ignorance he is
easily led astray; thus the victory of Ahura Mazda has been delayed." (Reese
1980:643). This possibility is reinforced by Zoroaster's urgent emphasis on actively
doing good and opposing evil, including good acts such as caring for creation. This
would open the possibility that the fulfilment of the eschatological triumph of good
depends on mankind improving itself and its surroundings until all things choose good
out of wisdom, enabling a renewal of existence.
4. The nature and divisions of the soul
The structure of the entire human being is designated in the Gathas as being a
tripartite division of body, spirit, and mind, with some divisions within these
respective categories. The Gathic description, as translated by Haug (1971: 152), is:
"When Thou madest the world with its bodies, and (gavest them) motions and
speeches, then Thou Mazda hast created at first through Thy mind the gaethas
(enclosures), and the sacred visions (daenao), and intellects." (Yasna 31.11). Haug
(1971: 152) points out that the daenas, as the revelations communicated to the
prophets through visions, involve perception in terms of seeing as well as thinking,
because the root of the word is di, "to see", which is related to the Sanskrit root dhyai,
"to think", and thinking was therefore considered a perception with the mental eye,
and that only later did it pass into the general meaning of religious creed. The
possible meanings of the word Daena will be discussed below.
Schwartz (1985 :647) describes this division of the individual as consisting of a body
and a number of "psycho-noetic faculties". The body, Schwartz (1985:647) notes, is
referred to as both tanu- (the physical part of the individual in its totality) and as
kehrp- (the outer appearance), and the large inventory of the various parts of the body
correspond essentially to the various limbs described in other Indo-European
languages. The psycho-noetic faculties, Schwartz (1985:647) states, are far less clear,
though his translation of ahu- as literally 'essence', which further implies intellect and
will, baodah- as 'perception' or 'consciousness', and urvan- as 'soul' or that which
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survives after death (a faculty, he points out, that is also possessed by righteous
animals), seems to correspond with Haug's translation (1971: 152) discussed above.
The psychic-noetic faculties mentioned in the Gathas are rarely translated or
interpreted as such, because of the rather puzzling nature of the content of the
passage. The verse in question has Zoroaster asking Ahura Mazda:
"This I ask Thee, tell me truly, Ahura - whether I shall indeed, 0 Right, earn the
reward, even ten mares with a stallion and a camel, which was promised to me, 0
Mazda, as well as through these, the future gift of Welfare and Immortality" (Yasna
44.18, transl. Mills 1898).
In the Gathas, Haurvatat (Perfection/Welfare) and Ameretat (Immortality) are the
twin rewards acquired by man at the end of a life lived spiritually on earth, and, as
Bode and Nanavutty (1952:79) point out, the possession often mares, a stallion and a
camel would therefore neither help Zoroaster to understand or attain Haurvatat and
Ameretat, nor induce him to dedicate these Powers to the service of Ahura Mazda.
This passage has long troubled scholars, but some scholars, such as Bode and
Nanavutty (1952:78-79), believe that the key to the imagery employed is to be found
in the Katha Upanishad and the Bhagvadgita. In the Katha Upanishad, III, 3-5, the
soul is described as riding in a chariot, the body being the chariot, the intellect the
charioteer, the mind the reigns, and the senses the horses, and in the Bhagvadghita,
XIII, 5, the senses are divided into five of action and five of contemplation, and are
said to be controlled by the "one", that is, the mind (Bode & Nanavutty 1952:78).
This is rather peculiarly reminiscent of the Myth of the Charioteer in the Phaedrus
(246a-250d), although the connection with the Gathic passage is not immediately
clear.
Bode and Nanavutty (1952:78) render this passage intelligible by noting that the
Avestan word for camel, Ushtra, is derived from the root vas, ush, 'to shine', 'to
bum', and that Zoroaster is therefore adhering to a commonplace of Aryan imagery
when he speaks metaphorically, in this Gathic verse, of the ten senses as the ten
mares, controlled by the mind, represented as a stallion, which in tum is guided by the
camel of illumination. The verse therefore can be translated as follows:
"Answer me aright that which I ask Thee, 0 Ahura. How may I deserve, through
Asha, that blessed reward, the firm control of my ten senses by the mind illuminated
with spiritual insight that Perfection and Immortality might be understood by me, 0
Mazda, so that I may lay them both as Thy feet?" (Yasna 44.18, trans!. Bode &
Nanavutty 1952).
4.1. The two Intellects
Another division is found in the Gathas that designates two intellects, often referred
to as the first and last intellects, which Haug considers to be notions of the Zoroastrian
philosophy. The first intellect is innate in the soul and originates from heaven, and
the last is one that man himself acquires by experience (Haug 1971: 161). They are
mentioned several times in the Gathas (Yasna 44.19; 48.4; 50.6; 50.10). In Yasna
44.19 Zoroaster asks Ahura Mazda: "How is the first intellect of that man, who does
not return (what he has received) to the offerer of this gift, of him who does not grant
anything to the speaker of truth? For the last intellect of this man (his doing) is
already known to me."
The Gathas also describe the intellect as hidden wisdom: "Zoroaster is the prophet
who, through his wisdom ('mazda' in the appellative) and truth, utters in words the
sacred thoughts (mantras). Through his tongue he makes known to the world, the
laws given by my intellect, the mysteries hidden in my mind" (Yasna 50.6) (Haug
1971: 168). There is also mention of the two intellects as good and evil, according to
Haug, though this interpretation is tentative: "He who created, by means of his
wisdom, the good and evil mind in thinking, words and deeds, rewards his obedient
followers with prosperity. Art Thou (Mazda) not he, in whom the final cause of both
intellects (good and evil) exist?" (Yasna 48.4) (Haug 1971:167-168).
The Gathas mention not only "two intellects", but also "two lives". The two intellects
are commonly distinguished as the "first" and the "last", though Haug (1971 :310)
points out that their meaning is not certain from the passages where they are
mentioned in the Gathas (Yasna 44.19; 48.4), but are described in more detailed terms
in the Later Avestan writings, as "the original intellect or wisdom, spiritual/heavenly
wisdom" and "the wisdom heard by the ear". The "two lives", on the other hand, are
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distinguished as "bodily" or "prior life" and "mental" or "the second" (Yasna 28.3;
43.3; 45.1; 46.19), and their meaning is clearly our idea of "body" and "soul" (Haug
1971 :310). The bodily life, or "second" life, is also quite clearly paralleled by the
"last" intellect, or the intellect that is the result of bodily experience. Another way of
describing the "two lives" would therefore be to say they are the "first" and "last
lives", which mean this life and the life hereafter (Haug 1971 :310-311).
4.2. The Daena
Daena has been a problematic word to translate from the Gathic, and this problem is
compounded by the fact that the meaning changed in later Zoroastrianism. The word
is used in a variety of senses, one of which is the conscience of man which meets him
at the Chinvat Bridge, as has been mentioned above. Bode & Nanavutty cite five
different meanings of the word as employed in the Gathas: (1) visionary perception in
man; (2) Divine Revelation; (3) Faith or religion, the Zoroastrian faith being called
"Daena Vanguhi", the Good Religion (an interpretation partly dictated by later
Zoroastrian interpretation); (4) Conscience in man, good or evil; (5) Character and
conduct, and behaviour, good or bad (Bode & Nanavutty 1952: 113).
The Daena as Religion was a later development in Zoroastrianism, and does not seem
well attested to in the Gathas . The notion of the Daena as representing religion came
from the concept that Ahura Mazda had a Daena, which would therefore necessarily
be the Good Zoroastrian Faith. Duchesne-Guillemin also discusses the term at length,
and concludes by quoting Pagliaro (L'Idealismo Gathico, in Samjnavyakarnam,
Studia Indologica Internationalia, Poona-Paris 1954):
"In the Gathas the manner in which the daena is assumed by the individual is not
stated in explicit terms. But it was certainly meant in the sense of that freedom of
choice between good and evil which is at the basis of the dualistic conception:
whoever takes sides assumes a spiritual essence in conformity to one or the other
principle. Only in this sense does Zoroaster's preaching, with its inherent
proselytising effort, appear justified. (It is therefore something quite different from
the choice of a 'Bios' made by the soul before being reborn into the world, as
described in Plato's Republic, Book X.) This daena motif had a moderate success in
ulterior theological speculation, since it was partly absorbed into the fravashi
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'protective spirit, genius', which has a more religious, less speculative value and is
not mentioned in the Gathas. On the other hand Ahura Mazda also has his daena,
like man, of whose spirit he is an hypostasis; the daena of the only god, viz. his
essence, is religion, an abstract image of the deity. The semantic evolution from
'essence, spiritual image (ofthe deity)' to 'religion' can be legitimately inferred from
passages such as Yasna 44.11: 'Shall Armaiti extend to those to whom thy essence
(religion) is proclaimed, 0 Wise One" (Duchesne-Guillemin 1958:64-65).
Although the Daena is not etymologically related to much the Socratic concept of a
daimon, it is much like a daimon in that it is the conscience of man, but carries
implications of spirit, free will, and many other complex concepts pertaining to the
proper conduct of which man is inherently aware.
4.3. Geush Urvan - The Soul ofthe Ox or the World-Soul
The section in the Gathas, Yasna 29 or the "Lament of the Ox", has been problematic
and many interpretations do not go further than to refer to the importance of cattle for
the ancient Iranians as the origin of the ox-image. The importance of Geush Urvan,
commonly translated as "the Soul of the Ox", has always been explained with
reference to the importance of cattle in general to the Iranians of that time. Though
the importance of cattle is a significant fact in as far as it explains why the Ox is used
in the metaphor about the soul crying out for deliverance from evil, it does not explain
the passage at all if it is just taken literally to mean the soul of an ox. Some scholars,
however, believe that the reference to the Soul of the Ox in fact designates a WorId-
Soul. This conclusion is based on comparative material from the Vedic tradition, but
the older tradition of Iran also has many references to the Ox itself, which is
understandable if it is remembered how important cattle were.
Cattle are indeed a favourite metaphor for many societies, and the bull figures in
much protology, not only Iranian. Creation myths often depict a primordial sacrifice
of a man or animal from whose bodies the creation comes into existence. Dhalla
(1938:65) mentions several examples, namely the Babylonian myth of Marduk and
Tiamat, the Vedic texts which relate the sacrifice of Purusha at the hands of the gods,
and the Pahlavi works which say Ahriman (Angra Mainyu) killed Gaya Maretan, the
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Primeval Man, and Gavyokdat, the Primeval Bull, and men and animals and plants
came into being from the various parts of their slaughtered bodies.
It is probably because of the economic importance of cattle as a source of wealth,
food and labour, as Dhalla (1938:65) points out, that they were held in religious
veneration in early agricultural societies, and the ancient Iranians were no exception.
Dhalla (1938:65) notes that when Zoroaster preached his new philosophy, it was
Mithra who was the post powerful deity, worshipped as 'lord of the wide pastures'
and as the creator who fashioned the earthly creatures from the remains of the
Primeval Bull he had killed. A more familiar reminder of this god's identity is the
pose, common in mithraic sculpture, of Mithra on the back of a bull with his knife in
its back. Zoroaster, Dhalla (1938:65) notes, excluded Mithra, although he included
the bull in his creation mythology and transformed the bull sacrifice theme into an
ethical lesson.
The importance of the bovine is also reflected in later Zoroastrian thought, according
to Schwartz (1985:657), by the role of the Bull as the origin of all benign animal life,
and by the related usage of the term "bovine" for the animal creation. Schwartz
(1985:657) notes that the bull figures in Zoroastrian mythology not only in its
protology, but also continues as a central theme in its later eschatology, as the body of
the bull Hadayans, sacrificed by the final Saviour in an ultimate Yasna, will yield up
the substance which will secure immortality. Schwartz (1985:657) also remarks that
this is reminiscent of the hoama, in the later texts, that comes from the tree, which
also bestows immortality, and argues that this might be a reference to the sacrifice of
the primal bull from which all plant life was created, and who is possibly associated
with the "Soul of the Bovine" (Geush Urvan) interpreted as the collective sum of the
souls of sacrificed animals (Schwartz 1985 :670).
In Zoroaster's Gathas there is a variety of references to cattle which make it clear,
according to Schwartz (1985:657) that there was some struggle between settled
herdsmen and cattle-rustling marauders. In Yasna 29 the cow or bull (the gender of
gav- is often ambiguous) longs for a protector against violence and is urged to adopt
Zoroaster as guardian whom Ahura Mazda has appointed, and in Yasna 31.10, the
cow chooses for herself "the cattle-tending herdsman as a just lord, as one who
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promotes Good Mind" (Schwartz 1985 :657). Schwartz (1985 :657) argues that cattle-
herding provided "a model and symbol of ethical behaviour in general, with the role
of the herdsman parallel to that of the biblical 'good shepherd', and the role of the
gentle, defenceless cow like that of the biblical sheep (or lamb), a symbol of benignity
and of suffering".
Dhalla (1938:46) also dêscribes Geush Urvan as "the genius of all the sentient beings
living on earth". It is interesting to note that the Dutch word 'beest' (the English
equivalent would be beast or creature), means both cow and animals in general. It is
possible that this may be the case with the Avestan ' gav-', which would mean that the
many references to the cow include all the animal kingdom, and by proxy, the
principle of Good Mind in earthly form or symbol. Even if this were not the case, the
image of the ox seems much more complex than just the result of a prominent aspect
of the ancient agrarian existence. One possibility is that the concept of the ox in
Iranian society was similar to the concept in the Indian society, and that a comparison
between the Gathic and Vedic texts would help illuminate some of the other aspects
of the cattle metaphors.
Dhalla (1938:65) notes that the Avestan gav and Sanskrit go both mean bull or cow,
and the dual Vedic divinities Dyaus ('the Heaven') and Prithivi ('the Earth') are often
given the epithets 'bull' and 'cow' (Rigveda 1.160.3). Because of the analogy with
the Sanskrit tradition, Dhalla (1938:65) believes that it is possible that the above
expressions are used with reference to the earth, or may even mean the spirit of the
world (Dhalla 1922:25).
Haug (1971: 147-148) likewise believes that the ox should be connected to the earth,
and therefore Geush Urvan as the "soul of the animated creation" means the universal
soul of earth, the cause, or representative, rather, of all life and growth. The literal
meaning of the word, 'soul of the cow', implies a simile; for the earth is compared to
a cow (from the Sanskrit Gaush which has two meanings, 'cow' and 'earth') (Haug
1971:148).
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According to Bode & Nanavutty (1952:46), the passage in the Gathas, the Lament of
the Ox (Yasna 29) is also comparable to a similar passage found in the Vedic Indian
tradition, namely the complaint of Mother Earth in the Bhagvata Purana, X,1 ,17-18:
"The Earth oppressed by schemes of princes proud,
Leagued in their might with countless Demon hosts,
Bowed down with this great burden, she approached
Her great Creator, seeking help from Him.
Wearing the shape of cow, two streams of tears
Flowing down her face, lamenting loud
And piteously, with heavy heart she stood,
And poured out to her Lord her suffering soul."
The Lament of the Ox may even be a surreptitious commentary on the threat of
wounding hostility towards creation, perhaps even a reference to the violence of
Mithra towards the sacrificed bull, and a warning that this wrong will be stopped by
Zoroaster, whose new religion will end this senselessness. It is, however, almost
impossible to believe that texts as philosophically abstract as the Gathas could devote
a large section to the lamenting of cattle without having some more universally
applicable meaning or message.
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CHAPTER 5 - DUALISM
Plato
Dualism is the "religious or philosophical doctrine which holds that reality consists, or
is the outcome, of two ultimate principles which cannot be reduced to one more
ultimate first cause" (Werblowsky 1971 :242). In terms of the problem of the
existence of evil, More (1928:233) argues that one can broadly identify two groups:
one group categorically denies the existence of evil, and the other group, at least
theoretically, admits its reality. Although Plato appears at first to have no overt
category of evil, the hasty conclusion that this implies that he did not believe in the
existence of evil must be avoided, as his position on the problem of good and evil is
quite complex and not very clear. It is possible, however, that he had no belief in the
existence of evil, but even if this were the case, he certainly was aware of the problem
such a belief could pose philosophically.
This apparent lack of philosophical attention to evil could be a result of a variety of
reasons. Cherniss (1971 :253) argues that Plato did not collect and set down his
doctrinal OpInIOnS systematically under the constructs and categories of later
philosophy, but discussed aspects of problems he thought to be relevant to the context
of a particular dialogue. Even so, themes dealing with the problem of good and evil
are evident throughout Plato's dialogues. Cherniss (1971 :253) warns that one should
beware of reading into Plato's dialogues something not implied by it according to
Plato's own standards, and even a collection of the instances where Plato mentions the
problem still does not add up to a theory, but Cherniss argues that one must be equally
wary of not recognising the insights one can derive from a comparison of the various
dialogues. It is such a synoptic reading of the dialogues which suggested to Cherniss
(1971 :253) that, "behind all the apparently diverse statements concerning the sources
of evil [Plato had] a theory more complicated than any of the current interpretations
has recognised but perfectly coherent in all its parts and consistent with Plato's
fundamental theory of reality".
1. Good and Evil in the Cosmos
Plato believed that the phenomenal world is a spacial reflection of the perfect Idea
World (Timaeus 52a-c), but Cherniss (1977:254) notes that a copy cannot be identical
to its model, and that the phenomenal therefore cannot perfectly imitate the Forms,
involving it in what could be called "negative evil", since it is a derogation of the
ultimate reality expressed in the Forms. The corporeal is therefore viewed as evil
insofar as it is deviates from or falls short of the good that is inherent in the divine
(Theaetus 176a; Timaeus 48a; Philebus 25e-26b, 16d-e).
Plato states that the Demiurge, who is good, desired that all things should be good and
perfect as far as it was possible, and therefore created the best possible world
(Timaeus 30a-b). Cherniss (1977:254) notes that Plato also states that for man, at
least, there is more evil in this world than good (Republic 379c, Laws 906a-b). The
Demiurge is not responsible for the evil in the corporeal world, however, as Plato
repeatedly states (Timaeus 2ge, 30a, 42d, 46e; Republic 379b-c, 617e; Laws 900d),
but makes all things good. This indicates that things were not good to start with, or
rather in a state of "inharmonious and disorderly motion" (Timaeus 30a).
Cherniss (1977:254) notes that the Demiurge creates neither the Ideas nor the space
(receptacle), and both are described as uncaused and ultimate factors (Timaeus 52a,
52a-b, 51a-b). The role of the Demiurge is to bring reason to the chaos of necessity
and make it conform as far as possible to the Forms, but in doing so, Cherniss
(1977:255) argues, the Demiurge does not eliminate the character of the basic material
or nullify the negative evil in which it necessarily participates. The work of necessity,
as Plato describes it (Timaeus 47d-48c), does not conform perfectly to the purpose of
the Demiurge, the fulfilment of which is the work of reason, despite the persuasion of
necessity by reason to conform as far as is possible, because its nature does not allow
total cooperation.
Despite the work of reason, the character of creation implies imperfection, for it is a
created existence (as opposed to an eternal existence) and it is in a state of becoming
(as opposed to unchanging being), and therefore the creation is near good, but not
completely good, because it is a copy of the Forms (and is good so far as it resembles
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them) and is ordered and organised by the Demiurge (as opposed to the state of chaos
it was in before reason ordered it). The receptacle was characterised by heterogeneity
and an imbalance in the forces within it (the elements of fire, water, earth and air),
whose perpetual motion made the receptacle "sway unevenly" and caused the
receptacle to move the elements in tum iTimaeus 52d). The elements themselves
have different densities, weights and geometric shapes, allowing them to combine to
make the varied shapes in which they appear and explaining why they are in perpetual
motion and change (Timaeus 53a-61 b).
The work of reason was to persuade necessity, which is an indeterminate cause and
therefore in motion, to cooperate in forming the best possible creation, and the
Demiurge did this by "using this type of cause as subordinate but himself contriving
the good in things that come to be" (Timaeus 68d). Nothing corporeal can have its
own motion, however, because motion must be caused by incorporeal self-motion as a
primary cause (Laws 894b-896c), and Plato admits only one self-mover, namely the
soul (cf Lee 1977:46-47). The soul, as the primary cause of movement, can cause
other things to trigger movement, but the movement of corporeal entities that are thus
moved, is the result of secondary causes (Timaeus 46d-e).
Cherniss (1977:255-256) points out that erratic or random motion must therefore have
its primary source in the soul just as much as orderly motion has, and argues that to
assume that Plato meant to make it a characteristic of corporeality per se in the
Timaeus, is to assume that he "temporarily forgot or abandoned a fundamental tenet
which he not only emphatically maintained both before and afterwards, but which in
fact is implied in the Timaeus itself'. This is evidenced, according to Cherniss
(1977:256), by the fact that Plato refers to the soul as the only origin of movement in
the Timaeus 37b-c and refers to corporeal motion as secondary to primary causation in
the Timaeus 46d-e, Phaedrus 245c and Laws 895b, 897a.
Cherniss (1977 :256) notes that, if "soul" moves all, some interpreters have concluded
that the cause of the random, disorderly motions of the phenomenal world must be an
irrational element in the soul, which according to the Timaeus, pervades the universe
and moves the heavenly bodies. Cornford (1956: 176-77,205-206,209-210) discusses
this at length, and I shall not go into it here. Suffice to say that another interpretation
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is that this disorder is also ascribed by some scholars to an evil World-Soul, opposed
to the good World-Soul of the Timaeus and which is posited, they believe, in the
Laws.
It could very well be that Plato postulated an evil World-Soul, but it is likely that, if
he did, it would only be as a metaphorical, or perhaps mythical, description of
necessity or the "errant cause" in the Timaeus (which are figurative names for the
same thing - irrationality, an element in both man and cosmos, which is incompletely
mastered by the rational will). It is doubtful that Plato meant a personalised concept
such as he implies the Demiurge is, however, as he would undoubtedly have overtly
juxtaposed the two in such a case. Nevertheless, Plato does categorically state that
soul is the cause of all good and evil in the phenomenal world (Laws 896d, Charm ides
156e), possibly because all motion has its ultimate origin in the soul as primary cause,
even of the chaotic motions described as secondary causes (Timaeus 46d-e; Laws
894e-895b, 896a-d).
Chemiss (1977:256) points out that not all evil is the result of secondary causes, but
that evil can have its immediate source in psychical or primary motion, as there are
souls in the universe which produce evil effects because they themselves are evil
(Timaeus 48a, 57e-58c). A soul, Chemiss (1977:257) points out, is good or evil
according to its knowledge or its ignorance, for the self-motion of the soul has to be
directed by knowledge of the Ideas, or the lack of it, and it sets phenomena in motion
in accordance with its knowledge or ignorance of the Ideas.
Furthermore, there are among these objects of knowledge also Ideas of certain
phenomenal evils, according to Chemiss (1977:257), although not all the phenomenal
evils have Idea equivalents, for much of what is termed evil is merely negative, "a
phenomenal deficiency or deviation from the positive Idea imperfectly reflected or
imitated", and many have a positive content too, and as such must refer to real entities
among the Ideas. The Ideas that occur and which are reflected in the phenomenal as
evils are in themselves not evil, according to Chemiss (1977:257), for their evil is
context-dependent and relative. Disease is an example of an Idea that, when
manifested in the phenomenal world, is classified as evil, although the Idea of disease
is no more evil than the Idea of man (Timaeus 89b-c). Similarly, Ideas such as
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pleasure, pain, and desire are not as dire as evil either, as Cherniss (1977:257) points
out, but their phenomenal manifestation, though they can be good, is frequently evil
relative to circumstances and degree of their manifestation (relative excess or
absence).
Phenomenal evil therefore occurs only when motion is determined wrongly, as a
result of ignorance of the true nature of the ideal and purpose of the motion of the
soul. Positive evil, Chemiss (1977:257) argues, whether absolute or relative, is
produced by the misguided motion of evil souls. Chemiss (1977:258) further argues
that, since these souls move in ignorance of the truth, they do not necessarily intend
the evil they do, but the motions they cause in phenomena are nevertheless induced
deliberately and can therefore not be attributed to the random motions of necessity.
Although the ignorance which causes the evil of the soul is an elaboration of the belief
that no man errs if he knows the good and would therefore necessarily seek to realise
it, the punishment for evil and ignorance alike is clearly stated in the Timaeus (91c-
92b), and ignorance is no mitigating factor for evil.
The question of the source of evil is not to be confused with the question of moral
responsibility, however, for no one can be accountable for negative evil, according to
Chemiss (1977:259), whether the cause is considered to be the space itself or the
imperfect reflection of the Forms in it, nor for incidental evil, even though the soul is
its ultimate cause. Chemiss (1977:259) argues that the soul is only accountable for
positive evil, of which it is not only the direct cause, but also the wilful agent. Plato
has expressed many ideas about the fate of the imperfect soul, and believes that
morality and responsibility are attainable by all, but nevertheless Plato is rather vague
about evil as a concept, other than the brief mention he gives it as a concept related to
the soul.
2. Good and Evil in the Soul
Plato's concepts of the evil in the soul are vague, however, and Plato's dualism is
virtually tantamount to a refusal to deal with the origin of evil metaphysically, which
More (1928:242) argues, is because Plato recognised the question as rationally
insoluble, and as not making for edification. His mythology leaves evil in the cosmos
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as a mysterious, unaccountable fact, for which no person (that is, no conscious will
such as our own) is responsible, and in doing so, avoids the "abyss of monism" by
firstly distinguishing between the immortal and the mortal elements of the soul, and
secondly by the myth of transmigration, which regards the state of any individual soul
as the product and result of its previous existence (More 1928:242).
More (1928:242) argues that although Plato is "continent" on the subject of
metaphysical evil, he does deal with the psychological aspects more thoroughly, since
his philosophy is predominantly ethical, and the details of his metaphysical concepts
of evil must therefore be discovered with the aid of his more fully developed study of
psychological causes. In the Timaeus, the evil in this world is presented as originating
with the irrational aspects of the soul, which are "unregulated and endlessly
expansive", and with a similar chaotic motion in nature itself (More 1928:242). This
raises the obvious question, according to More (1928:242), of how this view accords
with Plato's belief that evil must be equated with ignorance and that no man errs
willingly.
Bevan (1962:212-213) points out that the idea that vice is its own punishment, that the
retribution for someone being a bad man is that he is a bad man, is often attributed to
Plato, but that this seems to be only partially correct, for although Plato certainly
maintained that being bad held no rewards, he repeatedly insists that those who
choose evil will suffer pain after death. The distinction between these two views
pertains to the question, not of whether wrong-doers are punished, but of when this
retribution and correction occurs. The former theory, that vice is its own punishment,
seems to imply that the evil-doer will suffer only during life or rather in his present
incarnation, whereas the latter theory, held by Plato on judgement and punishment as
correction, refers to its occurrence after life.
Punishment after death (when the corporeal distractions and the confusing elements
are therefore removed) would imply that the soul itself is being punished for
something, not merely its association with the corrupting corporeal, which, after all,
has ended by then. This may be because of Plato's theory that the soul, as immortal,
is capable of an existence free of material nature, but not of spiritual nature, which is
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still free to choose good or evil. The concept of choice quite possibly originated with
the religious views that Pythagoras held on the subject.
The soul, which is immortal, is after all also the only self-mover and primary cause
from which evil comes about. As such, it seems that the bad deeds done during life,
or the physical manifestation of evil, will be punished during life, but there must
therefore be punishment in the afterlife for the continuation of this evil in the
immortal soul. How the soul became evil, however, seems linked with ignorance of
the good, and evil is therefore to a degree involuntary. The evil man would not want
to commit evil if only he knew what was good. The question that remains is, of
course, whether man wants to know what is good, and if not, whether this directly or
indirectly leads to his evil.
Plato took over from Socrates the well-known concept that virtue is identified with
knowledge, as well as the belief that no man errs willingly, and More (1928:243)
argues that for Plato this became the foundation of his ethical psychology. These two
basic assumptions that Plato made are therefore the basis of his concept of evil,
according to More (1928:243), and the statement Plato made in the Sophist (228c):
"We know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything", seems not only to
combine the two assumptions, but also answer the question of whether man seeks to
know the good.
It is not clear, however, what Plato means by involuntary ignorance. In the Laws
(860d), Plato states that "the unjust man is doubtless wicked; but that the wicked man
is in that state only against his will". He goes on, however, to qualify this assumption
as a position which must be accepted in this instance, or "here and now" (860d), and
further states that the two states in which the wrong could be committed, voluntarily
or involuntarily, must be punished equally (861a-863b). Plato therefore considers two
aspects of willingness: firstly, the actual physical harm being done or the criminal act
itself, and secondly, the injustice which prompted the criminal action, a psychological
state (Saunders 1970:367). Plato argues that the criminal act itself is voluntary, but
the psychological motivation for it is not (Saunders 1970:367-368; cf Euthyphro 8c).
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Plato further analyses the motives for the acts of injustice by stating that there are
three possible motives which are described as constituent elements in the soul: firstly,
anger or fear, as a vice of the emotional faculty, or the thymoeides; secondly, the
desire for pleasure, as a vice of concupiscence, or the epithymetikon; and thirdly,
ignorance, as a vice of reason (Laws 863b-c; cf More 1928:244). The motive of
ignorance is further subdivided by Plato into "simple" ignorance (agnoia) of the facts
of the case, and a "double", or deeper, ignorance (amathia) in the very soul of man, an
ignorance which is the more dangerous because the ignorant man does not believe he
is ignorant, but claims to have thorough knowledge (Laws 863b). More (1928:245)
notes that this first falsehood (proton pseudos) is often described by Plato as not
knowing what one knows or what one does not know.
More (1928:245) notes that the same triple division is carried through the elaborate
metaphor of the purgation of evil in the Sophist (226c), that is, the art of separating or
removing impure or disturbing elements from healthy ones much like one would heal
a corrupt body. There are two different cures for the body, medicine which purges
away disease, which is seen as a surfeit causing a discord among the humours of the
body, and gymnastics, which removes a native deformity or disproportion of the body
itself (More 1928:245). For the vice in the soul there is a corresponding remedy, and
punishment must be employed as a medicine to drive out a temporary discord of the
faculties, whereas instruction, either by admonition or by dialectic (elenchos) as
employed by Socrates, serves to reform the inner deformity of the soul which is called
ignorance (More 1928:245-246).
More (1928 :246) points out that the whole tenor of Plato's philosophy leads to the
conclusion that all evil in the soul, however varying its manifestations may be, is
somehow the contrary of knowledge. It will therefore be in conformity with Plato's
general method, according to More (1928:247), to take the analysis of evil as
proceeding by way of "subsumption" rather than by way of "exclusion", for ignorance
(amathia), which is the ultimate form of evil, is necessarily connected to other forms
of evil, but will be different in order, or precedence. Ignorance is both a specific kind
of vice and the source of all vice, just as vice itself is "one", though it has manifold
appearances (More 1928 :247).
The cure for this fundamental evil is the Socratic elenchos, which reveals the self-
contradictions of the "presumptuously wise", and so brings them to a recognition of
their state of ignorance, and an accompanying humility, which renders them receptive
to correction (More 1928:247). This ignorance must be recognised and dispelled
before any knowledge can be accessed the reason, "for, as physicians hold that the
body can have no enjoyment from proffered nourishment before the internal
hindrances are expelled, so the philosophic purgers of the soul believe that it can
derive no benefit from proffered instruction before it is brought to a kind of shame by
the elenchos of conviction, and thus, the opinions hostile to the instruction being
driven out, it is made pure and thinks it knows only those things which it really
knows" (Sophist 230c). The comparison of evils afflicting the soul to diseases
afflicting the body occurs in the Timaeus also, and Plato discusses at length how the
various passions can infect and affect the reason (86b-90d).
In other words, the purging of presumptuous ignorance must precede, and is the sine
qua non of, instruction, and can be likened to a medicinal chastisement of the soul
"sick with the passions of anger and fear, pleasure and desire" (More 1928:249). The
purgation of the soul is the revelation of ignorance, but its evil actions are also
punished. Plato viewed punishment as a corrective rather than a vindictive measure,
and the penalties imposed on the soul which is, as it were, the victim of its own baser
parts, are merely a special and drastic form of the Socratic elenchos, according to
More 1928:249).
It is also possible that the punishment was intended as a just act on the part of the law
enforcer, and a recompense for those wronged. The rectification of the physical
damage is only apart of the process, for the more important aim of the exercise was to
bring the Socratic elenchos to bear on the "faction and self-contradiction of moral
disease and so arousing the soul to efforts of self-mastery and unison" (More
1928:249). Until that inner conviction takes place the soul, under the sway of
voluntary falsehood, "is content to wallow like a swinish beast in the mire of
ignorance, and has no shame at being detected" (Republic 535e).
Knowledge and virtue are identical, but the ignorance which is the fountainhead of
evil is not a mere lack of calculation in which the brain alone is concerned, and Plato
144
certainly did not consider it so. More (1928:249) argues that evil is something which
affects the whole soul and all the soul's faculties, not something negative as the mere
absence of knowledge, but something positive that can be purged away, just as disease
and discord in the body can be purged away. Plato nowhere states that evil is solely
negative, for he repeatedly provides an ultimate cause for the most accidental of
wrongs, and the evil that comes from a lack of knowledge is no less evil than the good
that comes from having knowledge is good, nor is evil in any way excusable, and it
must be punished and corrected.
More (1928 :250) argues that the precise nature of this "parent of the vices" can be
gathered by bringing together three or four scattered passages. In the First Alcibiades
(l17d) it is said: "You understand, then, that our sins of practice are owing to this
ignorance, that we think we know when we do not know". In the Laws (731d) this
presumption of knowledge is further described: "The greatest evil to men, generally,
is one which is innate in their souls, and which man is always excusing in himself and
has no way of escaping. I mean what is expressed in the saying that every man is and
ought to be dear to himself.From this same fault arises the common habit of
regarding our own ignorance (amathia) as wisdom, and of thinking we know all
things when, so to speak, we really know nothing".
By this deceit the very desire of enlightenment is killed and philosophy is cut off at
the root, "for herein is the calamity of ignorance (amathia), that he who is neither
good nor wise is nevertheless content with himself; for feeling no want, he has no
desire of that of which he has no conscious need" (Symposium 204a). And by the
same conceit he is deprived of religious support in the hour of temptation; for the
baser crimes are committed by those "who fear not the wrath of the gods or the storied
vengeance of the nether world, but, as knowing what they by no means know, despise
the ancient and universal belief of mankind" (Laws 880e).
This ignorance is clearly a self-ignorance nourished by self-love, and is, according to
More (1928:251), the opposite not only of the skepticism, or humility of the intellect,
which was characteristic of the method Socrates employed to gain spiritual insight,
but also of the command "know thyself' (Alctbiades 129a; Charm ides 164d-165b)
which the god of Delphi described as the beginning of religion, and which influenced
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both Socrates and Plato. In terms of Plato's philosophy, More (1928:251) defines
ignorance (specifically self-ignorance) as an "inherent reluctance of the soul to face
honestly the dualism of man's nature, and, under the spur of noble discontent, to
acknowledge its own darker member and turn from that to what is akin in itself to the
gods".
More (1928 :251) believes that in the Platonic doctrine, flattery is the great enemy of
the soul, especially flattery of the self, for it is self-love that breeds the illusion that it
knows what it does not know, and causes it to disparage the elenchos that would
purge away its self-complaisance. More (1928:251-252) notes that this delusion takes
many forms. Plato discusses the many forms of delusions in the Laws (726a- 728d),
such as the belief that men are naturally virtuous and need only be released from
constraint to fulfil their noble destiny; that men are naturally unselfish but have been
corrupted by society, or by some other factor, which therefore releases them from the
responsibility of their own evil; that education should develop native temperament;
that self-respect precludes reverence for authority; and that progress can be made only
if each man can do as he pleases.
The Athens in which Plato lived, More (1928:252-253) argues, was "full of these
flattering voices", and especially the humanists, such as the Sophists, come to mind.
Plato called this flattery "the utter dishonour of the soul" (Laws 727a), and when
Plato, in the Gorgias (463a), represents Socrates as defending his own practice against
the more popular teachers of the day, he makes the use of flattery the point of
distinction. "As in the treatment of the body", he says, "there is a true science of
gymnastics and physics, of which the 'so-called arts of adornment and fine cooking are
servile imitations, so in matters of the soul there is a true art of law and judgement in
opposition to which there is sophistry and rhetoric" (Gorgias 463a-d).
Plato mentions yet another vice of the soul: rhathymia (indolence or effeminate
slackness of the soul itself), and it is this rhathymia that leads men "to rest lazily in a
materialistic philosophy", according to More (1928:257), relying on the physical
observation of the mechanical causes as the explanation of their actions and avoiding
the search for the ethical motives which should be governing their behaviour. More
(1928:257) argues that it is against the "innate indolence of the will" that Plato's
proposals for the ideal education is directed. In the Republic (413c) a strenuous
programme is proposed for the future Guardians, so that they may be rendered
impervious to flattery and not be seduced or misled by propaganda or the temptations
of sensual pleasures, but remain true to the principle of doing the best which they
learnt in their education.
The downward course of the soul and the state, in what More (1928:257) says may be
called the tyrant's progress of the eighth and ninth books of the Republic, follows a
successive yielding to the indulgence of temperament. As an opposition to the
indulgence of the temperament, Plato proposes (Timaeus 87b-88b, 89b-90d; Laws
728a-d, 729a-734d, 791c, 841a, among others) a strengthening of that part of the soul
which imposes a check on the desires through a rigorous discipline. This regulation
of the part of the soul that could cause evil is not only dealt with in the Laws, and
More (1928:258) argues that everywhere in Plato's dialogues the life of philosophy is
represented as "a deathless battle within the fortress of the soul, a constant warfare, in
which vigilance is the price of liberty", and "few are the victors, but the reward is fair
and great the hope".
So far Plato carries the analysis of evil to the ignorance that is involved in self-love
and rhathymia, but if one inquires into the further cause of the evil, More (1928:260)
believes there is no answer given in the dialogues, nor does he think one will find
satisfaction elsewhere. More (1928:260) also states that it is tempting to explain the
defect of the will and the ignorance of self-love as belonging to the necessity of the
phenomenal creation, and believes such an explanation to be sound to the extent that
moral evil also goes back to a principle of spontaneous disorder. Yet blaming evil on
nature cannot negate the responsibility of the individual in the matter, for Plato does
believe that nature is a corrupting influence, but nowhere accepts that the rational part
of the soul is subject to it, for the mortal cannot harm the immortal aspect in the
individual, though it can confuse it (Timaeus 78a). In terms of ethics, as well, only
the individuals, not their environments or other external factors, are accountable for
their evil deeds.
Evil cannot be equated with necessity, however, for necessity is a secondary cause,
whereas the soul as self-mover is the primary cause, and necessity is completely
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extraneous to the conflict of good and evil as the result of a primary cause, the good
and evil in the soul itself. If nature was the sole cause and origin of evil, all evil
would fall away from the discarnate soul, yet Plato's theory of reincarnation
presupposes that there are certain things the soul itself must be purged of to be able to
escape the wheel of birth and return in its state of purity.
Meanwhile philosophy is the clear and present call to the soul to shake off its lethargy
of ignorance, according to More (1928 :261), so that it may learn of itself and of its
destiny, and fortunate is the man who in this life finds a guide or teacher, whether it
be his daimon or teacher such as Socrates, to "warn him of his peril before the twilight
darkens into night". This is attested to in the Alcibiades: "There is one who cares for
you. But it seems to me that, as in the Homeric story Athena took away the mist from
the eyes of Diomedes, 'In order that he might know well both god and man', so this
monitor of yours must first remove from your soul the mist which now envelopes it,
and then, in good time, he shall bring you to the knowledge both of evil and of good"
(Alcibiades 150D).
Zoroaster
The problem of evil is a philosophical and theological question that seems to pervade
both these fields, and various systems have been devised to try and solve this
conundrum. Dhalla summarises this difficulty as follows:
"The origin of evil has been the deepest problem of life. It confronts every human
being in one form or other. If there is one question which has eluded all
investigations of the keenest intellects of all lands and all times; if there is one
problem which has called forth volumes of writings from the profoundest of thinkers;
if there is one riddle that has baffled all attempts of the sages at solving it; if there is
one problem on which the last word yet remains to be said, despite the world's
voluminous literature of some ten and twenty centuries - it is the problem of the
existence of evil.The creation has not only a bright but also a dark side, and the
latter is to be accounted for" (Dhalla 1938:81, cf Fox 1967: 129).
Dhalla (1930:3) believes that delusional optimism or pessimism about evil did not
affect Zoroaster, but that he pragmatically saw its presence in God's good world as
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stubborn fact. A more optimistic view, as Dhalla (1930:3) points out, may regard the
world as all-good, denying its imperfections and seeing evil as complimentary to
good, but argues that Zoroaster did not palliate evil, or invest bad things with good
names and meanings in the hopes that this would negate the separate existence of evil;
rather, he saw the world was not all-good and he sought to make it so. And so, Dhalla
(1930:3) argues, a recognition that life, physical, mental, social and moral, is
imperfect is followed by the ideal of life - to make life perfect.
To make life perfect, however, one must oppose its imperfections, and Dhalla
(1930:4) states that not only cooperation with good but also conflict with evil are the
cardinal principles of a moral life. Dhalla (1930:5-8) further argues that Zoroaster's
doctrine was that man, in resisting evil and doing good, should help God transform
the world of imperfection into a world of perfection, since his policy was one of
active involvement in the issue, not of passive lamentation that imperfection exists.
Dhalla (1930:8) mentions some thinkers and their VIews of the subject of the
imperfection of the world and its relation to God. Spinoza, for instance, said that
God, being perfect, can not act with any end in view because that would involve
something yet to be attained by him, and Leibnitz catered to the optimists with his
belief that ours is the best possible world, although William James observed that it is
not true to facts to suppose that the world, with its hundred wrongs, can be in
harmony with God (Dhalla 1930:8). Other thinkers, Dhalla (1930:8-9) states, such as
Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, have all but exhausted the topic of whether or not
God could have created a better world. Dhalla (1930:9) notes that in response to these
issues, Zoroaster's philosophy is that the world is in an unfinished state, to be
moulded to perfection, which will be reached when the struggle between good and
evil ends in the defeat of Angra Mainyu, with whom imperfection and sin will
disappear.
This is similar to what Plato calls 'becoming' and 'being', and involves the important
Zoroastrian doctrine of man's free will in his choice to assist perfection or aid
destruction, for an active part surely makes for a more stable moral philosophy than a
passive acceptance of inevitability which not only demotivates any good action, but
nullifies free will ultimately. Dhalla (1930:9) mentions that James Mill, and his son
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John Stuart Mill, both saw in Zoroastrian dualism what he terms "a close approach to
the rational solution of the problem of evil. [which they] justly regarded as a happy
compromise between the extreme optimistic view that all is well with the world and
the inordinately pessimistic view that irremediable wrong is involved in the very
nature of things".
The dualism in Zoroastrianism is most clear from his myth of the Twin Spirits or
principles. The conflict between the two principles, Truth and the Lie, was manifest
on a number of levels, however, and only had its origin in the myth of the Twins.
Malandra (1983:22) argues that on one level, the conflict was between the daevas and
ahuras of the Old Iranian religion over the ritual; on another it could be seen in socio-
political terms between peaceful and ordered pastoralist life and the constant threat of
nomadic invasion and plundering; and finally it was a conflict manifest in the human
choice, made empirically. Malandra (1983 :22) also notes that this conflict, which
plagued Iran throughout history, was to become fully articulated between civilised
Iran and the northern barbarians in Turan, and Frye (1984:40) argues that this
antagonism served to "exemplify Zoroastrian ideals of good and evil". The political
and social environment of Iran might have contributed to the development of a
philosophy of dualism, although it is impossible to say whether this was more so the
case than in other areas, but the dualism led to another interesting development in the
Zoroastrian tradition in the form of a richly elaborate and advanced eschatology that
was to influence many other religions.
Malandra (1983 :22) argues that it is difficult to judge on the basis of the Gathas alone
just how fully developed Zoroaster's eschatology was, but is convinced that it is
apparent that he had formulated at least the 'germinal' concepts. It was only in later
Zoroastrian writings, as Malandra (1983:22) points out, that a fully mature
eschatological system was recorded, and it was probably the fully elaborated system
that made such an impression on Judaic messianism. Malandra (1983:22) argues that
the lack of a fully adumbrated eschatology was due to the fact that Zoroaster was a
realist who focussed on the here and now, and who rather referred to more immediate
rewards and punishments, but he did in fact speculate on a day of judgement and a
future life, where all the reward and retribution not accomplished on earth were to be
meted out.
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Zoroaster, according to Gnuse (1997:221), proclaimed a doctrine of complete
devotion to a supreme and good deity, Ahura Mazda, and therefore required followers
to choose the good above the evil and maintain a high ethical standard. in life. The
choice between good and evil would last until the end of time, when the good will
vanquish evil with the coming of the saviour figure, the Saoshyant, and the earth
would be purged of evil (Gnuse 1997:221). The 'moral imperatives' of the
Zoroastrian faith has led scholars to call it a religion of 'ethical dualism', but it is
difficult to classify Zoroastrianism as primarily dualistic as it has many monotheistic
elements, and even less which of these doctrines Zoroaster himself intended to convey
(Gnuse 1997 :221).
The later Zoroastrian religion portrays Ahura Mazda himself as opposite to Angra
Mainyu, unlike the Gathas, which juxtapose Angra Mainyu with Spenta Mainyu,
God's creative spirit. The new opposition left a void where the ultimate principle that
transcends both should be, therefore forming a strict dualism of absolute opposites,
but a reinterpretation of the new opposition and a reinstatement of a more ultimate
being soon came about in the form of the Zurvanite Heresy. Zurvanism held the
belief, according to Gnuse (1997:221) that Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu opposed
each other completely, but were like twin brothers, both descended from Zurvan
('Infinite Time' or 'Divine Time'). Gnuse (1997:221) argues that Zurvanism,
although seemingly similar to the situation in the Gathas, by postulating an amoral,
not a moral, superior spirit, conformed more to later Zoroastrian dualism, which was
predominant in the Zoroastrian state religion of the Sassanian Empire (226-652 CE).
Gnuse (1997 :221) further notes that this has led scholars to doubt whether a strict
religious dualism should be attributed to Zoroaster at all (cf Zaehner,
"Zoroastrianism" in "The Concise Encyclopaedia of Living Faiths" ed. Zaehner,
1958; Duchesne-Guillemin, "Symbols and Values in Zoroastrianism: Their Survival
and Renewal" in Religious Perspectives, 15, 1966; Noss & Noss, "Religions";
Tremmel, "Religion"; Smart, "The World's Religions", all in Noss & Noss, "Man's
Religions", 1984; Yamauchi, "Persia and the Bible", 1990).
I shall be discussing whether or not Zoroaster's doctrine can be called dualistic, as
opposed to monotheistic or polytheistic, and whether Zoroastrian dualism should be
seen as conflicting with Zoroastrian monotheism, as well as how this dualism operates
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1. Zoroastrianism: dualism, monotheism or polytheism?
within the doctrine. Additionally, I shall be discussing the dualistic opposition of the
Twin Spirits in the Gathic text, as well as the dualism within the soul and the dualism
between the spiritual and the material.
There is general agreement that dualism is a feature peculiar to Iranian religion in
ancient and medieval times, although some scholars have minimised the importance
of dualistic elements in Zoroastrian doctrine and even denied their existence, in order
to emphasise monotheistic or crypto-monotheistic aspects (e.g. Schroff, Moulton and
Gray) (cf Fox 1967:129-131). It is not certain, however, if these dualistic elements in
the Zoroastrian doctrine would justify classifying it as religious dualism, as opposed
to a monotheism, since many monotheistic elements also abound. From a strictly
religious-historical perspective, however, Gnoli (2000: 1) argues that dualism should
not be seen as opposed to monotheism (as polytheism must be). On the contrary,
Gno~i (2000: 1) argues that it can be viewed as "monotheism itself in two opposite and
contrary aspects", and although this is not a universal dualistic conception, it can be
applied to Zoroastrianism, in which "monotheistic tendency and a strong dualism
coexisted" .
The problem of dualism in Zoroastrianism is complicated, according to Gnoli
(2000: 1), by the fact that Iranian dualism was not 'unitary' or 'static', but in a process
of change and development as a concept. Gnoli (2000: 1) further argues that the
religious system in Iran must be recognised as heterogeneous, and that the
"fundamentally ethical and philosophical dualism of Zoroaster", as it appears in the
Gathas, must be differentiated from the later Zoroastrian doctrine and its dualism, in
which the two entities of good and evil are coexistent and opposed by their intrinsic
natures rather than by choice.
Such differentiation is rejected by scholars who maintain that dualism, as it is found in
the later Zoroastrian literature, appears in the Gathas, and that the reference to the two
Mainyus is "at most a statement regarding their essence" (Gnoli 2000:1); their choice,
therefore, merely means "the declaration of their inborn natures" (Bianchi 1987:507).
Nevertheless, Gnoli (2000:1) notes that the axial role of choice and free will in
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Zoroastrianism has been "established by Herman Lommel and others, and
Gershevitch has argued effectively for the ethical character of the Gathic opposition
between the two spirits". Zoroastrian dualism was dependent on the idea that free will
can be exercised, and the argument that the one who chooses evil follows his own
nature (Bianchi 1987:507) does not affect that principle (Gnoli 2000:3).
1.1. Arguments for dualism
A possibility for the origin of Zoroaster's dualism, according to Reese (1980:643), is
that it represents a purification of the Aryan-Iranian religions. Contrary to the opinion
that Zoroaster purified the pagan religion, it could be argued that the question is to
what extent the Gathas incorporate the polytheism of the society. The Avesta
professes the existence of a complete list of good spirits such as the Amesha Spentas,
Sraosha, Tishtrya, Haoma, Geush Urvan and others. Several of these good spirits
have forms that are derived from pre-Zoroastrian times, possibly belonging to an
Aryan nature-worship, and they are also encountered in the Indian Vedic hymns. This
could indicate an incorporation of the polytheism then current, but Zoroaster's
dualism is more often ascribed to a reaction against monotheism, and the polytheistic
elements, and whether they are present in the Gathas or whether they are noticeably
absent, do not significantly affect the interpretation of Zoroastrian dualism, even
supposing they caused it.
Henning (1951 :46) is one scholar who interpreted Zoroaster's dualism as a reaction
against monotheism, proposing that the assumption that the world was created by a
benevolent god raises the question of why the world is itself not good, and that
Zoroaster's dualism was a logical answer which monotheism could not provide.
Zoroaster postulated that the world was the product of both good intention and evil
intervention, which Henning described as "more satisfying to the thinking mind
than.[the one] given by the author of the Book of Job, who withdrew to the claim
that it did not behove man to inquire into the ways of Omnipotence" (Henning
1951 :46).
Henning (1951 :45) also argues that the two main features which distinguish
Zoroastrianism from other religions, namely a force of evil opposing the good and
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man's capacity to judge between them, which are necessarily linked, should be
described as an ethical dualism, as opposed to the dualism of spirit or mind and matter
of later Zoroastrianism. The opposition of the spiritual and the material became, in
fact, a commonly held belief in many dualistic systems of thought, but Zoroastrianism
holds that the only important dualism is the one between good and evil.
Because of his belief that Zoroastrianism is an absolute dualism, Henning (1951:45-
46) proposed that the battle between good and evil is evenly matched and will last
from the beginning of time to the end of the world, which means the outcome is
therefore dependent on the collective action of mankind. Henning is right in his
proposition that the forces of good and evil are equal, but he does not take into
account the higher good, Ahura Mazda, which is eternal, whereas evil only has sway
as long as it affects creation. According to Zoroastrian eschatology, when people
cease to choose evil, and those who have done so have been purged of it, evil itself
will cease to be. Free will is a very central concept in Zoroastrianism, and could be
viewed as a leap forward in the liberation of men's minds within religious systems
which too often rely on unthinking faith or fear, but precisely because of this exercise
of free will, which necessarily entails the possibility of choosing wrongly, mankind is
doomed to make this mistake until it learns the good.
This emphasis on free will in Zoroastrianism led Henning to comment:
"How different Zoroaster's Man is from the cringing primitive who runs to his witch-doctor to
beg for protection against the dark threats of imaginary spirits; or from the trembling believer
of the contemporaneous religions of the Near East, who approaches his god with fear and
servility. He is a proud man, who faithfully serves the side he has, freely and deliberately,
chosen, but who remains conscious of the value of his support and of his own value.
Zoroaster's view of Man was not reached by nebulous feeling or by the dreams that may come
to one in a drugged stupor; it can have been reached only by thinking, and I should say by
very clear thinking. This is true also of his dualism. It seems to me that a dualism of this kind
can have been built only on a pre-existing monotheism, on the belief that one God, a good
God, was responsible for the world. For this reason I would claim that the religion in which
Zoroaster grew up was purely monotheistic. Zoroaster's religion (as are most dualistic
movements) is best understood as a protest against monotheism" (Henning 1951 :46).
Zoroaster's protest against monotheism, which Henning sees as evidence that
Zoroaster came from a monotheistic tradition, might just as well be seen as
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Zoroaster's explanation of the evil in the world as a supplement to formulating
monotheism as a theological concept within his own speculation. Zoroastrianism
need not, therefore, be classified as wholly monotheistic or dualistic, for it clearly has
features of both, a situation not unique to Zoroastrianism either, as it is also found, for
instance, in Plato's combination of theological monotheism and philosophical
dualism.
Spiegel followed a similar line of reasoning to Henning's: "It is only when one has
come to admit one omnipotent, omniscient creator, who created the world with all
there is in it, that the question arises why everything in the world does not go
according to the will of the creator and ruler, why not only praiseworthy undertakings
of the creature go wrong but also things happen of which he could not possibly
approve. In a word: the question arises as to how evil came into the world. An
attempt to answer this question: such is dualism in its different forms" (Duchesne-
Guillemin 1958:1).
Scholarly debate has been lively regarding whether or not Zoroaster was a monotheist
or a dualist, and some scholars (Collinson 1994:4-5) believe that the concept of
Zoroaster as a monotheist is an error that is the result of Haug' s work (1971), who
translated the Gathas and established them as Zoroaster's own work, but who also
interpreted them as embodying a monotheism and a rejection of ritual sacrifice. The
cause for concern about Haug's interpretation was solely because it differed
completely from nineteenth century Parsi practices in India, and therefore fails to take
into account that the modem Parsi beliefs do not perfectly copy the original
Zoroastrian beliefs as set out in the Gathas.
Collinson (1994:5) notes that when secondary Zoroastrian literature was later
translated by E.H. West, in consultation with Parsi priests and with references to
modem Zoroastrian practices, a "somewhat different conception of Zoroastrianism
emerged, one more consistent with its known tradition of a belief in dualism". What
Collinson (1994:5) fails to mention is that the modem Zoroastrian practices are very
similar to the beliefs and doctrines found in the 'secondary Zoroastrian literature', but
the beliefs that this literature propounds bears little resemblance to what is
propounded in the Gathas. The secondary literature may have been a development
and elaboration of the Gathas, but it was also a reintroduction of many pagan
concepts the Gathas expressly oppose, or pagan deities that were replaced by the
abstract Amesha Spentas in the Gathas ..
The tradition is far from homogenous, and although the rest of the Zoroastrian
tradition from the Later Avestan texts through to modem Zoroastrian practices in
India are useful, they serve mainly to show how concepts found in the Gathas have
developed and changed over the 4 000 years of the Zoroastrian tradition. Besides
these considerations, to describe Haug as regarding Zoroastrianism as a monotheism
is to quote him selectively, since Haug (1971 :303) considered Zoroaster's religious
convictions to be monotheistic, but regarded him as an ethical dualist as well. The
issue of the nature of the opposition of good and evil in Zoroastrianism, to which
Haug found an ingenious explanation, is still a point of contention, however.
Collinson (1994:5) argues that "the central issue in the debate which has ensued arose
from the tension between Zoroaster's assertion of the fundamental dualism of the
cosmos and later interpretations of his theology as monotheistic". It could also be
said that the problem lies in reconciling Zoroaster's concept of a dualism, not a
cosmic dualism as Collinson believes, for nowhere in the Gathas is the opposition
described as cosmic, and his belief in a single good God. Whatever the specific
interpretations of the problem, it remains a difficulty arising from an attempt to
classify Zoroastrianism as either a dualism or a monotheism. This issue gave rise to
yet other problems, according to Collinson (1994:5), such as whether the two
principles posited are entirely distinct from one another and what the status and source
of each is.
The distinction between the two principles, although blurred in the later tradition, is
clearly stated in the Gathas, where the Good Spirit addresses the Evil Spirit: "Neither
our minds, nor doctrines, nor directive intelligences, nor choice of faith, neither words
nor deeds, neither our consciences nor souls agree" (Yasna 45.2). Later
Zoroastrianism identified the principles as two gods, and Collinson (1994:5) argues
that either the concept of monotheism does not apply, or it must be reinstated, as with
the Zurvanite heresy. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the good is supreme,
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Collinson (1994:5) notes that the presence and power of evil, as well as its relation to
the good, must be clarified.
I argue that the debate mentioned above confused Zoroaster's doctrines with the
doctrines of the later Zoroastrian tradition, and that the fundamental dualism of the
cosmos, against which later interpretations of monotheism reacted, was part of the
later tradition, and not of the doctrines in the Gathas. This underlines the problem of
the emphasis on the later Zoroastrian tradition versus the exclusive treatment of
Zoroaster's doctrines as found only in the Gathas. Some scholars, such as Boyce
(1975; 1982; 1984; 1978; 1992), rely on the later tradition as well as the current
anthropological evidence of the Zoroastrian faith, whereas other scholars, such as
Haug, only rely on the Gathas. Unless the tradition is completely homogenous, such
vastly different sources cannot result in similar interpretations, although neither of the
interpretations is invalid if it does not profess to exceed the sources from which it was
derived.
Although there is continuation in the Zoroastrian tradition and anthropological data
are important to its study, there is also a process of evolution involved in the tradition,
and quite an amount of change is likely to have taken place given the time-span of the
faith. I have therefore confined this study to an investigation of the Gathas, using
supplementary material from the later tradition only where necessary, since the later
tradition often differs remarkably from the Gathic texts. These differences include the
extreme cosmological dualism that was introduced in the later tradition, and which, I
believe, is wrongly attributed to Zoroaster.
1.2. Arguments against dualism
Some scholars, such as Malandra (1983:19), have argued that the dualism of
Zoroaster, in contradistinction to that of the Later Avesta and of orthodox
Zoroastrianism of the Sassanid period, is not absolute, that is, the opposing forces of
Truth and Falsehood are not primordial. Other scholars have argued, more radically,
against Zoroaster's dualism by postulating that he advocated a monotheism. Geiger
argues (1977:37) that Zoroaster had "arrived at the idea of an Almighty, All-wise, and
All-just God, a Creator and Preserver of the world, and thereby provided his people
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with a monotheism in the place of a polytheistic nature-worship". Yet Zoroaster's
supposed monotheism must also be qualified, as it seems not to appear in any pure
form.
Gnuse (1997:222) states that the mam factor is the nature of the monotheistic
elements in Zoroaster's doctrine, although to ascertain this is by no means an easy
task and scholars in both biblical and Zoroastrian studies widely agree that Zoroaster
cannot be called a 'true monotheist'. According to Gnuse (1997:222), Zoroastrianism
is often described as a 'pseudo-monotheism', such as Atonism in Egypt is, because of
the dualistic elements it contains. Zoroastrian monotheism must not be confused with
monism either, as it conceives of the divine as "personal, transcendent and
monotheistic", as opposed to the Hindu concept of the divine or the ultimate as "non-
personal, pantheistic and monistic" (Gnuse 1997:220). The problem arises, however,
as to how a monotheism can represent the forces of good and evil with a dualistic
emphasis on their equal power in the cosmos, and this has led some scholars to
classify it as mid-way between monotheism and dualism, because Zoroastrianism
does not have the pure monotheism of the Jewish faith, but is closer to this
monotheism than the monism and "occasional monotheistic speculations" of India
(Gnuse 1997:220-222).
Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:2) states that the denial that dualism is to be found in
Zoroaster's teaching has recently been made by Parsi theologians, who find the
suggestion insulting, but their position is clearly apologetic and almost certainly a
reaction against the attack by Christian missionaries in the early nineteenth century
that relied heavily on old arguments against dualism, much like St. Augustine's
arguments against the Manichaeans. The Parsi defence was to elevate the status of the
good (and God), diminishing the status of evil, and so to assimilate their religion into
Christianity (Duchesne-Guillemin 1958:2; cf Henning 1951:47).
Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:26) also discusses the scholars who argue in favour of
monotheism, referring to Moulton's "Early Zoroastrianism" (1972) as one such work
which insisted on Zoroaster's monotheism, ascribing the sections of the Avesta which
are characterised by radical dualism to the Median Magi (as Nyberg was to do).
Moulton also made a special study of the particular relationship of Ahura Mazda to
the Amesha Spentas, arid insisted, as Jackson had done, on the doctrine of Free
Choice (Duchesne-Guillemin 1958:26).
Moulton (1972: 126) drew a sharp distinction between the Gathas and the Later
Avesta, arguing that Parsism differed in many important ways from the original
teachings of Zoroaster. The characteristic of Magianism, Moulton (1972: 126) claims,
is "bilateral symmetry", but there is no evidence to support the assumption that this
originated in Zoroaster's doctrines. Moulton (1972: 126) further argues that, although
Parsism shares Zoroaster's view that good will be the end of evil, there is no fixed
name for evil in the Gathas, and the creative privilege of evil independent of Ahura
Mazda, the co-eternity of the Good and Bad Spirits, and other important
eschatological notions in the Later Avesta are not developed from the Gathas.
Henning (1951 :47) also discusses the arguments propounded by scholars, both
modem and Parsi, who are opposed to the conviction that Zoroastrianism is a dualism,
which Henning held to be the case. The criticism of dualism is based on the
imbalance between the powers of good and evil (Ahura Mazda being supreme, and
the opposition existing only between Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu) and the
belief that good will triumph in the end. Despite the fact that the Gathas clearly
support this view, Henning (1951 :48) argues that the "apparent attribution of greater
weight to the powers of good lies in the nature of these movements as religions",
therefore qualifying the theology of Zoroastrianism as dualistic. Henning (1951 :48)
also believes that the possibility of evil being victorious could not be publicly
admitted, but argues that "in their hearts they knew that the possibility existed", proof
of which he finds implicit in their own activity, for if good was to triumph anyway
they would not need to exert themselves. Henning (1951 :48) argues that this is the
result of a conflict between an abstract doctrine and the needs of missionary policy.
Although such a conflict seems quite plausible, it should perhaps be considered that
evil was seen, both philosophically and theologically, as something that was both
possible to destroy and that necessitated destruction. The onus would therefore be on
creation to speed the advent of the return of the Good by purging evil from creation.
Geiger (1977:39) believes that a distinction should be drawn between the Gathas and
the rest of the Avesta, and that the Gathas clearly indicate a far purer monotheism. In
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the Gathas, Mithra and Tishtrya are not mentioned, the Fravashis are never directly
alluded to, as is the case with Haoma, Verethraghna and Anahita, in fact, the names of
all the good spirits (mostly personifications of attributes) in the Later Avesta are
absent from the Gathas (Geiger 1977:40). Geiger (1977:41) further believes that "the
character of the Gathas is so philosophical, abstract and transcendental that such good
spirits (yazatas) or angels as are mentioned above would be quite unsuitable in their
theology" .
Geiger (1977:41) goes further and infers that Zoroaster and his followers undoubtedly
knew of the existence of these spiritual entities, who must have been much revered by
the Iranian people, that there was ample opportunity to include them in the Gathas,
and that their absence is due not to accident, but design - that "their non-mention is
evidently the result of an object aimed at". He argues (Geiger 1977:41) that Zoroaster
intended to replace with higher and more philosophical ideas the good spirits, who
resembled the pagan gods of the old Aryan tradition too much, and all the genii that
are named in the Gathas along with Ahura Mazda are in point of fact abstract
conceptions.
Now the question arises what the nature of the relationships are between the Amesha
Spentas and Ahura Mazda, if the unpolytheistic character of the Gathas is not to be
impaired by them. Geiger (1977:45) argues that the Amesha Spentas and Ahura
Mazda seem almost equally important, and he substantiates this (Geiger 1977:45-46)
by citing several instances of the number of times the Amesha Spentas are named in
the Gathas in relation to Ahura Mazda, for example, the word 'asha' occurs in the
Gathas about 180 times, and the name 'Mazda' about 200 times. There is an
important difference, however, between Ahura Mazda and the Amesha Spentas. The
Amesha Spentas (or their functions) are related to each other in many instances and
they often operate together, and are therefore sometimes open to comparison. This
comparison excludes only Ahura Mazda, to whom they are compared or equated only
in or as a group. Geiger (1977:46) argues that Ahura Mazda has become the only
proper name to designate an Almighty God, and that he alone has achieved true
personification, whereas the Amesha Spentas are abstract concepts that form part of
this personification.
In fact, the apparent personification of abstract concepts could be misleading and their
correct interpretation should perhaps exclude any image of their existence as divine
beings per se. Regarding the names of the Amesha Spentas, Geiger (1977:46) notes
that in the majority of the passages the only right interpretation of the word is as its
abstract idea, and in other instances where the fixing of the correct meaning is
difficult, it is likely that a double meaning was intended. The Amesha Spentas,
Geiger (1977: 46-47) argues, therefore designate abstract concepts and as such
represent certain powers and qualities of the "Godhead", which are included in Mazda
and in his "Essence". This is reinforced by the fact that Mazda's poetic designation in
relation to them is as father and progenitor as well as creator, and is of one nature with
them all and the powers they represent emanate from him, not from themselves
leading a spiritual existence outside of God (Geiger 1977:47-48).
As for the dualistic nature of the Zoroastrian religion, Geiger (1977:50-51) argues if
one is to understand under dualism a religious system wherein the existence of a force
working in opposition to the good is assumed, that in this sense the religion ofthe Old
Testament must also be classified a dualistic system. Geiger (1977:51) also argues
that a religion can only be classified as a dualism if both the good and evil principles
oppose each other with equal right and equal might, exert equal influence on the
world, and if man considers both as agents he is dependent upon and therefore would
sacrifice to and propitiate both in order to ward off bad and receive good things. The
Gathas do not advocate this, nor does the rest of the Avesta, and the dualism in the
Zoroastrian doctrine is present only in its philosophy, not its theology.
The Avesta, however, describes an evil spirit who stands opposed to the good spirit in
everything. Pains are taken, in fact, in many of the passages to match the opposition
of evil to good with exactly opposite epithets and opposite actions. The question
remains whether this signifies a dualism. Geiger (1977:51-54) argues that although
the opposition of evil to good is so painstakingly traced, and that the good spirits, such
as Vohu Manah, often have their exact counterparts in evil spirits, such as Akem
Manah, it is important to note that there is no regular counterpart of the name Ahura
Mazda.
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Another possibility in explaining the presence of an opposing force of evil, according
to Geiger (1977:51), is to view its presence as a solution to the question (that plagues
'every philosophic mind') - that of how evil came into the world if there is only a
good deity capable of producing only good things. Geiger (1977:51) believes that
Zoroaster endeavoured to solve the question in a philosophical way. This
philosophical question therefore presumably has a philosophical answer. In the
Gathas, the abstract concept of evil certainly was personified along with the abstract
concepts of good, but it seems not to have had an impact on the monotheism of the
theology, as God remains above the opposition hierarchy. This conforms to Haug's
view (1971), which will be discussed shortly, and which also distinguishes between
theological monotheism and philosophical dualism in Zoroaster's doctrines.
The opposition between the spirits of good and the spirits of evil is present from the
earliest parts of the Avesta, and was most precisely and formally portrayed in the
Later Avesta. In the Gathas, however, the system is not so thoroughly developed or
pursued. The name Angra Mainyu occurs only once (Yasna 45.2), and then in
opposition to Spenta Mainyu, not Ahura Mazda as one might expect from the Later
Avesta. Likewise, Ako Mainyu occurs only in one passage (Yasna 32.5); Akem Manah
(which, however, has in other passages the original abstract sense of "evil mind") is
found twice (Yasna 47.5, 32.3); and Achistem Manah (the appellative) also twice
(Yasna 30.6,32.13).
With these data in mind, Geiger (1977: 54) summarises the philosophy of Zoroaster by
stating that Ahura Mazda is certainly the Highest Being or Godhead, who is by nature
good and from whom only goodness emanates; and that evil is the negation of the
good, and exists only in relation to the latter, just as darkness is only the negation of
light. Geiger (1977:54) further argues that evil (Angra Mainyu) is never opposed to
Ahura Mazda himself but rather to his creative spirit (Spenta Mainyu). Spenta
Mainyu and Angra Mainyu are referred to as twin (Yasna 30.3), and Geiger (1977:54)
postulates that they do not exist alone for themselves, but each in relation to the other
and are both absorbed in the higher unity, Ahura Mazda.
Haug (1971) made two important distinctions. Firstly, he argued that in the Avesta
the Gathas were the only works that could be attributed to Zoroaster himself, and
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displays a monotheism as opposed to the dualism found in later books in the Avesta
such as the Vendidad. Secondly, he argued that, following only the Gathas,
Zoroaster's theology was monotheistic, whereas his philosophy was dualistic.
Duchesne-Guillemin (1958:20) argues that the distinction between a monotheistic
theology and a dualistic speculative philosophy enabled Haug to argue that a separate,
equal and opposing force of evil is entirely foreign to Zoroaster's theology.
Haug (1971 :303) argues that the opinion that Zoroaster was preaching a dualism, that
is to say, the idea of two original independent spirits, one good and the other bad,
utterly distinct from each other; and one opposing or counteracting the creation of the
other, is a confusion of his philosophy with his theology. Haug states that: "Having
arrived at the grand idea of the unity and indivisibility of the Supreme Being,
Zoroaster undertook to solve the great problem which has engaged the attention of so
many wise men in antiquity, and even of modem times, viz. how are the imperfections
discoverable in the world, the various kinds of evils, wickedness, and baseness,
compatible with the goodness, holiness, and justice of God?" (1971 :303). Zoroaster
solved this difficult question philosophically by proposing that there were two
primeval causes, according to Haug (1971 :303), that produced the material and
spiritual world, but that these were diametrically different yet united, as is evidenced
in certain portions of the Gathas such as Yasna 30. I disagree with Haug that the two
opposing causes were primeval, but concur with the postulate that the dualism in
Zoroastrianism is to be found in the philosophical postulates, not the theological
statements. This will be discussed more fully in the section on Qualified Dualism.
1.3. Conclusion
It would be reasonable to conclude, according to Gnoli (2000: 1), that dualism was
central to Zoroaster's message and that Gathic dualism cannot be dismissed simply
because there is a supreme force, Ahura Mazda, above the opposed principles of good
and evil, or because of the belief in the final triumph of good over evil. Gnoli
(2000: 1) points out that both these elements are common to other dualistic systems
that also believe in the triumph of good. Therefore, there can be no doubt that various
dualistic elements can be found in the Gathas, and dualism seems an undeniable part
of the Zoroastrian doctrine.
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1.4. Qualified dualism
It is not necessary, however, that monotheistic and dualistic concepts be seen as
mutually exclusive, and any analysis of the Gathas would be incomplete if the
dualism apparent in the doctrine was dealt with at the cost of ignoring the equally
apparent monotheism. Zoroaster could be said to be a monotheist inasmuch as Plato
in his conception of the Demiurge could be described as one, but Zoroaster can also
be described as adhering to dualistic principles, just like Plato's philosophy can be
described as dualistic. It therefore remains to be clarified which part dualism played
in the Zoroastrian doctrine as found in the Gathas.
Gnoli (1987: 581) argues that monotheism and dualism are related to each other in the
Gathas, and are not in conflict with one another, as Henning (1951 :46) argued, for
Gnoli believes that the dualism in the Gathas is in opposition to polytheism, not
monotheism, as dualism is a "necessary and logical consequence" of monotheism, and
serves to explain the origin and existence of evil. As such, Gnoli (1987:581) argues
that Zoroaster's dualism is essentially ethical, and revolves around the concept of a
moral choice between good and evil, as illustrated by the prototypical choice made by
each of the Twin Spirits, one choosing order and truth (Asha) and therefore good
thoughts, words and deeds, and the other choosing the opposite (Yasna 30.2,5; 49.3).
The emphasis in this myth of the two spirits is on free will and the ability to choose
what is good, as the good or evil nature of the two spirits derives from their own
moral choice, not from an "innate, ontologically given or predetermined" compulsion,
as some scholars argue (Gnoli 1987:581). The accent in Zoroastrianism is constantly
on free will and the ability to make an informed decision, and fatalistic concepts are
entirely alien to the doctrine in the Gathas. As this is the case, it is highly unlikely
that an exception was made in the case of two beings in the creation only, and even if
this were the case, it is as unlikely that this deviation from the norm would not be
noted or explained. This renders the possibility of a religious dualism absurd, as it
clearly remains an ethical issue.
In addition to the ethical nature of the problem of good and evil, there are
cosmological ramifications. The problem of evil and suffering in this world,
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according to Gnoli (1987: 582), is a central concern in Zoroastrian thought, and Gnoli
argues that explaining evil in what is believed to be a good creation, and in which man
has dignity and freedom, necessitated a belief in the myth of choice as the origin of
the principles of good and evil. The doctrines Zoroaster held on the Twin Spirits, free
will and the primordial choice, will be discussed later in this chapter.
The nature of the dualism in Zoroaster's doctrines has been described as ethical by
Gnoli (1987:581), with whom I agree, but the further implications of this premise
regarding the structure of Zoroaster's philosophy is most clearly stated by Haug
(1971 :300). Although Haug's belief in the theological monotheism of Zoroastrianism
has met with opposition, it is important to see this belief in context. Referring to the
doctrines held in the Gathas, Haug (1971 :300) postulates that there are three different
aspects to Zoroaster's speculation, and proposes that "the leading idea of Zoroaster's
theology was monotheism, i.e. that there are not many gods, but only one; and the
principle of his speculative philosophy was dualism, i.e. the supposition of two
primeval causes of the real world and of the intellectual; while his moral philosophy
was moving in the triad of thought, word, and deed".
Haug's postulate solves the problem ofthe perceived opposition between monotheism
and dualism in Zoroaster, and places in proper categorical context, i.e. theological,
philosophical and moral, the beliefs expressed in the Gathas . I fully concur with
Haug's interpretation, and would speculate that it could successfully be applied to
Plato's doctrines as well. Yet there are differences within the concept of dualism too,
and these will be discussed below.
2. Different forms of dualism
2.1. Religious and philosophical dualism
Bianchi (1987:506) argues that dualism, as a category within the history and
phenomenology of religion, could be described as a doctrine that proposes the
existence of two "fundamental causal principles" that underlie the existence of the
world. Bianchi (1987:506) adds that dualistic doctrines, worldviews or myths portray
an ontological opposition and antipathic quality characterising the dual existence that
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is inherent in the world, and as such are different from the philosophical doctrines of
"transcendence and metaphysical irreducability" which oppose monistic or pantheistic
doctrines of immanence. This extrinsicality, as opposed to the intrinsicality of
monism and pantheism, could be seen as inherent to Zoroaster's dualism as much as
the opposition of the 'fundamental causal principles' operating in creation are,
however.
The philosophical aspects of Zoroaster's dualism are often overlooked because they
are held to be incompatible with the existence of two opposed causal principles, and
are therefore not recognised. Zoroaster's doctrine reveals itself as multi-layered,
however, and all the religious precepts have a philosophical implication that is
inseparable from them, his doctrine of dualism being no exception. This is attested to
by the fact that the combination of monotheistic and dualistic notions in the Gathas is
often overlooked in favour of arguing for the existence of one of these concepts while
implying the absence of the other.
Bianchi (1987:506) argues that, in the historical phenomenology of religion, there is
no need to regard dualism as an opposition to either monotheism, polytheism, or
monism, as "dualistic manifestations of monotheism" can be found in both the Gathas
and in Christian gnosticism. This is also the case if the dualism is philosophical and
the monotheism is theological. This is the case in the Zoroastrian doctrine as it
appears in the Gathas, as has been argued by Haug (1971 :300), just as it is in Plato's
doctrine in the Timaeus, in which a philosophical dualism is found side by side with a
monotheistic theology as well.
Bianchi (1987:506-507) also states that examples of "dualistic manifestations in
monotheism", as is found in Zoroastrianism and Christian gnosticism, can also be
seen in some non-gnostic forms of Christian speculation, that were dualistic because
they were influenced by Plato, as well as in similar notions that occur in Jewish
thought, which postulates the existence of angelic agents who work alongside the
Creator. One such instance, Bianchi (1987:507) argues, is Philo Juadaeus's concept
of angels who create man or his "lower constituents", a concept which is clearly
influenced by Plato's Timaeus (41a-c), where the created divinities in turn create the
mortal parts of man.
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Dualistic formulations within monotheism, even if recognised, are not readily
accepted, however, and Bianchi (1987 :507) notes that Christian theologians criticised
such interpretations for fear that it would limit the absolute creativity of God. Bianchi
(1987:507) points out that the above-mentioned formulations were intended to free
God of the responsibility of creating something evil or imperfect, rendering the evil or
imperfection as an attribute, in the case of Platonism, of human free will and the
corrupting influence of the base corporeal nature. Although Zoroastrianism does not
conceive of the corporeal as base or evil, it does regard evil as the consequence of
exercising free will incorrectly. Evil is therefore not in any being's nature, but can be
a corrupting influence if the individual chooses it above the good. The importance of
the concept of free will in Zoroastrianism is discussed later in this chapter.
Bianchi (1987:507) argues that dualistic conceptions are not only found in
monotheism, but in polytheism as well, as there are instances of an opposition
between two causal principles in polytheistic cosmogonies, often an opposition
between "older, semi-personal archai" and new gods who are "youthful and
energetic". Examples of these oppositions can be found in Ouranus in Hesiod's
cosmogony and Apsu in the Enuma Elish, both "violently opposed in their
egocentrism and ontological passivity by new gods, among whom figures a wise and
energetic demiurge who creates or sets in order the world, apportioning lots and fixing
destinies" (Bianchi 1987:507).
Even monism, according to Bianchi (1987:507), can be expressed in dualistic terms,
and can even be seen in the classical advaita doctrine of Sankara, and other systems
that reduce the multiplicity of the material world to illusion, that is, to metaphysical
non-existence, for in advaita the illusion (maya) which is insubstantial, nonetheless
causes the phenomenal world and its suffering. Bianchi (1987:507) mentions
examples of monism with dualistic overtones outside of India as well, such as the
monistic doctrines of the Pre-Socratics. Parmenides proposed an opposition between
truth and opinion (doxa), an opposition which was recognised by Plato as well;
Empedocles postulated coetemal and opposed principles of Love and Discord;
Heraclitus conceived of a war (polemos) between the "way downward and the way
upward", all within the context of "the axiological pre-eminence attributed to the
principle of Logos, which has as its material aspect fire" (Bianchi 1987:507).
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There is also a dualistic opposition in the polytheism of the pre-Zoroastrian religion,
between the ahuras and the daevas. This opposition is also found in the Brahmanic
tradition, between the asuras and the devas, though the attributes of good and evil are
not as overtly stated as in the Iranian tradition, yet the opposition clearly exists (cf
Haug 1971 :267-271). If all these instances are to be taken into account, it is perhaps
duality, rather than dualism, which seems to pervade speculation, and it could be
argued that dualism should not be considered a religious notion at all, but rather a
philosophical recognition of opposition, inherent in all thinking, including monism.
Dualism itself has various different classifications of degree and type, however,
namely radical or moderate, dialectical or eschatological, cosmic or anticosmic
(Bianchi 1987:507).
Radical dualism, Bianchi (1987:507) argues, postulates two "coequal and coeternal
principles", principles that exist from the beginning, whatever their final destiny may
be. Bianchi (1987:507-508) further argues that radical dualism is found, among the
Greeks, in the cycle of birth postulated by Orphism, in the opposition of forces
conceived of by both Empedocles and Heraclitus, in Plato's doctrines of the two
motions of the world, mentioned in the Statesman, and of the coeternity of the Ideas
and the Receptacle (chara), and among the Iranians in Late Avestan and medieval
Zoroastrianism, as well as in the Gathic doctrine of the Twin Spirits, the latter
supposedly "existing independently from the very beginning of the world with their
perfectly contrary natures".
As has been argued in chapter 8 (Creation), it is possible that the two Gathic
principles were not primordial, but that their existence could have been dependent on
creation. The reference to their existence in the beginning likewise has a connection
with the destruction of one of the opposing forces in the end, and both these
references to time quite possibly refer to the Zoroastrian concept of linear time that
will end, and therefore has a beginning, though not a primordial beginning. If this is
the case, the two opposing forces are not primordial, and radical dualism is therefore
not found in the Gathas, but rather a moderate dualism.
Moderate dualism, or the existence of one primordial principle, with a second
principle deriving from the first, often attributes an important part to the second
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principle in bringing the world into existence, and example of which is the dualism of
the "anthropogony" of Plato's Timaeus (Bianchi 1987:508). The Gathas display
characteristics similar to what can be described as moderate dualism, since the Evil
Spirit does playa part in the shaping of creation, albeit destructive, though it is not
stated that the Evil Spirit derives from God in any way, unless God's gift of free will
is to be considered a connection.
The dualism in the Gathas can also be described as an eschatological dualism, as
opposed to a dialectical dualism, the latter postulating that the two principles function
eternally and are often conceived of as not only ethically dualistic but also
metaphysically (Bianchi 1987:508). Examples of dialectic dualism can be found in
the speculations of Empedocles and Heraclitus, as well as in the doctrines of Orphism
and Platonism, whereas Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Gnosticism are some
examples of eschatological dualism (Bianchi 1987:508). Plato's ideas concerning the
soul's escape from the wheel of incarnation could also be described as an instance of
eschatological dualism. It could be argued that this is analogous to the perfecting of
the creation, body and spirit, propounded by Zoroaster, who includes the corporeal
because he, unlike Plato, did not view it as base or evil itself.
Finally, cosmic and anticosmic dualism, as the names imply, are different beliefs
regarding the world, cosmic dualism maintaining that creation is good, and evil is an
external force (a belief held by Zoroaster), as opposed to anticosmic dualism which
considers the corporeal to be inherently evil and corrupting (a concept common to
Plato and many other dualistic systems) (Bianchi 197:508-509).
2.2. Ethical and Cosmological dualism
If there is anything known about the Zoroastrian faith in the West, it is that it is a
dualistic religion and "Zoroastrian dualism" has even become a cliché often used in
the field of religious scholarship as well as in popular accounts of religion (Shapero
1995b:3). The current Zoroastrian community also regards Zoroastrianism as a
dualism, although Shapero (l995b:4) notes that there are three major interpretations
of the type of dualism found in the religion. The first interpretation of the Zoroastrian
dualism is that it is ethical, an interpretation which is influenced by dualism as it is
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portrayed in the Gathas; the second interpretation that the dualism is cosmic, and
conforms to the beliefs held in later Zoroastrian traditions that claim they are an
elaboration of the Gathic doctrines; and the third interpretation seeks to reconcile the
previous two, presuming a homogeneity within the long tradition of the Zoroastrian
religion or a compatibility between the ethical and cosmic interpretation of dualism
(Shapero 1995b:5). The notions of ethical and cosmic dualism, as well as attempts at
their synthesis, will be discussed below.
2.2.1. Ethical dualism
The "dualism" of Zoroastrianism may be known in the West, but Shapero (1995a:4)
argues that it is mostly misunderstood. The doctrine of dualism as it appears in the
Gathas, Shapero (1995a:4) argues, where Spenta Mainyu, the "Holy Creative Spirit",
is opposed to Angra Mainyu, the Hostile Spirit, proposes a conflict that takes place in
the human heart and mind only, not in the material universe. The only evil that is
manifest in material reality is the direct result of evil will, not of inherent nature.
Shapero (1995a:4) concludes that the constant struggle between good and evil is
therefore a struggle within human beings themselves, and that this is clearly an ethical
dualism. In later traditions the opposition of good and evil incorporated the material,
dividing the Universe into two camps, ruled by the Good God or his opponent, the
Evil Spirit, the conflict changing into an opposition of two coeternal beings, and
therefore becoming a cosmic dualism (Shapero 1995a:5). Some modem Zoroastrians
believe in cosmic dualism, others in ethical dualism, but the teachings concerning
dualism in the Gathas remain ethical (Shapero 1995a:5).
Shapero (1995b:6) points out that the interpretation that the dualism in the Gathas is
ethical, and that the two principles of Good and Evil are purely psychological, mental,
and abstract, illustrations of an opposition active only in the human mind, is supported
by linguistic studies (already mentioned) which reveal that the word Zoroaster chose
to describe these principles, Avestan mainyu, is from the Indo-European root man,
which is translated as "mind" or "mental". Jafarey, in translating the Avestan, renders
mainyu literally as "mentality", but most of the other English translations of mainyu
use the word "spirit" (Shapero 1995b:6). There is quite a difference between a
"mentality" and a "spirit", the first being a concept or a condition in the mind, but the
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second having the potential for a much more independent existence (Shapero
1995b:6). This second meaning of the word mainyu, spirit as opposed to mentality,
perhaps suggested the interpretation in the later tradition of the two spirits as
autonomous and active entities within the material sphere.
The Californian Zoroastrian Centre describes the opposition of the two spirits as being
that of a progressive versus a retarding force or mentality (Panthaki 1999:5), and
Shapero (1995b:6) believes that the description in the Gathas could be called
"psychological language", e.g. the better and the bad in thoughts, words and deeds;
worst vs. best mind, wrongful vs. progressive mind. Shapero (1995b:7) further notes
that Zoroaster would have conceived of and expressed such psychology in mythical
terms and with the aid of personification, hence his use of metaphor in calling the two
"Twins". Shapero's use of the word "psychological" for Zoroaster's description of
the Twins is in reaction to Jafarey's use of the word "imaginary" in his translation,
which Shapero considers to be misleading, since it connotes something fanciful that
has no reality (Shapero 1995b:7).
The Avestan word translated by Jafarey could mean either "seen in a dream/vision" or
"self-active", its translation is obscure, but Jafarey's interpretation is also
psychological rather than mythological, as it pertains to human consciousness and
refers to the fact that, in reality, the importance of the choice is not whether the two
spirits make it, but rather that man himself must choose between Good or Evil
(Shapero 1995b:7). It is as illustration of the choice "each man and woman" must
make between good and evil (Yasna 30.2) that the choices of the Twin Spirits are
related. Shapero (1995b:8) further believes that the ethical choice in the Gathas is
only experienced by sentient beings, human or divine, for good and evil are
essentially linked with consciousness, and only conscious beings can make a choice.
The ethical dualism in the Gathas therefore proposes that the conflict of good and evil
exists only in the world of consciousness, and specifically human consciousness.
Shapero (1995b:8) notes that evil arises in this world only through the wrong choices
and actions of human beings, and all the things that are viewed as wrong: war,
pollution, crime, oppression, hate, deprivation, violence, are the result of human
Shapero (1995b:8) concludes that:
"In this humanistic ethical view of dualism, our responsibility is huge. Every morally
good action we do advances God's work on earth and brings us closer to the Wise
Lord, but every evil action we do, no matter how small, retards that work and
distances us from God. This is a sober and even stark way: everything is up to us. We
cannot blame our bad actions on an independent Devil who made us do it, or on the
inscrutable plan of an incomprehensible God. If we do wrong, it is our fault alone,
having given in to our own hostile mentality."
thoughts and actions, and it is the human society that is the arena in which the battle
of good and evil is fought.
2.2.2. Cosmic dualism
There is, as Shapero (1995b:6) has mentioned, another translation of mainyu, and that
is Spirit, which is favoured by most Gathic translators "despite its somewhat Christian
sound", and Shapero (1995b:9) believes that this meaning of the word led to the
interpretation of dualism as cosmic. The Gathas describe the two mentalities, or
Spirits, as if they acted independently, making their choices for Good or Evil, but the
question is whether this is just a poetic metaphor for a human, psychological reality or
whether it is meant to be taken more literally, that Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu
are indeed independent beings with consciousness of their own (Shapero 1995b:9).
Ethical dualists consider Zoroaster's personifications as a literary device only,
according to Shapero (1995b:9), whereas the later dualists interpret them as actual
theological realities. The translations of the Gathas that emphasise the idea that Good
and Evil are represented by personified, living beings are equally plausible
linguistically (Shapero 1995b:9), although it could be argued that they do not
represent an interpretation harmonious with the rest of Zoroaster's doctrine. The
personification of the opposing forces only truly eclipsed the "strictly ethical-
psychological view" of the Gathas in the later Zoroastrian tradition, which became
what is thought of as "classic" Zoroastrian doctrine (Shapero 1995b:9).
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Dhalla (1922:33) argues that the successors to Zoroaster's ethical dualism in the
Gathas extended the concept and developed a system of cosmic dualism, and dualism
therefore remains a "salient feature of religious thought in Iran". This cosmic dualism
seems absent in the Gathas, however, and present only in the later Zoroastrian
tradition, which casts considerable doubt on the thesis that Zoroaster preached a
dualistic theology. Shapero (1995b:9) believes that this elaboration, in the Later
Avesta, of the initial Gathic dualism is due to the reintroduction of myths.
Shapero (1995b:9) states that myth, as it is part of all religions, was also part of the
ancient, polytheistic Indo-Iranian religion that Zoroaster rejected "in order to establish
his radical new monotheistic way". Shapero (1995b:9) also argues that the mythical
elements in the Gathas, although still present, are muted in favour of abstract moral
'philosophy and worship, but soon returned to the religion after Zoroaster's death, and
dualism, amongst others, became mythologised, changing from abstract philosophy to
sacred story. This was a reintroduction not only of myths of divine creation and
conflict, but of the "God-forms" of the old Indo-Iranian gods and goddesses, who
were re-adapted into the Zoroastrian faith by the later priests of the religion, the Magi
(Shapero 1995b:9). This observation of reintroduction of the older, pre-Gathic
tradition in the later Zoroastrian texts was also made by Zaehner (1956: 14), who
believes that there was a revival of paganism, especially in the Yashts.
Zoroaster's two principles, Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu, also changed as the
religion evolved. Instead of being an emanation of God, Spenta Mainyu, the Good
Spirit, became identified and united with Ahura Mazda Himself, so that they formed
one Godhead, Ohrmazd in the later language of Middle Persian. Angra Mainyu, the
Spirit of Evil, became the fixed epithet in the later texts as well, known as Ahriman.
Shapero (1995b: 10) notes that the battle of good and evil was no longer between one
emanated mentality and another; it was between the God of Goodness Himself and an
independent spirit of evil, a cosmic rather than an ethical dualism.
Although the opposition of God to the Evil Spirit in later Zoroastrianism has been
classified as a dualism in the sense that there are two gods opposing each other,
Shapero (1995b: 10) argues that this is a misinterpretation of the dualism in the later
Zoroastrian belief as well: the notion of two gods has never been part of Zoroastrian
belief, neither in the Gathic nor the Later Avestan and Pahlavi traditions; Angra
Mainyu (or Ahriman) may appear to be powerful and even to have divine
characteristics, but he has never been divine, for he is considered a subordinate entity
in rebellion against the One God (Ahura Mazda or Ohrmazd) and His Truth, his reign
is temporary, and he is not eternal.
The dualism of the later doctrine is in fact material rather than cosmic, as the physical
world becomes the stage for the opposition of the forces of good and evil, the universe
having been divided into areas where evil dominates and areas where the good does.
There is, therefore, a Good Creation and an Evil Creation, and the earth is described
as the "World of Mixture", where neither Good nor Evil has yet prevailed (Shapero
1995b:l0).
This is in direct opposition to the teachings of the Gathas, where evil is said to have
no existence other than the spiritual. The introduction of the physical as a possible
realm of evil changed much of the previous Gathic belief, and the implications are
manifold. Firstly, the nature of ethical dualism internalised the struggle of good and
evil, and, because of this internal contemplation of the choice, letting the
responsibility fall on the individual. As soon as the physical realm came into play it
made way for the reintroduction of many pagan beliefs. Rituals, for instance, could
be reintroduced as they would necessarily be believed to have an effect on the
spiritual as well as the material worlds, and evil was no longer a mere concept which
had to be morally opposed, but a force to be magically destroyed.
Pagan gods were also reintroduced, presumably as the battling of good and evil
suggested a reincorporation of the old divinities as a form of army, who could
continue their fighting with each other as of old, but under new banners, as it were.
Shapero (1995b: 11) notes that, unlike the 'plain' world of ethical dualism, where the
only moral actors are human beings on the neutral stage of the physical world, the
world of cosmic dualism is an extravagant drama played out in an elaborate theatre
with many levels, populated with countless spiritual and physical beings, each aligned
to one side or the other, and the plot takes aeons to unfold
Whether it be a slow and inner process of becoming good, or a cosmic battle of divine
beings, the opposition of good and evil will end. Both ethical and cosmic dualism,
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and their respective contexts of the Gathas and the later Zoroastrian doctrine,
postulate a linear timeline, with a clearly defined end of time, when evil will be
vanquished and creation will be perfected. Also, in both ethical and cosmic dualism,
human actions are crucial for making this Renewal of All Things (frashokereti)
happen, and the moral imperative and goal is the same in both views: righteous action
and emulation of the goodness of God and His divine Order, Asha (Shapero
1995b:ll).
2.2.3. Synthesis
There are many other ways in which the dualism of Zoroastrianism has entered
Western thought, through religions and ideologies such as Manichaeism and
Gnosticism, which extended the boundaries of cosmic dualism. In Manichaean and
Gnostic thought, the entire physical world is the product of an evil entity, and is
completely corrupt, except for the "particles of light" or soul-essence trapped in the
prison of matter, and therefore the work of humanity is not to redeem the world, but to
escape it by rejecting matter as much as possible (Shapero 1995b: 12).
This form of dualism, which led to an otherworldly contempt for the physical world
and the human body, influenced major Christian thinkers, especially Augustine, and
can still be recognised in some areas of Christianity today (Shapero 1995b: 12). It is
important to remember, however, that this Manichaean dualism of soul against world,
of mind against body, is not the true Zoroastrian dualism, for the Zoroastrians,
whether they are cosmic or ethical dualists, believe in the continuity of the physical
and spiritual, not their separation. What is done in the physical world affects the
spiritual world, and vice versa. Zoroastrianism has never called the entire physical
world evil; rather, it rejoices in the goodness of the world which was created by an all-
good God (Shapero 1995b:12).
Other Western schools of thought have attempted to generalise dualism in non-
religious ways. System-building philosophers such as Hegel proposed a world-view
of alternating opposites, both in the material and social world, which would then be
resolved into a "synthesis" of the two opposites (Shapero 1995b:13). This Western
dualism is not really Zoroastrian either, although Zoroaster, in his Gathas, did
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contemplate pairs of opposites in the natural world (light and darkness, sleep and
waking, night and day, in Yasna 44). Zoroaster's purpose, however, was not to create
a philosophy of Being, but to lead people to God and to right action and thinking
(Shapero 1995b: 12). Therefore, in the Zoroastrian doctrine there can be no
reconciliation or "synthesis" between the two opposites of Good and Evil, for it is
stated in the Gathas that neither the thoughts, teachings, intellects, choices, words,
deeds; consciences nor the souls of the Twin Spirits agree (Yasna 45.2).
A synthesis of good and evil, or a reconciliation of the Twin Spirits, was already
attempted in ancient times. This attempt at a synthesis tried to identify the Twin
Spirits (Ohrmazd and Ahriman at this point in the tradition), as literally twins, the
offspring of a single father, Zurvan. Zurvan was a personification of Time, and the
twins were primordially connected through their progenitor, making them a unity
rather than a duality (Shapero 1995b: 13). Zurvanism flourished along with
mainstream Zoroastrianism for centuries, but disappeared as a religious movement
some time after the Arab conquest (Shapero 1995b: 13). Zurvanism, however, can be
viewed as a partial return to the original Zoroastrian concept of the good and evil
opposites being or existing above and beyond this opposition, although it is more
often considered a heretic movement away from 'true' Zoroastrian dualism, which
postulated only the existence of two deities opposed to each other. Gathic dualism,
therefore, remains a lesser-known form of Zoroastrian dualism.
3. The Twin Spirits
Fundamental to the understanding of the dualistic nature of the Gathas is Yasna 30.3-
4, as it discusses the nature and choice of the two spirits, and their role in creation:
"Now in the beginning, these two Mainyu, the twins, revealed themselves in thought, word
and deed as the Better and the Bad; and, from these two, the wise chose aright, but not so the
unwise. And thus, when these two Mainyu first came together, they generated life and the
absence of life [non-life], and so shall human existence continue till the end of time: the worst
life for the Followers of the Lie, but the supreme beatific vision [best Thinking] for the
Followers of the Truth."
The later tradition, according to Zaehner (1961 :51), is divided on the interpretation of
the Gathas as propounding a monotheism or a dualism, a rigid dualism between
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Ahuramazda, an incorporation of Ahura Mazda, erroneously identified, according to
Zaehner, with Spenta Mainyu, and Ahriman being supported by the late Sassanian and
later orthodoxy. Zaehner (1961:51) further believes that the Zurvanite heterodoxy
drew the correct conclusion from the Gathic description of the two spirits as twins,
interpreting it as signifying that they had a common father, substituting Zurvan
Arkana for Ahura Mazda, since the latter was now identified as one of the twins.
Zaehner (1961: 51) also mentions that yet another sect believed that the Evil Spirit
came into being because of a single evil thought of the Supreme Being.
Since both these heretic sects attributed the creation of the Evil Spirit to God, Zaehner
(1961: 51) argues that the notion of Zoroaster having held a similar belief cannot be
. summarily dismissed, although Zaehner points out that Zoroaster did not believe the
Evil Spirit was evil in substance, forced to do evil by God or any "inner compulsion
of his own nature", as the later Sassanian orthodoxy did, but was evil because he
chose to be. The choice exercised by the Twin Spirits, as it must be exercised by all
people, is the important factor in Zoroaster's doctrine, whether the Evil Spirit be
regarded as God's literal offspring or not, for the choice implies a dualism of
mentalities or spirits, not deities.
Eliade (1976:310) also believes that Zoroaster's theology is not "rigidly dualistic in
the strict sense of the term", 'since Ahura Mazda is not confronted by an anti-god, but
the opposition in the beginning is between the two Spirits. Eliade (1976:310)
recognises that a unity between Ahura Mazda and Spenta Mainyu is implied (Yasna
43.3) also, and if they are separate, this nevertheless translates into Good and Evil
(these two spirits) originating from Ahura Mazda himself. Conversely, Eliade
(1976: 310) argues, since Angra Mainyu freely chose evil, Ahura Mazda cannot be
accountable for his actions or responsible for the introduction of evil, although Ahura
Mazda, in his omniscient capacity, would have known from the beginning what
choices were to be made and nevertheless did not prevent it. Eliade (1976:310)
postulates that this may mean either that God transcends all contradictions or that the
existence of evil "constitutes the preliminary condition for human freedom". A
similar argument could conceivably be pursued regarding the Old Testament religion
or the Judeo-Christian tradition, neither of which is classified are a dualism.
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It is not only in the Hebrew religions that a parallel can be found, either, and Eliade
(1976 :310-311) states that the antecedents reach as far back as prehistory, in the
different "mythico-ritual systems of bipartitions and polarities, alternations and
dualities, antithetical dyads and coincidentia oppositorum - systems that accounted at
once for the cosmic rhythms and the negative aspects of reality and, first and
foremost, for the existence of evil". Yet Zoroastrianism contributes significantly to
the illumination of this problem of evil, and Eliade (1976:311) also states that
Zoroaster conferred an entirely new religious and moral meaning to this immemorial
problem, and the Gathas are the basis for the characteristics and later elaborations of
the Iranian religion.
One of the important contributions that Zoroaster made is to stress the faculty of free
will, and therefore to relegate evil to a position that is chosen, not preordained, for
Eliade (1976:311) points out that the primordial separation between good and evil is
the consequence of the choice exercised by the twin spirits, one choosing Asha
(Justice) and the other Drug (Deceit). The beings that follow evil are therefore doing
so by choice. Some of these followers of evil are condemned by Zoroaster
specifically, such as the daevas, or old Iranian gods. Zoroaster speaks against the
worship of these daevas and forbids the sacrifices made to them, specifically bovine
sacrifices, which Eliade (1976:311) interprets as being a result of the importance of
bovines in the Mazdean religion and as possibly reflecting a conflict between
sedentary and nomadic tribes. Eliade (1976:311) also mentions that it is not only a
question of criticism on the social plane, but also of a rejection of the Aryan national
religious tradition. It seems obvious that Zoroaster, having reformed the national
pantheon considerably, should explain the position of the old gods within the new
religion, as well as the reason for his disagreement and resulting reforms. These are
only the physical and social factors contributing to an exposition of Zoroaster's
dualism, and are rather less important than the spiritual and intellectual aspects.
Gnoli (2000:2), like Zaehner (1961 :51), notes that Zoroaster's dualism was a "wholly
transcendent" or "spiritual" dualism, not based on the opposition of mainyava/menog
(the 'spiritual') versus geithya/getig (the 'material'). This spiritual-material duality is
mainly found in the later Zoroastrian literature, such as the ninth century Pahlavi
texts, although there are Gathic antecedents (Gnoli 2000:2). In later Zoroastrianism
the material is not considered inherently evil or base, however, but 'negative' in the
sense that it is the place where the two spirits 'intermingle' and, as such, the place
where creation is contaminated by the evil, despite the non-material existence of evil
(Gnoli 2000:2). The dualism between good and evil takes place on the spiritual or
mental plane, however, and is not to be equated with a dualism between spirit and
matter, but is rather an opposition of spirit against spirit, reinforcing the purely mental
issue of choice which is to be made by all (Gnoli 2000:2, cf Shaked 1967).
The dualism of good and evil does affect both spirit and matter, however, as IS
indicated by their respective creations. Gnoli (2000:3) regards these two creations, or
rather the creation and the counter-creation, as a crucial element of Zoroastrian
dualism, and interprets the non-life that Angra Mainyu creates in answer to the life
that Spenta Mainyu creates as having a negative character only. The physical creation
remains God's (through his creative spirit Spenta Mainyu), and Gnoli (2000:3)
interprets Angra Mainyu's role as that of attacker and corrupter, not creator, for he has
no power outside the spiritual. Certain references in the later Zoroastrian literature
that claim Ahriman can never exist, prompted Shaked (1967:232) to go so far as to
argue that the Evil Spirit's presence in creation may not be "an ontological fact, but
merely an anthropological and psychological phenomenon". There is certainly no
indication that this is not also the case in the Gathas, as the Evil Spirit is hardly seen
as anything but a rather vague concept, and solely as an antithesis to the Good.
Something the Gathas are surprisingly clear on, however, is the good forces that are
mentioned in opposition to the evil. Not once is evil opposed directly to Ahura
Mazda himself, only to his Amesha Spentas, and specifically to Spenta Mainyu. Later
Zoroastrian dualism differed from the doctrine of dualism in the Gathas in that Spenta
Mainyu became increasingly assimilated into Ahura Mazda, an assimilation which
Gnoli (2000:3) argues was suggested by two references: the Gathas, which clearly
states in Yasna 44.7 that God created everything through his Beneficent Spirit; and the
Later Avesta, which defines Spenta Mainyu as a 'creator' not unlike Ahura Mazda
himself (Yasht 10.143).
I disagree with Gnoli on his interpretation of these two passages as indicating
concepts antecedent to the later interpretation of Zoroastrian dualism, as they both
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seem to indicate a clear division between Ahura Mazda and Spenta Mainyu. The
problem lies not so much in ascertaining whether Spenta Mainyu and Ahura Mazda
are to be identified as one, but whether the Amesha Spentas in total are part of God.
However, the identification of God and his creative spirit was only recorded as late as
the ninth century Pahlavi texts, though mentioned by Greek sources in the fourth
century BeE, but Gnoli (2000:3) notes that there is nothing in the Avesta to indicate
that the opposition between Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu was transferred to
Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu. Zoroaster's doctrine, as Gnoli (2000:3-4) argues,
had therefore become an "uncompromising dualism, in which two aboriginal deities,
Ohrrnazd and Ahriman, God and the Devil, face each other and contend for ultimate
victory" (Gnoli 2000:3-4).
The Gathic doctrine of Ahura Mazda and the opposition of Spenta Mainyu and Angra
Mainyu seem to have led to the development of two other doctrines, namely Pahlavi
and Zurvanist dualism. Pahlavi dualism married the concepts of Ahura Mazda and
Spenta Mainyu, forming the one cognate Ohrrnazd and opposing it to the transformed
Angra Mainyu who had become Ahriman. The Zurvanistic dualism retained the
concept of twin spirits (here Ohrrnazd and Ahriman instead of Spenta Mainyu and
Angra Mainyu), but inserted a deity in the role of the Gathic Ahura Mazda - Zurvan,
the god of time and father of the twins, although closer examination will show
Zurvanism to have a different philosophy than early Zoroastrianism.
Gnoli (2000:4) himself argues that Zoroastrian dualism was reformulated by the later
degradation of God to the level of "devil's antagonist", but believes that this
reformulation was part of a "unitary body of doctrine that remained essentially
unchanged for centuries". Gnoli (2000:4) argues that the heterogeneous sources serve
partially to reconstruct the historical development of such a 'unitary doctrine', and
states that it progressed from the Gathic doctrine of Ahura Mazda as separate from the
twin opposing forces, to the belief that Ahura Mazda himself was opposed to the evil
spirit, which in tum was expanded to the belief that Zurvan (Time) was the father of
the twins Ohrrnazd and Ahriman.
The supremacy of Time has been variously regarded as a development parallel to
Mazdaism in Iran, a Mazdean heresy, a theological 'trend' "peripheral to orthodoxy",
180
181
related to the religion of the Magi, and even as a speculation introduced in the ninth
century Zoroastrian religious literature (Gnoli 2000:4). Gnoli (2000:4-5) argues that
Zurvanism, "with its speculation on Time, its apparatus of numbers and the idea of the
world-year", is the result of contact between Zoroastrianism and the Babylonian
civilisation in the fifth and fourth centuries BeE, specifically with Babylonian
astronomy, astrology and astral religion, although an influence from the prevailing
thought of the Achaemenid and Hellenistic period in the Near East, mostly notions of
universal, regulating, and impersonal laws and forces, cannot be discounted. These
influences on Zurvanism, Gnoli (2000:5) argues, caused a subversion of the original
Zoroastrian moral values and belief in the dignity and freedom of man, subjugating
God and man to the omnipotence of time. This fatalism, Gnoli (2000:5) notes, was to
continue into and deeply influence medieval Persia.
The basic hierarchy underlying Zurvanism was not new, however, as the dual
principles of good and evil that are subject to a higher power seem to have appeared
in the Gathas as well. As has been noted by Geiger (1977:54), there do not seem to
be any references in the Gathas to an evil force opposing Ahura Mazda himself, only
to his Amesha Spentas, unless no distinction is drawn between Ahura Mazda and
Spenta Mainyu as in the Later Avesta. An evil force opposing Spenta Mainyu is
mentioned only twice (Yasna 30.4-7, 45.2). The role Spenta Mainyu has in the
Gathas is not very clear, however, as he is sometimes identified with Ahura Mazda
(Yasna 43.2), and sometimes distinguished from him (Yasna 45.6, 47.1).
Geiger (1977:54) contends that Spenta Mainyu must therefore be a divine being who
sometimes rises to the level of the Highest Godhead, sometimes is distinct from him
or has separate existence. However, the other Amesha Spentas, as they are depicted
in the Gathas, can also be said to alternate between having a separate existence and
being an emanation from or attribute of the Godhead. The important distinction is
that Spenta Mainyu is an important attribute of Ahura Mazda as his creative spirit, just
as the creation is an important manifestation of that force.
Evil is depicted as a destructive force in its capacity of negating creation, but a non-
creative force itself, thereby fulfilling its role of mere negation of good in an
opposition of being vs. nothingness. Geiger's view that Spenta Mainyu sometimes
rises to the level of Highest Godhead, if correct, should by rights apply to all the
Amesha Spentas. It seems rather that evil negates good in both the moral and
intellectual spheres as Lie and Evil Mind, but also in the physical realm as an
opposition to creation, the most important aspect of a Creator.
Ahura Mazda therefore creates everything through his creative spirit, Spenta Mainyu,
and Zoroaster expresses the negative counterpart to his creativity as Angra Mainyu,
the evil spirit and twin of the good spirit Spenta Mainyu, who chooses evil in
opposition to goodness (Yasna 30.3). The first thing which the twins produced is life
and the absence of life (or being and not-being/nothingness) (Yasna 30.4). Geiger
(1977:55) explains this opposition by the example that if Spenta Mainyu creates light,
the counteraction of Angra Mainyu is darkness, or the absence of light.
Geiger (1977:55) postulates that to the Zoroastrian all evil is therefore not something
properly realistic, existing in and for itself, but only the failure of goodness, and
furthermore that it is self-evident that good and evil throughout are not parallel ideas
of equal value, but the latter has a purely relative existence. This semi-reality of evil
coincides with the belief in its temporal nature held in Zoroastrian eschatology.
This temporal nature of evil is also connected to the immaterial nature of evil, as
opposed to good that has both material and immaterial forms. Later Zoroastrianism
opposes menog to getig and maintains that Ahriman has only menog existence in the
hearts of men. Being driven from every human heart would therefore drive evil from
the world as well, though in the Gathic doctrine it is less clearly classified (cf Shaked
1967:230-231 ).
If the Gathic doctrine of evil is to be understood, however, what must be resolved is in
which relationship Angra Mainyu stands to Ahura Mazda or to Spenta Mainyu - its
twin spirit; in which case, in what relationship do the twin spirits stand to Ahura
Mazda? This relationship has proven problematic, and many interpretations have
been biased by a desire for a certain outcome. Such misreadings have been
perpetrated, among others, by Christian scholars, according to Boyce (1984:15-16),
who began reconstructing Zoroaster's teachings before the Avesta was available to
them, and without contact with the Zoroastrian community, and who sought to cast
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Zoroaster in a role similar to the biblical prophets who proclaimed the coming of
Christ.
After the Avesta became known to them, Boyce (1984:16) states that they interpreted
the relevant Gathic passages as indicating Ahura Mazda as the father of the twin
spirits, and therefore as the source of good and evil. They seem to have ignored the
implication this interpretation had for their own belief that the biblical God did not
create evil, though he created Satan. Boyce (1984: 16) argues that this "European
heresy" was inspired by the heretic Zurvanite cult, and was a rejection of all post-
Gathic literature concerning dualism and the Heptad (the Amesha Spentas, including
Ahura Mazda as one with Spenta Mainyu), and notes that it has dominated Parsi
theology from the nineteenth century onward.
Therefore, the argument for monotheism was the product of an ulterior motive in a
zealous Christian missionary community, whose interests were not to preserve the
truth of an existing faith, but to use it as a stepping-stone for replacement by their
own. The argument against monotheism for dualism in tum was an apologetic
reaction to this proselytism, and is therefore equally biased and unreliable.
Boyce's criticism (1984: 15-16) is valid, but fails to take into account that it is by no
means a commonly held conviction, outside of the Parsi faith, that the Gathas and the
Later Avestan literature form a homogenous philosophy, nor does it touch on the crux
of the 'European heresy's' error, namely that placing Ahura Mazda as the literal
progenitor of the twin spirits and then attempting to demonstrate that he was the
author of evil as well, is by no means a valid interpretation. It is constantly asserted in
the Gathas themselves that Ahura Mazda is wholly good, and all that he creates is
good, and furthermore, that evil is followed by choice, first by Angra Mainyu and
thereafter by all who make the same mistake. Unlike in Christianity, there is no
inherent evil in anything, and both man and spirit are not born or created evil, but
become so by choice. This makes Zoroastrianism less of a dualism than Christianity,
if the Christian scholars' reasoning is to be taken to its logical conclusion.
Boyce (1984: 16) argues that it is clearly a case of Christian biases and of Parsi
reformists being taken in by these apologetic arguments. Nevertheless, Boyce is
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similarly biased, as is apparent in her assumption that the Gathas and the Later Avesta
can be seen as uniform in opinion on the issue, and in her general reliance on later and
current Zoroastrian beliefs, which becomes almost apologetic itself. Some distance
seems to be required from such religiously affected views. The scope of this work,
however, relies solely on the Gathas as the only works attributable to Zoroaster.
Within this framework, it seems that both arguments (for and against dualism) can be
supported by the Gathas. It remains only to investigate in what relationship the twin
spirits stand to Ahura Mazda.
Ahura Mazda seems to stand in a paternal relationship to one of the two spirits,
namely Spenta Mainyu, since the Good Spirit is referred to as the son of Ahura
Mazda. The two Spirits are also described as twins (Yasna 45.2), which some
scholars (cf Collinson 1994:6) take to be an indication that the spirit of evil is as
much the offspring of Ahura Mazda as is the spirit of good, but this conclusion is
problematic even for its advocates: it implies that God is the author of evil and
responsible for its introduction into the cosmos - an impossibility, since God is
wholly good. A solution to this difficulty, which also accords with the doctrine of the
Gathas, according to Collinson (1994:6), is the possibility that Ahura Mazda created
two spirits and gave them free will to choose their ways. This solution permits the
interpretation that the spirit that chose evil, having done so of his own volition, was
not created evil, but as something that had the freedom to choose evil, and this would
accord well with the fact that Zoroaster nowhere attributes evil to God (Collinson
1994:6).
Collinson (1994:6) points out that those who adhere to a strictly monotheistic
interpretation of Zoroaster's doctrine cite passages from the Gathas in which Ahura
Mazda is described as, for example, "the creator of all things by the Holy Spirit
[Spenta Mainyu]" (Yasna 44.7), whereas those who regard dualism as central to the
doctrine, emphasise the opposition of Good and Evil, mostly as it appears in the later
tradition, and as such is seen as an opposition between Ahura Mazda and Angra
Mainyu, without denying the attribution of supremacy to Ahura Mazda.
Boyce (1978:608) believes that "in one sense, that of believing in only one eternal,
uncreated Being, who is worthy of worship, Zoroaster was indeed a monotheist, with
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a concept of god as exalted as that of any Hebrew or Arabian prophet. But he was
also a dualist, in that he saw, coexisting with Ahura Mazda, another uncreated Being
who was maleficent, not to be worshipped". This would mean that 'Traditional
Zoroastrianism' teaches that Ahura Mazda is supreme and wholly good, but not
omnipotent, and Angra Mainyu is an active force of evil that is pitted against the good
and that must be opposed with courage and resolution (Collinson 1994:7).
This view is entirely foreign to the Gathas, however, because, firstly, there is no
opposition between Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu, and no substitution of Ahura
Mazda with the opposing force to Angra Mainyu, namely Spenta Mainyu. Secondly,
evil is not even properly opposed to Spenta Mainyu, and the Gathas seem to display a
tentative definition or manifestation of evil, even though the concept itself was quite
important.
Dhalla (1938:89) points out that the Evil Spirit who opposes the Good Spirit is not
given a proper name in the Gathas. Dhalla (1938:89) notes that as an opposition to
Spenta Mainyu (Holy or Beneficent Spirit), the other spirit is given the epithet Angra
(Enemy or Evil), and it is applied directly only once (Yasna 45.2), and once indirectly
(Yasna 44.12), where it is asked "why is a bad (angra) man is not like unto Angra,
'The Evil One'. Dhalla (1938:89-90) lists the other examples where evil is mentioned
as well, namely: in Yasna 43.15; 44.12; 48.10, where the term angra is used in the
ordinary meaning 'evil' to indicate wicked men; in Yasna 30.3 the epithet aka ('bad')
and Aka Mainyu ('Bad Spirit') (Yasna 32.5) also appear; and in Yasna 30.5 he is
called dregvant, or the Wicked One; in Yasna 45.2 he is described as the opposite to
the Good Spirit in minds, doctrines, faith, words, deeds, conscience and soul, and
again in Yasna 30.3 as evil in thought, word and deed; in Yasna 30.4 he is described
as having created an absence of life in response to the Spenta Mainyu who generated
life. Not only is there a distinct absence of the hierarchy found in the arrangement of
the Amesha Spentas, but evil is also seemingly only superficially described. In fact, it
seems that the name for the opposing evil force depends entirely on the formal name
of the entity it is opposing, and this would therefore imply that its epithets are related
to its current actions only, not to a permanent state of existence.
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It is, according to Collinson (1994:5), in contrast to the good force, which "epitomises
everything that is life-affirming and creative, and all activities that foster truth, the
benign ordering of life and a pastoral care of the earth and its creatures", that evil
exists. Collinson (1994:5-6) believes that Angra Mainyu is the representative of
"destruction, untruth and bloodshed, and the aggressive life-pattern of the pillaging
nomad rather than the settled pastoralist". This concept of the opposition of two
beings could have originated with the opposition of the two types of divine entity in
Indo-Iranian pagan times, the opposition of the ahuras and the daevas, a correlation
that is also pointed out by Collinson (1994:6), who further states that this Indo-Iranian
polytheistic religion was rejected by Zoroaster, who changed the previously popular
daevas into symbols and followers of evil and the Lie, and chose from among the
ahuras one supreme deity, Ahura Mazda.
The daevas chose evil, however, for between the two spirits "even the Daevas did not
discriminate aright, for confusion came upon them as they stood in doubt so that they
chose the Worst Mind" (Yasna 30.6), and they are later described as the offspring of
Evil Mind (Ako Manah) (Yasna 32.3) who now corrupt men, turning them away from
Ahura Mazda (Yasna 32.4) and defrauding mankind of the good life and Immortality,
as they were beguiled by the Evil Mainyu, with evil thought, word and deed (Yasna
32.5). Their misdeeds against the pastoralists are specifically mentioned, and they are
accused of abusing the earth and cattle (Yasna 44.20). It is only in the later literature
that the daevas become the counterparts to the hierarchy of the Amesha Spentas.
Dhalla (1938:91) states that in later Zoroastrianism Angra Mainyu has a retinue of
demons just as Ahura Mazda has his council with the Amesha Spentas. The
hierarchical opposition was in fact so painstakingly balanced that, as noted by Dhalla
(1938:91), for every angel and archangel there was a corresponding demon who forms
an exact opposition. This exact opposition mirrors the absolute dualism of the Later
Avesta between Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu as well, but is found in the Gathas
only inasmuch as evil, when it is mentioned, is exactly the opposite of the good force
discussed. The Gathas are devoid of a formal hierarchy of evil, however, and this
formulaic opposition could not have been native to Zoroaster's philosophy, or he
would have elaborated as much on the evil forces as he did on the good.
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Dhalla (1938 :91) also remarks that there is no such symmetry of diametric opposites
between these rival forces in the Gathic literature, and that the only demons
mentioned are in opposition to Vohu Manah, Asha, Armaiti and Sraosha, and these
are called Aka Manah (Evil Mind), Druj (Lie), Taromaiti (Heresy) and Aeshma
(Wrath) respectively. Dhalla (1938:91) further points out that, except for the Druj,
they work infrequently and do not antagonise their opponents systematically, nor do
the terms used to describe them always signify personified demons. This could even
cast doubt on too much emphasis on the personification of the Twin Spirits, as
everything thereafter chooses Angra Mainyu (or a related term for evil) as a principle
of evil, as opposed to the principle of good, which is only represented by and goes
beyond the personification of Spenta Mainyu, if this is valid.
lyer (1983: 16) believes that the two spirits, Spenta and Angra Mainyu are impersonal,
universal forces - "centripetal and centrifugal", a concept derived from the same
source from which the Ahimanyu of the Rigveda comes, not necessarily borrowed
from the Vedas, but rooted, as many other concepts in Zoroastrianism are, in the
system in which the Vedic and Avestan concepts originated. An example, according
to lyer (1983:16), is the similarity between the Avestan Angra and the Vedic Ahi, the
serpent of evil and the Cycle of Matter, or the Avestan Twin Spirits (as impersonal
and universal forces), which are akin to Purusha and Prakriti of Indian philosophy.
lyer (1983:16) argues that, just as "Light and darkness are the world's eternal ways"
(Gila VIII), so the struggle between Spenta and Angra Mainyu "commence, sustain
and renovate the cycle of necessity". lyer (1983 :28) concludes that Angra Mainyu is
to be equated with matter, and, as such, is the begetter of all evil and the destroyer,
since matter must destroy itself as part of its process of change and flux, whereas
Ahura Mazda, as spirit, remains immutable in its abstract unity. Evil's association
with matter is most likely a pagan concept that was revived in the later Zoroastrian
tradition, and it is not found in the Gathas, except for evil's association with matter in
its capacity for destruction and corruption of the good material creation. The
opposition of good and evil in the realms of spirit and matter will be discussed more
fully later in this chapter.
The question that must be answered concerning the conflicting principles of good and
evil is what the nature of these principles is. Do they exist as real entities, actual
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beings with minds and will, or are they abstract principles with no existence other
than that of ideas, or tendencies, in the human or divine mind? Do Good and Evil
only exist in the world of human actions, or are there good and evil in the natural
world, the non-human world? (Shapero 1995b:14).
Zoroaster considered the Good as an attribute of God together with Wisdom and
Justice, and saw evil as that which prevents or deprives him of God's help and
obstructs the realisation of the ideal (Afnan 1960: 120). Therefore, if religion is the
revelation of that "help" or guideline of God's purpose for the cultural and spiritual
evolution of man, the good is whatever conforms to and aids the acquisition of this
perfection, and evil is any force that retains or retards that realisation (Afnan
1960: 120). Afnan (1960: 120) therefore believes that evil is not a being with any
substantial existence, but a relative reality, opposing the good and God's divine plan
of perfecting the creation as an obstructing force only. Any abstract principle, be it in
human thought, a force in nature, a tendency in human instincts or habits, that
obstructs or thwarts the ideal constitutes evil, and should be avoided or overcome
(Afnan 1960:120).
The divine purpose that must be pursued is aided and thwarted respectively by good
and evil forces, but their goodness and evilness reside not in themselves, according to
Afnan (1960: 120), but in the manner they operate on the purpose pursued, and are
therefore not substantial but relative. Evil will continue, therefore, to operate until the
goal of perfection and the realisation of the good in everything is attained (Afnan
1960:120). This interpretation serves to explain not only Zoroaster's lack of
description of good and evil as personified divine beings in favour of a more abstract
description of them as spirits/forces or mentalities, but also how Zoroaster could
propose the eventual vanishing of evil completely. Afnan (1960: 120) argues that it is
in this light that Zoroaster's concept of evil should be understood, as he did not
consider evil as possessing a substantial being, a god who wrestles with Ahura Mazda
throughout the ages, until he is killed or defeated.
The good, on the other hand, possesses a positive existence, not an existence based on
negation, as evil has, according to Afnan (1960: 120), for it constitutes an attribute or
revelation of the divine being. It is important to note, however, that the relative good
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is not the 'Absolute Good', that which is an attribute or revelation of God's being, but
relative good is what helps its realisation in the life of society and of man (Afnan
1960: 120). This could be compared to Plato's belief that all that is good on earth is
good insofar as it is part of the ideal Form or absolute Good, and all that is not good is
so inasmuch as it fails to emulate the absolute Good. Evil in Zoroastrianism also
seems to have existence only as a negation of the good, or as something that is present
in whatever measures the good is not emulated. Afnan (1960: 120) argues that evil is
always relative to the process through which the Absolute Good is gradually acquired
and realised, and furthermore constitutes a negation of only the relative good, not the
Absolute, which does have a separate existence.
Throughout the Gathas, and in all later Zoroastrian teaching as well, Ahura Mazda,
the Wise Lord, is an entirely good God. No evil of any kind can proceed from him,
and Ahura Mazda, unlike God in the Semitic view, does not personally take
vengeance or send punishments or temptations to His followers (Shapero 1995b: 16).
Evil must then have arisen apart from the One Good God. This process is suggested
in the Gathic text where Zoroaster describes the primordial choice of the two
mentalities, in which the wrongful mentality chose the worst actions, and the most
progressive mentality chose righteousness (Yasna 30.3). Zoroaster does not speculate
on the origin of the two mentalities, whether they were both created by God, or
whether they already existed simultaneously when they 'first came together', whether
this 'coming together' was in a mythical time before human beings, or in the first
moral awakening of every human being (Shapero 1995b: 16). Zoroaster is clear about
the choices, however, and Evil arose when the wrongful mentality first chose worst
actions - and it continues to arise whenever anyone chooses worst actions, as it is a
rebellion and a defiance of the One Good God and the universal law of Righteousness,
which Zoroaster calls Asha (Shapero 1995b: 16).
The emphasis on choice in the opposition between the good and evil spirits, especially
considering the epithet of Ako Mainyu or Evil Mind, could be interpreted as merely
an illustration of the choice man has to make. Haug (1971: 150) goes one step further
in his interpretation of the illustration of opposition in the Gathas, and argues that
Worst Mind (Yasna 30.6) is a philosophical term applied by Zoroaster to designate his
principle of non-existence, non-reality, which is the cause of all evils. lyer (1983:15)
190
also believes that the good and evil forces III Zoroastrian cosmology represent
"definite philosophic concepts".
4. Free will and the dualism in the soul
The free choice which is the privilege of even the animal kingdom, was God's gift to
his creatures at the very beginning of existence, for 'in the beginning, 0 Mazda, by
thy mind didst thou create for us material forms (gaetha) and consciences and rational
wills (khratu), for thou didst establish corporeal life - deeds and doctrines that men
might thereby make their choices in freedom of will' (Yasna 31.11). Zaehner
(1961 :41) argues that the choice that must be made can be summed up as ultimately
that between Truth and the Lie, as is stated in the Gathas, "For our choice, Truth has
been presented for our own benefit, but to the (false) teacher the Lie is for his own
undoing" (Yasna 49.3). Zaehner (1961:41) also points out that Zoroaster must have
been fully aware of the fact that this choice also enabled one to make the wrong
choice. The choice is not to be made blindly, however, and there are various passages
in the Gathas explaining that it is the result of good thinking, recognition of the good
as better, wisdom or piety that the right way is chosen, whereas it is because of fraud
and confusion that evil draws people in. The choice must be made, however, as
existence is divided entirely between the forces of good and evil.
It is after Zoroaster explains that all must make their choices, each individual for
himself, after having heard with their ears and beheld with their minds (Yasna 30.2),
that he first speaks (Yasna 30.3-6) of the choice that had to be made by the Twin
Spirits at the beginning of time (Zaehner 1961 :42). In this myth of the two opposing
spirits, it is not just the physical world's dualism that is explained, but, true to the
style of multi-layered meaning in the Gathas, has an implication on other levels as
well, namely the spiritual and ethical. This is possibly due to Zoroasters belief in the
connectedness of the physical and the spiritual.
Malandra (1983: 19) believes that the dualism of Zoroaster, in contradistinction to that
of the Later Avesta and of orthodox Zoroastrianism of the Sassanid period, is not
absolute, and that the opposing forces of Truth and Falsehood are not primordial, but
came into being as emanations or creations of Ahura Mazda, just like the other beings,
or 'Entities' (hatam) as they are called, who surround him and who appear to be
emanations of aspects of his own personality. It is not certain whether Zoroaster was
the first to compose the myth of the Twin Spirits or whether he reinterpreted the myth
of an ancient tradition (Zaehner 1961 :42), but it is probable that, as Malandra
(1983: 19) believes, Zoroaster was drawing upon the ancient Indo-European myth of
the Twins in whom life and death originate.
Although an antecedent exists for the myth of the Twin Spirits, Malandra (1983: 19)
emphasises that Zoroaster extended his version to include Ahura Mazda as the creator
of the two Spirits as twin brothers, whose natures differed in thought, word and deed,
one good and one bad (Yasna 30.3), and who established life and death (Yasna 30.4).
Although their natures differed completely (Yasna 45.2), Malandra (1983:19) believes
that the fundamental difference is in their ability to exercise free will and choice.
Although this interpretation is a valid one for Zoroastrianism insofar as it is similar to
the scenario in the Old Testament religion, and the two religions have much in
common, it is not as clear whether there is too much emphasis on personification in
the Gathas, which in actual fact lends itself more to abstract concepts than
personifications. It could well be that the Evil Spirit is only a counterpart to the
creative process, and that the choice referred to is merely an illustrative myth. It is
not impossible, however, that Malandra is correct in interpreting Ahura Mazda as the
progenitor of both, but the important factor is their choice, made between good and
evil, through which this myth communicates the analogous human choice between
good and evil.
Zaehner (1961 :42-43) argues that in the myth of the Twin Spirits Zoroaster was
projecting onto the spiritual the situation of conflict he observed on earth, especially
the opposition of destruction and conservation which surrounded him. The life-
affirming and life-creating spirit, Spenta Mainyu (often translated as "Bounteous" or
"Holy", and implying increase and abundance) is opposed to the spirit of destruction
who negates life, and the two spirits are 'irreconcilable' in their 'total contradiction'
(Zaehner 1961 :42-43). But the myth, most importantly, illustrates the ethical problem
of evil, and man's choice in the situation, not its physical manifestations.
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The original exercise of free will, according to Malandra (1983 :20), remains
paradigmatic for man, although Malandra postulates that this precedes creation,
whereas the Gathic evidence points to the introduction of both free will and evil at
creation. Malandra's (1983:20) point, however, is that free will to choose between
good and evil is the very essence of Zoroastrianism, and man is responsible for his
fate. Completely devoid of fatalism, this philosophy has another interesting aspect to
it: man is responsible for his own salvation or damnation as much as he is responsible
for his own choice of good or evil. The importance of his choice, however, is never
underestimated in Zoroastrianism, and it is not assumed that this choice is obvious,
and individuals who fail to recognise the good are therefore 'naturally' evil. Much of
the Zoroastrian literature is given to explaining that the process by which the good is
chosen is a rational one, and that a pure mind is the tool with which to recognise the
good. A pure mind in turn is a product of both intellect and piety (Vohu Manah and
Armaiti). The possibility of confusion is also taken into account (Yasna 31.12), and it
is recognised that the opposition to good is often deceitful and difficult to recognise.
Despite the thoughtful mention of these mitigating circumstances in the recognition of
good and evil, the opposition of good and evil remains quite simple, a rather black and
white issue in the true spirit of dualism.
Dhalla (1938:85) views this opposition in the spirit world as a reflection of the
opposition of two conflicting natures within man himself. Dhalla (1938:85) believes
that man is divided into higher impulses and lower appetites, and that the conflict
between the two spirits in Yasna 45.2 is the same complete polarity as the aspects of
man which stand respectively for truth, virtue and righteousness or falsehood, vice
and wickedness.
Dhalla (1938: 86) further states that it is not only the evil within man himself which he
must oppose, but the evil in society as well, for one is the microcosm of the other.
Dhalla (1938:86) argues that just as man's higher impulses must band together to
resist the lower appetites, so too must men band together in society to oppose evil, but
that men often fail at this and fight each other instead, ignoring the commands of a
moral world in order to continue the practice of the physical world in which might is
right. Dhalla (1938:86) views this failure as caused by incomplete evolution from
base creatures to divine products, and assumes that the baser element will be disabled
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by degrees only. The comparison to evolution is a fitting one up to a point only, for
Zoroastrianism preaches a far more active mode of reform of the present state of
being, not a slow, natural process at all. It is up to man to improve himself, and
although the result may be so slow as to suggest evolution at a leisurely pace, the
accent remains on a very active self-improvement and resistance to evil, not a
salvation granted or an instantaneous perfection for the initiate.
There are many religions and societies which adhere tothe precepts that one must be
good and oppose evil. Zoroastrianism, as Dhalla (1938:87) points out, is one such
system, but with the remarkable difference that it takes such an active, not passive,
role and furthers good while fighting evil, for Zoroaster proclaimed that man is to
seek salvation not only for himself but for the whole world. Dhalla (1938:87)
explains that to seek individual salvation and leave others to their fate is to fail in
one's civic duty, and to refrain from being evil but not to resist evil worked by others,
is merely a negative virtue.
Kotwal and Boyd (1982:xxii) point out that although Dastur Erachji (a modem
Zoroastrian priest) clearly believes that spiritual powers of evil exist, and are caused
by the Hostile Spirit named Angra Mainyu, human 'evil-doers' concern him most.
The evil which mankind can commit is varied, and concerns the elements, such as
extinguishing sacred fire and polluting water or earth, or moral laws, such as giving
false evidence or harming another person, but the greatest enemies man encounters
are "vices that cause pain and damage" (Kotwal & Boyd 1982:xxii). Christian
Catechism has largely demythologised many references to the evil spirits, however,
and the man who commits evil becomes an evil spirit himself (Kotwal & Boyd
1982:xxii-xxiii).
lyer (1983 :28) similarly believes that the evil to be most feared lies in man himself.
Concerning the concept of an opposition between good and evil, he states that:
"It was neither the metaphysical nor the historical aspect which perpetuated the
teaching about Ohrmazd-Ahriman in old Iran; it was the personal - the strife of mind
and heart in man, the struggle between his own members.[What appealed to the
Iranians] was the truth that Mazda's Law of Purity was the weapon to destroy the
impure being of their own passion-nature. Their veneration for the great elements, in
fact the whole of Nature, sprang from the idea that it was the religious duty of man
not only to refrain from polluting but to raise and elevate all the kingdoms of the
manifested universe. The aspect of the dual powers which persist with such tenacity
in Zoroastrianism is a psychologic-human one, and while Ahriman has been
personified and has become, like Satan, a living entity for the superstitious, for the
cultured he is but a force within man, his own lower nature" (lyer 1983 :28-29).
lyer (1983:31) further argues that there is no substitute method of gaining insight into
the good and attaining happiness thereby, but that man must himself choose to
practise good and resist evil, and man is aided in this internal struggle by good
thoughts, words and deeds, which, being in accordance with the Good Law, secures
his purification and immortality. It is clear that, although lyer dismisses belief in the
existence of spirits of good and evil that exist outside of man as superhuman beings in
the spiritual realm, the passage in the Gathas can be interpreted on many levels,
including the "psychologic-human" one. The Gathas abound with abstract concepts
and multiple meanings, and it is therefore quite plausible to interpret Yasna 30.4 as
referring to an opposition of good and evil (from the beginning) that denies any
reconciliation of the concepts and provides an absolute divide in moral behaviour that
is independent of class, wealth, status or might. Evil is not linked, however, with
anything material in the Gathas, as the term "lower nature" might convey, and
although a person consists of nine parts making up his entire being (Bode &
Nanavutty 1952:112-113), none of the parts is inherently base or evil at all, and it is
only as a spiritual threat that evil exists, not as something material.
5. The Dualism of Spirit and Matter
The Zoroastrian religion is primarily known as dualistic in the sense that the
opposition between the powers of good and evil occupies a central position in its
ethical thought. Another dualism that is characteristic of Zoroastrianism, as Malandra
(1983 :20) points out, is the opposition between matter and spirit. Malandra (1983 :20)
emphasises that this matter-spirit opposition should not be confused with the gnostic
systems that view matter as the root of all evil and spirit as purely good, as this
thinking is entirely foreign to Zoroastrianism. Quite the opposite applies, in fact, for
Ahura Mazda created a good world, and the demons (daevas) and evil creatures
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(khrafstras), as Malandra (1983:21) points out, are the work of Angra Mainyu.
Malandra (1983 :21) adds that, in Zoroastrianism, "evil is always a product of will,
never of nature". A dualism is present, however, in the sense that there is a distinction
between nature and the supernatural. This dualism is important, though often
overlooked, as it transpires that evil has no natural incarnation, and is entirely
deprived of physical existence except where physical beings choose to allow its will
to operate through them. The terms used to indicate the material and the spiritual are
complex, however, and in themselves carry a wealth of meaning completely apart
from the implications for the dualism of good and evil.
Shaked (1995:59) states that the term for spirit (Avestan mainyava-, Pahlavi menog,
'that which is non-material, non-sensual, intelligible') is sometimes best translated as
'ideal', in the sense of a conceptual prototype of a concrete existence, and its opposite
is getig (Avestan gaethya-, 'the material, earthly (world), that which can be
apprehended through the senses'). The notions of spirit and matter occupy a
prominent position, as Shaked (1995 :59-60) points out, in the Zoroastrian religion and
particularly in the later texts, but although the terms are opposites, they are neutral to
the ethical dualism of Zoroastrianism. Schwartz (1985 :641) elaborates on the usual
translation of the terms simply as 'physical' and 'spiritual' by proposing that they are
more appropriately described as the realm of the tangible and the intangible.
Schwartz (1985:641) also notes that the etymology of the term mainyava is mainyu-
(often translated 'spirit', but connected with the root man - 'to think or perceive with
the mind'), and in Old Indie manyu is a 'force, vehemence, impulse', which adds a
dimension to the interpretation of the term mainyu as applied to the twin mainyus in
the Gathas who are the creative and destructive forces. Although these definitions of
the terms are commonly used, Schwartz (1985:641) argues that mainyava may, in
fact, mean the "mentalistic or 'ideal' realm through whose workings tangible reality is
made manifest", which leads him to conclude that Ahura Mazda first made the world
in ideal (mainyava/menog) form and then in actual (geithya/getig) form. This accords
with the later tradition, according to Shaked (1995 :66), specifically the mythology of
creation in the Bundahishn that seems to interpret in temporal terms the duality of
existence, which is taken to characterise life in the world. The menog world is taken
here to precede the getig, which does not exist on its own but is foreshadowed by a
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menog prototype, from which it is derived and on which it continues to be in a sense
dependent (Shaked 1995:66).
This is reminiscent of Plato's model from which the Demiurge made the copy of
physical reality, but Plato's mistrust of physical reality and his conviction that the
material is inherently imperfect was not shared by Zoroaster. The Gathas do not have
any indication that the matter-spirit dichotomy was one of evil vs. good, yet there is a
connection with ethical dualism. As Schwartz (1985 :641) points out, evil exists in
mainyava form only, whereas the divine has its menog and its getig states. This
unusual dichotomy is perhaps an excellent example of the difference between good
and evil, which followers of the interpretation of Zoroastrianism as a strict dualism
would be hard-pressed to explain, and could be seen not as evidence that good is
'stronger' than evil, but that evil has limited scope within which to act, whereas good
can operate in both the physical and spiritual spheres.
Importantly, this ideal form of creation is its spiritual (not physical) essence, reflected
in and connected with the physical. Being ideal in the sense of being related to both
"spirit" and "mental idea", the ideal is therefore cognisable by man. This is, once
again, analogous to Plato's Idea World that can be known through metaphysical
speculation about the ideal reflected in the corporeal. Plato also saw creation as good
in its aspects that were in harmony with the perfect ideal, a concept not absent from
the Gathas either, for another dichotomy in Zoroastrianism is the opposition of asha-
and drug. As Schwartz (1985:641) notes, asha (rta) is a concept in the Indo-Iranian
tradition which combines moral and cosmic harmony or order, often translated as 'the
true' or 'truth', opposed by druh ('the false'). All these instances of dichotomy
within the Zoroastrian doctrine serve to conjure an interpretation of resounding
dualism, but are probably much more complex and interconnected ideas within a
metaphysical philosophy than simply by-products of the fight between an evil deity
and a good.
Gnoli (1987:585) believes that the most original aspects of the complex Zoroastrian
doctrine are not the cosmological concepts but the doctrines concerning the history of
the cosmos, the three stages of Bundahishn, Gumezishn and Wizarishn, and the
concept of a dual state of existence, mainyava/menog and geithya/getig. Gnoli
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(1987:585) further notes that the concept of the two states of being, "although it is
also analogous in some of its aspects to a number of Greek ideas (a fact that has led to
speculation concerning Greek influences, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, as the
doctrine is recorded systematically only in relatively late texts), is nonetheless rooted
in very early Zoroastrianism". The Gathas describe the two states of being as
"spiritual" and "with bones", e.g. with a body, and the concept of these two realms is
central to Zoroastrian thought (Gnoli 1987:585).
Zaehner (1961 :62) notes that although Zoroaster differentiated between the spiritual
and material worlds, they are not in any way antagonistic, and even tend to merge into
one another. Zoroaster's emphasis remained on the spiritual and mental (or
intellectual) world, which Zaehner (1961 :62) finds 'astonishing' given the time and
place in which Zoroaster lived, the environment having probably encouraged
consideration of only the most practical aspects of survival. The material world in the
Gathas only has reality in relation to the spiritual, according to Zaehner (1961 :62),
and itself originated from the spiritual world, as God (through his creative Spirit)
thought the material world into existence. As such, however, the material and
spiritual worlds are connected to the extent of interdependence, which creates the
platform for the 'battle' between the followers of the Lie and the followers of Truth
(Zaehner 1961 :62).
Although there is a strongly marked dualism of the spiritual and the material
throughout the Avesta, including the Gathas, Moulton (1972:147) observes that,
unlike speculative Gnosticism, matter has no inherent evil. The Gathic distinction
between "this life here of body and that of thought" (Yasna 43.3) is an antithesis that
is continued through the whole of the Parsi scriptures, but in later Zoroastrianism the
division of good and evil becomes much more intimately associated with the division
of matter and spirit (Moulton 1972:147). The Yashts, which mention "spiritual and
corporeal yazata", state that Angra Mainyu, by nature mainyava ('spiritual') only, has
a representative in the corporeal world called Azhi Dahaka. Similarly, in the
Vendidad the question "Who is absolutely a daeva? Who is before death adaeva?
Who changes after death into a spiritual daeva?" is answered by stating it is the
human being who has practised unnatural vice (Mouton 1972:147-148). This
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baseness of the physical is like the Greek dualism, but is completely alien to the
Gathas.
There is a firm distinction in the Gathas between body and spirit, but, contrary to
Plato, Zoroaster does not "reject the body in the name of the soul.[and] suggests no
renunciation, [but] preaches the maintenance of life" (Duchesne-Guillemin 1979: 159-
160). This has important implications for worship in the Zoroastrian faith, and also
for ethical acts that, within the corporeal world, entail man not only refraining from
evil acts against others, but also from evil acts against nature. In the positive and
active sense, this means tending and conserving the good creation.
Boyce (1992:94-95) notes that, in addition to showing reverence for the Amesha
Spentas by emulating the virtues they embody, a believer could also care for the
physical creations which they represent, for it was believed that the Amesha Spentas
infused the creation with their presence, an illustration of how completely interfused
the mainyava and gaethya states were considered to be. In Boyce's opinion
(1992:95), such "subtle doctrines thus became assimilable, through regular, repetitive
and significant acts, by the simplest of his followers, and the sanction of carrying out
his precepts and of serving the world of Asha, could be constant". It could also be
seen as another example of the influence of the immediate economic environment on
Zoroastrian thought, as 'care' for the environment would be an activity specific to the
settled pastoralists, and could be a rather subtle encouragement to respect the earth
which one tills, or, more explicitly, to practise proper farming techniques and
conserve the environment. There are doubtless many layers of meaning to be
interpreted in this aspect of Zoroastrian thought, but it remains foremost a particularly
admirable precept, and an unusually practical one, which illustrates the importance of
the physical application of metaphysical convictions, so often ignored in systems of
metaphysical thought. Without this consideration of implementation, doubt may be
cast on the purpose of metaphysical speculation and moral philosophy.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION
I believe that this comparison has shown, firstly, that the various methods that are
usually employed for the study of religion often ignore the speculative tradition within
religion. The speculative tradition (or philosophy) within religion can be interpreted
as a system of speculative thought apart from the religious tradition in which it
originated, or which it underlies. A case in point is Indian philosophy, which has
grown into a tradition of philosophy entirely separate from the religion in which it
originated.
Secondly, that the categorisation of social phenomena such as religion or philosophy
is artificial and that the domains of religion and philosophy, like all cultural domains,
partially overlap. This interaction (and relation) between cultural domains such as
religion and philosophy necessitates a less rigid division between the study of these
fields, though a rigid classification for the sake of convenience is understandable,
given the basic need for clarity of terminology. Research in both philosophy and
religion should not be confined to rigid classifications that define each concept.
Thirdly, that previous interpretations have overemphasised a rigid division between
many cultural domains, as well as many fields of study dealing with these cultural
domains. Reactions against this overemphasis have compounded the problem, such
as the premise in Idealism, which reacted against the overemphasis on reason and fact
in Rationalism, and postulated subjectivity instead. These extreme reactions in one
methodological approach after another, and their search for an exhaustive approach to
the study of cultural domains such as religion, have created more problems than they
have solved. I have attempted a comparison of two systems of thought based on a
method I believe to be more holistic, although not exhaustive or comprehensive of all
aspects of philosophy or religion. Although the approach I have chosen is mainly
relevant to the specific problems encountered in this comparison, the method
employed is not irrelevant to other analogous studies.
Fourthly, that the use of the relatively familiar Greek philosophical tradition (familiar,
at least, to the West), to interpret a relatively unfamiliar 'Eastern' religious tradition
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has facilitated a better understanding of the unfamiliar 'Eastern' tradition as well as a
re-evaluation and re-illumination of the familiar Greek tradition. This has hopefully
demonstrated that the larger context within which the various cultures of the ancient
world functioned is not limited to a comparison of factually verifiable contact, but
could also be extended to more abstract aspects of the societies studied, such as their
world-views or philosophies.
Fifthly, that there is a clear correlation between the speculative thought of the fifth
century philosophical tradition of Greece and the speculative thought within the
religious traditions of the ancient Near East (including India), specifically the
philosophy of Plato and the religion of Zoroaster, as found in the Timaeus and the
Gathas respectively. The lack of an overt classification of speculative thought within
the religions of the ancient world as 'philosophy' by the ancients themselves does not,
therefore, preclude a study of what is apparently philosophy within a religious
tradition. There are other undoubted instances of philosophy embedded in traditions,
such as wisdom literature, myth, law, and others, and the separate classification for
speculative thought as "philosophy" by the ancient Greeks (as well as modem
Western people) need not preclude a study of philosophy in other traditions and
cultures that did not apply such classification or separation.
Sixthly, that this correlation between the speculative thought of the fifth century
philosophical tradition of Greece and the speculative thought within the religious
traditions of the ancient Near East is apparent in various concepts that both Plato and
Zoroaster speculated about. The philosophical and religious concepts, which I believe
are illustrated as similar in both systems of thought, include speculation on the
subjects of metaphysics, the creator and his creation, the soul and dualism. I shall
briefly mention some instances of correlation in the concepts of Plato and Zoroaster
below.
Plato and Zoroaster both postulated a metaphysical reality, the Forms in Plato's case,
and the Amesha Spentas in Zoroaster's. Both the Forms and the Amesha Spentas are
terms applied to abstract concepts, values and classifications, such as order, goodness,
truth, animals, and so forth. The metaphysical concepts of both Plato and Zoroaster
are further analogous in that they are concepts that have a more ultimate reality than
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the corporeal world. The metaphysical concepts are linked to the corporeal world in
two ways, for they are both reflected in the corporeal world and are also its ideal. As
the Forms or Amesha Spentas are reflected in the corporeal world as well, proper care
of the environment and a general enhancement of the divine order through reason
(which is achieved in increasing measure the more creation resembles or reflects the
Forms or Amesha Spentas) are prescribed by both Plato and Zoroaster.
As the ideal of the corporeal world, the Forms or Amesha Spentas are to be
assimilated and emulated for the good. Creation is perfect as far as it conforms to the
Forms or Amesha Spentas. The individual, like creation, must emulate the Forms or
Amesha Spentas in order to further the perfection of his soul. The immortality or
salvation of the soul is also dependent on this perfection by emulation. The
philosophies of both Plato and Zoroaster stress the contemplation and emulation of
abstract values for attaining the good, but both philosophies also discuss the lack of
good in the soul. Plato's concept of a rational and an irrational part of the soul
corresponds to Zoroaster's belief that the soul is capable of both good and evil. The
evil in the soul is also linked to the absence of knowing the good, and therefore
choosing the good.
Each soul is capable of good, however, as it has a conscience (a daimon or a daena,
according to Plato and Zoroaster respectively). The souls that are evil are to be
punished, according to both Plato and Zoroaster, and the form this punishment is to
take is similar in both philosophies. In Plato's doctrine, the soul is doomed to the
wheel of incarnation, and the form of its reincarnation is dependent on its previous
life. If it led an evil life, it would therefore be reincarnated as something suited to the
nature and extent of that evil. In Zoroaster's doctrine, the soul is also punished
according to the extent of its evil, for it is met in the afterlife by its daena, or
conscience, which will torment it if it has been corrupted by the soul's evil during its
life. Both philosophies therefore postulate punishment for evil according to what the
soul deserves, or has brought on itself.
The purgation of evil is also a concept important to both philosophers. Plato believed
that the soul would be reincarnated until it managed to live a good life three times in
succession, thereby proving its purity and freeing it from further punishment by
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incarnation. Although it is not certain whether Zoroaster taught that evil souls would
be purged of their evil and finally escape their hell, he certainly believed that creation
itself would eventually be purged of all its evil and become the perfect entity the
creator originally had in mind.
Plato, however, saw evil as inherent in the corporeal, whereas Zoroaster saw evil as a
purely spiritual force. Plato did not postulate the perfection of creation, therefore, but
both Plato and Zoroaster believed that the world was created by an agent who was
good and had only good as his purpose in creating. The creation is the result of a
process of thought and good action on the part of the creator. The creator is identified
not only with the good, but also with "mind", and can be discovered through "mind"
or "intelligence". It is through the operation of mind or intelligence that the creator
creates the world. The imperfection of the world, and the evil in it, is therefore not to
be considered as having originated with the creator. Instead, evil is that which is
opposite to the creative force, in that it is identified by both Plato and Zoroaster as
something inherently destructive and chaotic (since it is opposed to order).
There are differences in the type of dualism postulated by Plato as opposed to the
dualism postulated by Zoroaster, but both believed that evil is destructive to the good
creation, and inherent in the soul that does not know the good nor act according to the
good. Although good thought is of paramount importance, the actions that are
necessarily influenced by thought (or lack of it) are also very important, and both
philosophies had a highly developed system of ethics. Moreover, evil is identified
with ignorance (of the good) in both philosophies. The concept of the soul as
immortal, thinking, autonomous, capable of moral decision and accountable for any
action that it causes, was also propounded by both. The concepts of the afterlife of
the soul are therefore dependent solely on ethical thought and action (which are, in
tum, the result of knowledge of the good and choice exercised by free will to
participate in the good), and not on social status or propitiation of the gods.
Additionally, both had concepts of socio-political reform as a necessary extension of
the ethical concepts pertaining to the soul of the individual, and a concept of the
society as a microcosm of the macroeosmie cosmos.
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The good (or evil) of the cosmos was not linked to the creator of this cosmos by either
Plato or Zoroaster, however, and the accent on dualism remains ethical. Both Plato
and Zoroaster believed in two opposing principles of good and evil, but since this
. concept did not extend to their concept of God, they seem to display a theological
monotheism, namely a belief in one good and supreme god, alongside an ethical
dualism. In Plato's case this dualism is an opposition between the spiritual and the
material (an opposition of body and soul or matter and mind). In Zoroaster's case this
is an opposition between two spirits or two mentalities (an opposition, physically, of
creative and destructive action and, ethically, of truthful and deceitful action), but
both Plato and Zoroaster also had a dualistic concept of the fluctuating and the static.
Despite the importance of the opposition between good and evil in both philosophies,
the supremacy of the good remains a central concept for both.
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